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ABSTRACT
The primary purpose of this study was to investigate how systems of racial
inequality and dominance produced at macro-institutional level discourses are reproduced
and/or challenged in micro-interpersonal everyday discourses regarding
immigration/foreign workers in the U.S. and in Japan. To establish a link between the
discourses at these two levels, I employed a combination of critical and interpretive
theoretical perspectives, and analyzed how racial ideologies were reproduced and/or
challenged through participants’ use of various interpretative repertoires (i.e., discursive
themes and specific rhetorical moves therein) and positioning of self and Others.
Interpretative repertoires and discursive positioning of self and Others are major
analytical frameworks of discursive psychology that were developed by Wetherell and
Potter (1992), and I employed their discursive psychological analysis as the methodology
for this study.
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The present study included 14 pairs of self-identified white Americans in the U.S.
and 17 pairs of self-identified Japanese in Japan. I provided each pair with a discussion
guide and asked the participants to record their 30-60 min long private conversations
regarding immigration/foreign worker issues using the discussion guide that I provided.
The analysis of the participants’ interpersonal discourses demonstrated the
existence and significance of the dialectical relationship between macro and micro level
discourses regarding racial ideologies. In addition, the juxtaposition of discourses of
countries with different historical and sociopolitical contexts indicated the importance of
taking historical and sociopolitical contexts into account to understand the process of
reproducing systems of inequalities and dominance. Although similar discursive patterns
were recognized, such as erasure of race and positioning of positive-self and
negative-Others, the analysis showed that different backgrounds provide unique kinds of
interpretative repertoires as resources to maintain and/or challenge dominant racial
ideologies. The present results imply that successive studies on racialized discourses
about immigration/foreign workers in the U.S. and Japan are necessary. Given the rapidly
changing immigration policies and racial dynamics in the U.S. and Japan, it is important
to track the reproduction of systemic racism and changes over time.
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Chapter I: Introduction and Theoretical Perspectives
Immigration has become an important issue because it affects virtually every
aspect of life in America. With more than a million legal and illegal immigrants
settling in the United States each year, immigration has an impact on education,
health care, government budgets, employment, the environment, crime and
countless other areas of American life. It is evident to most Americans that
large-scale immigration is not serving the needs and interests of the country.
(FAIR, n.d.a)
In 2007, Southern Poverty Law Center released a list of 14 anti-immigrant
organizations as active U.S. hate groups on its website (Southern Poverty Law Center,
2007). The quotation cited above was retrieved from the website of one of the listed
organizations called “Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR:
http://www.fairus.org).” This non-profit organization with more than 198,000 members
across the nation calls for a temporary moratorium on all immigration, both legal and
illegal, to “regain control of our borders” (FAIR, n.d.a). As can be seen in the quotation,
FAIR attributes multiple problems in society to an increasing number of immigrants and
creates immigrants as threats or burdens to the nation. Given the demographic
composition of the current immigrant population in the U.S. that includes a high
percentage of immigrants from Mexico specifically and Latin America in general, it can
be assumed that their negative attitudes and exclusionary practices are geared toward
Mexican/Latin American immigrants. While being explicit about their anti-immigrant
position and nativistic attitudes, FAIR emphasizes equality under the law. One of the
seven principles of the “true” comprehensive immigration reform that FAIR suggests is
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that “there should be no favoritism toward or discrimination against any person on the
basis of race, color, or nationality…we should abolish special preference such as the
Cuban Adjustment Act.” (FAIR, n.d.b, p.2)
The discursive pattern or strategy that renders immigrants as negative elements
to the nation occurs alongside a denial of being “racist.” For example, FAIR creates
immigrants as threats to the U.S. job market and economy.
Because many of today’s immigrants are low-skilled, mass immigration brings
competition for entry-level jobs, harming American low-skilled workers.
Because most of today’s immigrants are poor, they are a drain on our fiscal
resources and our economy. (FAIR, n.d.b)
This discursive pattern is not exclusively employed by extremists or radical right
wing groups such as FAIR; it is actually a common discursive practice evident in public
texts as well as everyday discourses that serves a hidden racist agenda of the nation and
society. In contrast to the traditional concept of racism or racist practices during the
period of colonization, slavery and Jim Crow, contemporary racism and racist practices
are less blatant, more ambiguous and covert (Billig, 1988; Every & Augoustinos, 2007).
Discursive practices of contemporary racism can be also observed in Japan, the
nation where there still is a pervasive notion of racial/ethnic homogeneity. With an
increasing number of foreign workers in the nation, similar discursive patterns have
emerged in immigration discourses in Japan. In similar ways to how immigrants are
characterized in FAIR’s discourses, foreign workers/ residents in Japan are likely to be
rendered as potential threats to the nation. One example is the statements made by the
Ministry of Economy, Trade & Industry of Japan (hereafter METI). Recognizing that
2

accepting foreign workers as one possibility to deal with the need to increase the labor
force, METI presents their reluctance toward admitting foreigners due to a concern about
increased criminal activity.
More and more people are concerned about conflicts based on different cultures
and customs in communities and about increasing criminal cases such as robbery.
In recent years, due to rapidly increasing admissions of foreign exchange
students and trainees, we have witnessed more cases including illegal labor and
criminal offenses (Ministry of Economy, Trade & Industry, 2005, translated by
the author).
In addition to constructing foreign workers in Japan as a cause of troubles in
communities and as criminals, they are positioned as an economic and social burden in
METI’s statement.
Generally, they [foreign workers] are employed as low-wage workers, and
because of their needs to send their money back home, there is a gap in
economic affluence between them and neighboring Japanese. Especially, a sense
of distrust caused by a lack of communication due to [their] low Japanese
language level prevents the unity of local communities. In addition, there are
issues regarding unpaid social security insurance fees….local governments are
bearing a heavier burden. It is possible that this leads to an increase of social
costs including pensions and welfare services (Ministry of Economy, Trade, &
Industry, 2005, translated by the author).
Such discursive patterns also emerge not only in these governmental discourses
in Japan. A public poll conducted by the Cabinet Office of Japan (May, 2006) regarding
3

admission of foreign workers also reflects negative attitudes toward increasing foreign
workers in Japan. Of those who expressed their opinion that “Japan should admit
foreigners with professional skills, techniques, and knowledge, but should not admit
foreign workers for menial jobs” (537 people); 74.1% expressed their apprehension about
“deteriorating public safety;” 49.3% said that it might trigger “more troubles in local
communities;” and, 40.8% of them thought that admission of foreign workers may
“increase the unemployment rate among Japanese.” (p.2). Though there is a color-line
between Japanese and foreign workers, and also between foreign workers in professional
fields and those with menial jobs, issues of “race” never appear in Japanese discourses on
immigration/ admission of foreign workers.
Various discourse analytical studies on contemporary racism have demonstrated
that negative discursive presentation of immigrants as racial “Others”, along with denial
of racism, are pervasive strategies that construct and perpetuate dominant racial
ideologies as well as sustain the status of elites in various western societies, including the
U.S. (e.g. Bonilla-Silva, 2001, 2006; Flores, 2003; Santa Ana, 1999), the U.K. (Billig,
1998; Lynn and Lea, 2003; van Dijk, 1995; 2000), and the Netherlands (e.g. van Dijk,
1992; 1995). These studies reveal the function of macro-level institutional and public
discourses, such as governmental discourses or media discourses, that produce, maintain,
or challenge the dominant racial ideologies: The dominant racial ideologies rationalize
and justify hegemonic social systems of racial inequalities and domination (Bonilla-Silva,
2001; 2006).
One understudied area in terms of discursive reproduction of racial ideologies
and racist social systems is the arena of interpersonal discourses. I believe that
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interpersonal discourses, as well as macro/institutional-level discourses, play a key role in
reproducing, maintaining, or challenging the racial status quo. Since macro-level
institutional discourses and micro-interpersonal level discourses are interdependent
(Essed, 1999), it is imperative to examine the connection between the discourse at the
two different levels to understand how contemporary racism is discursively produced and
reproduced and what kinds of roles do these discourses play (Halualani, Fassett, Morrison,
& Dodge, 2006). Therefore, this study investigates how racial ideologies that sustain and
justify systems of racial inequality and dominance in society are reproduced in dyadic
interpersonal discourses regarding immigration/foreign workers in the U.S. and in Japan.
There are several reasons why I chose these two countries. First of all, the U.S.
and Japan are the two nations with which I affiliate as a Japanese Ph.D. student in the U.S.
As I learned the connection between immigration discourses and racism in the U.S., I
started questioning the lack of recognition and research on the same issue in Japan. Since
scholars have given attention to how institutional/public discourses construct and sustain
a racial hierarchy and inequality in the U.S., I believe that comparing U.S. and Japanese
discourses allows me to demonstrate the existence of racist systems in Japan. This is
important because the myth of Japan as a race-less society is pervasive. Second,
juxtaposing discourses from different nations allows me to understand how the discursive
processes of reproducing racial ideologies are influenced and constrained by particular
historical/socio-political contexts. It is beneficial to investigate how discursive practices
in nations with different historical and sociopolitical contexts regarding immigration to
identify what kinds of racial ideologies are reproduced and perpetuated in both nations,
and what these discursive practices achieve in the respective societies. Lastly, given the
5

relationship between immigration and globalization, it is useful to examine how the
different nations and their citizens attempt to deal with the dilemma of economic needs
and nativism, and how they discursively justify or legitimate their attitudes and opinions
regarding immigration and foreign workers.
Specifically, the primary goals of this study are: 1) to establish a link between
the reproduction of the systems of racial inequality at macro-institutional levels and
micro-interpersonal-levels by combining critical and interpretive theoretical perspectives,
2) to investigate how specific language use in dyadic interpersonal discourses reproduces,
maintains or challenges dominant racial ideologies, and 3) to examine how positioning of
self and Others in interpersonal dyadic discourses recreates and sustains systems of racial
inequality in the U.S. and in Japan.
Below I discuss the theoretical rationale of combining a critical and an
interpretive approach in investigating dyadic interpersonal discourse regarding
immigration/foreign worker issues in the U.S. and in Japan. First, I refer to the major
tenets of each perspective. Then I outline why I focus on the social construction of racial
ideologies and positioning of “self” and “Others” in dyadic discourses. I also define
several important concepts and describe theoretical frameworks and key constructs for
this study including “racialized social systems” (Bonilla-Silva, 1996; 2001; 2006).
Combination of Critical and Interpretive Perspectives
As researchers who investigate racism and racial inequality through analyzing
discourses argue (e.g. Essed, 1991; van Dijk, 1992; 1993; 1995; Wetherell & Potter,
1992; Moss & Faux, 2006), I believe that systems of racism and racial inequality in
society are reproduced and sustained at both macro-institutional levels and at
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micro-interpersonal levels, and there is a “dialectical relationship” between the processes
at these levels (Fairclough, 2003; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). In other words, the
systems of inequality and domination created at the macro-level are reproduced,
perpetuated, or challenged in dyadic interpersonal discourses, but at the same time, the
discursive practices at micro-interpersonal level are constrained and enabled by social
structural forces, institutional practices, and ideologies produced at the macro level
(Fairclough, 2003; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). Therefore, to understand hegemonic
systems of racial inequality and domination regarding immigration issues/foreign worker
issues in the U.S. and Japan, it is imperative to pay attention to both macro-institutional
and micro-interpersonal contexts.
To analyze the process of discursive reproduction of the systems of domination,
Potter and Wetherell (1992) delineate the three steps. First, researchers should analyze the
social and historical contexts and macro-level institutional practices. Second, detailed
analysis of linguistic and rhetorical moves in interpersonal discourses and patterns of
discourses should be conducted. Lastly, it is necessary to connect the first process and the
second process. In order to establish the links between the practices of reproducing racial
ideologies that sustain and reproduce hegemonic social structure at macro and micro level,
I believe that taking both critical and interpretive approaches is appropriate.
The major tenets of a critical perspective and a theoretical framework that
uncovers “a racialized social system” guide me to understand systemic and hegemonic
aspects of systems of racial inequality. Also, theoretical assumptions of an interpretive
perspective allow me to focus on dyadic interpersonal discourses, relational dynamics,
and discursive positioning.
7

Major Tenets of a Critical Perspective in Current Study
The major concern of critical research is to uncover hegemonic social structure
by focusing on different degrees of agency, ideologies, and systems of dominance and
exploitation in specific contexts, with an underlying goal of bringing about possible
change into society (Collier, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 1998; Martin & Nakayama, 2004).
Hegemony is defined as the process in which dominant group’s ideas, rules, and practices
are consolidated as “common sense” through consent instead of coercion (Gramsci, 1971;
Omi & Winant, 1994). Based on a combination of social constructionist and materialist
ontology and historical realist epistemology, critical researchers assume that realities and
identities are socially, historically, and ideologically constructed, while the construction
of realities and identities are constrained and enabled by social, political, and historical
contexts (Giddens, 1976). Therefore, critical research mainly focuses on macro-contexts,
such as historical and political backgrounds, socio-economic conditions, or institutional
practices and discourses including legislative documents and mass media texts.
Though my primary analytical focus is specific language use and positioning
process in interpersonal dyadic discourses, I believe that it is impossible to detach
discursive practices at the interpersonal level from the macro contexts in which the
discourses are situated. Specifically, macro-contexts are important for understanding the
issues of immigration/admission of foreign workers, because these issues are deeply
embedded into national and international history, politics, and socio-economic conditions
and other institutional practices in the U.S. and in Japan. By taking these macro-contexts
into account, I am able to identify how specific discourses of immigration/foreign
workers are constructed, reproduced, naturalized, or resisted in certain sociopolitical and
8

historical contexts, as well as how structural and institutional forces enable or constrain
certain ideologies and positioning of self and Others in interpersonal dyadic discourses.
To understand the reproduction mechanism of systems of racial inequality and
domination at the macro-level, the concept of a racialized social system theorized by
Bonilla-Silva (1996; 2001; 2006) is central. The idea of racialized social systems is a
helpful framework from a critical perspective because it incorporates many significant
concepts that critical scholars focus on, such as hegemonic systems of dominance in
society, ideologies, and agency. The theory of racialized social systems explains well the
process in which hegemonic social structures regarding race relations and the concept of
“race” keep reproducing themselves through various mechanisms, how ideologies act in
the process, and how the systems determine, protect, and constrain levels of agency of
different racial group members.
Racialized Social Systems
Bonilla-Silva (1996) defines racialized social systems as “societies in which
economic, political, social, and ideological levels are partially structured by the
placement of actors in racial categories” (p.469). The notable aspect of this framework is
that it brings “race” into the center. The centrality of race in various social issues is
oftentimes problematically blurred, obscured and made invisible through various
institutional and individual practices in the current society which regards race-related
topics as taboo. This framework delineates the invisible mechanisms (especially to the
dominant group members) that reproduce the structures. Based on Bonilla-Silva’s
literature about racialized social systems (1996; 2001; 2006), I selected the following
three mechanisms as relevant to the current study because they are the primary ones that
9

keep reproducing the system itself: 1) constructing the concept of race and racial
hierarchy, 2) providing different amounts of rewards to different racial groups, and 3)
generating racial ideology.
Construction of race and racial hierarchy. As seen in the definition of
racialized social systems cited above, a racialized social system categorizes people into
different racial groups, but at the same time, the racial categories are also constructed by
the racialized social system. Of importance here is that the process of categorizing people
into different groups cannot be neutral; racial categories are arranged hierarchically.
Racial categories are not static entities, because they have been constructed and
transformed historically, socially, politically, and ideologically (Omi & Winant, 1994).
The dominant racial group is always constructed as “normal and standard” at the top of
the hierarchy, while “non-dominant” racial groups are constructed as “abnormal” or even
“unhuman” below the dominant racial group(s) (Mills, 1997). The construction of and
qualification of dominant race are constantly shifting in the practices of constructing
“opposing,” “deviant,” and “exceptional” races in society (Mills, 1997; Omi & Winant,
1994; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). “Race,” thus, is not a biological concept, such as skin
colors and hair textures, but a sociopolitical concept (Mills, 1997).
Another important aspect of the construction of race and what makes this
framework fit in a critical perspective is that this framework regards race not as a mere
social identity construction. Once created, racial categories become “real” and they
influence actor’s life chances, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors (Mills, 1997). For example,
in U.S. history of categorizing race groups, a criterion of the “one drop rule” used to be
employed to construct the black race. On the other hand, however, a blood quantum
10

system was utilized to define Native Americans (Sturm, 2002; Snipp, 2002). These
practices produced more lower-caste blacks to be exploited and fewer Native Americans
who claimed their land back from the dominant white group. Thus, the U.S. racialized
social system provides the dominant group(s) a right to define racial Others, and to
sustain their white position and status in society. It also reifies socially and ideologically
constructed racial categories that act to constrain Others’ life chances and practices.
Providing different amounts of rewards. Based on these racial categorizations
that are historically, socially, and ideologically constructed, a racialized social system
provides different amounts of material, as well as psychological, rewards to different
racial groups (Bonilla-Silva, 1996; 2001; 2006). Since the system is hierarchical, it
institutionally provides more rewards to dominant racial groups (Mills, 1997;
Bonilla-Silva, 1996; 2001; 2006). The different amount of rewards can be observed in the
differences of income level, educational attainment, political representations, social
mobility, and disparity of wealth among others (Bonilla-Silva, 1996; 2001; 2006). In the
U.S., for instance, the median income of black households is 60% as much as
non-Hispanic white households; furthermore, 25.8% of blacks and 25.3% of Hispanics
live under the poverty line, while 9.4% of non-Hispanic whites do; also, 32.4% of
Hispanics are without health insurance, while 12% of non-Hispanic whites are (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2010a). The 2009 unemployment rate for blacks is 12.3%, while it is
7.3% for whites; additionally 12.5% of Hispanic males, 14% of Hispanic females, 17.8%
of black males, and 20.6% of black females have bachelor’s degree, while 30.6% of
white males and 29.3% of white females do. Finally, 36% of blacks’ home purchase loans
were denied, while 17% of white’s were denied (U.S. Census bureau, 2011).
11

Though detailed statistics across different racial groups are not available in Japan,
data shows that the Japanese average income is higher than that of non Japanese. While
the average monthly income of Japanese workers in manufacturing is ¥358,000
(approximately $3500), Nikkeijin (Japanese who migrated from Brazil or Peru) male
workers’ who work in manufacturing have an average monthly income of ¥293,000.
Technical trainees in manufacturing, mostly those from other Asian countries, earn
¥145,000 per month (Bank of Japan, 2008).
Thus, as Mills (1997) argues in his book, the Racial Contract, all whites
(Japanese, in the Japanese case) are structural beneficiaries of this racial contract, though
not all of them are willing to sign it. This concept illustrates that a racialized social
system structurally and systemically provides the dominant racial group unearned
privileges and “wages” that “non-dominant” racial groups are not allowed to have
(Jackson, 2002, McIntosh, 1988; Roediger, 1991). This system represents that the system
of racial inequality and dominance is hegemonic – the dominance is not achieved by
force or coercion but by making different racial group members consent to their position
and different amounts of rewards that accompany the position (Gramsci, 1971).
In addition to the different amounts of rewards, a racialized social system
provides different degrees of agency to dominant group members and non-dominant
group members. Agency refers to the intersection of the contextual factors that enable and
constrain, and freedom of choice and the capacity to act (Hegde, 1996). Scholars working
within a critical perspective assume that people have a different degree of agency and
various social contexts and ideologies, which are oftentimes invisible or hidden, privilege
and/or constrain certain group member’s agency over others (Collier, 2006).
12

The different degrees of agency a racialized social system provides determines
whose interests are normalized or institutionalized in society. The idea of racialized social
systems assumes that different racial groups develop different group interests based on
the different rewards that the system provides: The dominant group’s interest is to sustain
their privileges and non-dominant racial groups’ interests are changing their position in
society (Bonilla-Silva, 1996; 2001; 2006). However, since a racialized social system
provides different degrees of agency to dominant and marginalized racial groups, the
dominant group’s interests become institutionalized and naturalized as “normal” and
“universal” interests, while marginalized racial group’s voices are restricted and
diminished.
Derrick Bell (1980; 1992) argues that marginalized racial groups’ interests are
recognized or accommodated only when they match those of dominant white members;
he refers to this as “interest convergence” (Bell, 1980; 1992). In U.S. history, for example,
desegregation of schools was achieved because it benefited both whites and non-whites:
After the law of segregated schooling was abolished, maintaining a segregated school
costs more than desegregating because whites-only schools would receive less
governmental funding than integrated schools (Bell, 1980). Not only these material
interests, but also psychological interests – not appearing as a “racist school,” for
example – were met by desegregating.
Generating racial ideologies. The third mechanism of a racialized social system
to reproduce itself is generating racial ideologies. Racial ideologies are constructed and
employed by dominant group members to justify and legitimate their domination and
racial status quo, and they are used by marginalized members to resist the domination
13

(Bonilla-Silva, 1996; 2001; 2006). Thus, any racial groups can construct racial ideologies,
but due to the different degree of agency that a racialized social system provides them,
the dominant group’s racial ideologies become “common-sense” in society. A critical
perspective is appropriate to understand how the dominant group’s ideology becomes
“common-sense” through various macro-institutional level practices, for instance,
through media representation of racial Others (Hall, 1997; van Dijk, 1992; 1993; 1995),
educational discourse that reproduces color-blind ideologies in the U.S. (Du Bois, 1965;
Bonilla-Silva, 2001), in the UK and in the Netherlands (van Dijk, 1992; 1995), and
immigration policy that reproduces racial purity and xenophobia in Japan (Shipper, 2002;
Shikama, 2005).
From a perspective of racialized social systems, such a systemic ideological
process is considered as racism, that is, racism can be defined as ideological dimension of
a racialized social system. As Bonilla Silva (1996; 2001; 2006) and Omi and Winant
(1994) critique, racism is often treated as free-floating ideology, a psychological
phenomena, prejudicial attitudes or extreme overt discriminatory behavior, and also
researchers tend to study it as a static phenomena from a functionalist perspective by
using measurements developed in the 1950s or 1960s (Bonilla-Silva, 2001). On the
contrary, racism has structural roots yet is flexible. For example, during the slavery or
Jim Crow era, the dominant U.S. ideology was biological inferiority of blacks and
superiority of whites that justified owning slaves and the segregation policy. However, in
the contemporary period, the dominant ideology is less blatant and overt; racism has
transformed into being more covert and hegemonic in the U.S. (Bonilla-Silva, 1996;
2001; 2006, Omi & Winant, 1994). Hence, a critical perspective is appropriate in
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capturing the fluid nature of the systems of racial inequality and dominance due to its
emphasis on the macro-level contexts.
Although the macro-level institutional discourses and practices are not the major
analytical focus of this study, it is important to incorporate the macro-level aspects of the
system of racial inequality and domination in order to situate interpersonal discourses in
historical, political, and economic contexts of respective countries to uncover how the
system of domination functions to sustain and reproduce itself at micro-interpersonal
level. As has been noted, a critical approach allows researchers to situate immigration/
foreign worker discourses in historical and socio-political context and to understand how
hegemonic racial hierarchies and systems of racism are produced and sustained at
macro-level. Of importance here is that the systems of dominance/racial inequality are
not only reproduced at macro-level, such as through governmental policy, education, or
religious institution, but also at micro-interpersonal level; interpersonal discourses are the
location in which dominant ideologies are reproduced, sustained, perpetuated,
transformed, and challenged (Essed, 1991; van Dijk, 1992; 1993; 1995; Moss & Faux,
2006; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). In addition to the studies of macro-level discourses,
therefore, investigating the specific process of reproducing systems of racial inequality
and domination at the interpersonal micro-level is necessary. To pay attention to these
specific discursive practices, rhetorical and semantic components of the process, an
interpretive approach is appropriate.
Major Tenets of an Interpretive Perspective
The primary purposes of interpretive research are to understand and describe
intersubjective meanings, rules, identities, and social positioning that are constructed
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through interpersonal interactions, and also to investigate the construction process
(Collier, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 1998; Martin & Nakayama, 2004). Thus, this
perspective is appropriate in investigating the specific process of constructing realities
and meanings and making sense of them through interpersonal discursive practices. For
this study, an interpretive perspective guides me to put focus on the specific process of
constructing, perpetuating, or challenging the dominant ideologies by analyzing the
specific rhetorical moves individuals take in their interpersonal dyadic discourses, as well
as those in positioning themselves and “Others.” Taking an interpretive perspective, I can
demonstrate the important role that interpersonal dyadic discourses play in reproducing
dominant ideologies and sustaining hegemonic systems of racial inequality and
domination in conversations that are more private and less public.
Importance of investigating interpersonal discourses. In her book,
Understanding Everyday Racism, Essed (1991) defines “everyday racism” as a process of
integrating macro-level racist practices into everyday practices that reinforce the
underlying power dynamics in society, and she claims the significance of everyday
conversation in the reproduction of a social system of racism. Essed (1991) and other
discourse analysts whose concern is racial inequality and dominance focus on the
interpersonal discursive reproduction of social systems, especially the process of
reproducing and perpetuating dominant racial ideologies. They examine various
“interpretative repertoires,” which are resources of symbols and meanings that
individuals can use to justify and legitimate their version of realities (Potter & Wetherell,
1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). For example, Bonilla-Silva’s study (2006) demonstrates
that there are four major themes that people draw on in reproducing color-blind ideology,
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a dominant racial ideology of contemporary U.S. society: 1) abstract liberalism, which is
a combination of economic and political liberalism that values equal rights, equal
opportunity, freedom of choice, and meritocracy, 2) naturalization, which allows
individuals to construct racial phenomena as natural, 3) cultural racism, which attributes
racial problems to marginalized groups” cultures, and, 4) minimization of racism, which
denies the significance of race, and constructs racism as either a thing in the past or
practices of groups of racist individuals (Bonilla-Silva, 2006). In a similar light,
Wetherell and Potter (1992) found three different interpretative repertoires (culture as
therapy, culture as heritage, and culture as ideology) that Pakeha New Zealanders, the
white dominant group, use to justify their racist attitudes or practices against Maoris.
Also, Dixon, Foster, Durrheim, and Wilbraham (1994) propose that white South Africans
drew on “ecological discourse” when they justified their opposition against governmental
plans to expand the boundaries of a black squatter camp into white areas of residence.
The studies cited above demonstrate that interpersonal discourses play an
important role in reproducing and perpetuating dominant racial ideologies that sustain
and protect systems of racial inequality and dominance in society. Given the importance
of discursive reproduction of ideologies, van Dijk (1995) contends that discourse analysis
is actually an ideological analysis. Ideology is not a mere reflection of social structure; it
constitutes the social structure thorough discursive practices (van Dijk, 1995). Therefore,
through investigating what kind of interpretative repertoires and rhetorical tools people
use in reproducing racial ideologies in the U.S. and in Japan regarding
immigration/foreign workers issues, my research can contribute to the body of research
on discursive reproduction of racism. In addition to the focus on interpretative repertoires
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(outlined in more detail in the next chapter), I emphasize the discursive positioning of
self and “Others” in dyadic discourses as a mechanism of reproduction of racial
inequality and domination in society.
Negotiation of Intersecting Multiple Identities
An important aspect of my interpretive and critical perspective is that I assume
that individuals construct multiple realities and multiple identities and also that these
identity positions are historically, politically, and ideologically constrained and enabled
by various social structural forces (Miller, 2005; Martin & Nakayama, 2004). This
assumption is important in this study because of the following reasons. First, given the
goals of my study, I believe that individuals’ cultural identities should not be essentialized
nor are monocultural approaches that isolate race or nationality appropriate. I cannot
reduce people’s cultural identities into one racial identity that I ascribe to them.
Individuals’ cultural identities are multiple and intersecting, representations of Others
produce material consequences, and people negotiate different identities across different
situational and sociopolitical contexts (Collier, 1998; 2005). Therefore, it is necessary to
give attention to how participants discursively negotiate intersecting identities such as
race, nationality, ethnicity, gender, and class.
Second, negotiation of cultural identity positions and hierarchies that occur
through ascription and avowal is contingent upon the context of immigration/foreign
workers (Shome 2003; Flores, 2003). In postcolonial and critical media studies, scholars
demonstrate that immigrants’ bodies and border spaces are racialized and gendered
through the practices regarding sovereignty and territoriality (Flores, 2003; Root, 1996;
Shome, 2003). Also, given the fact that immigrants/ foreign workers are positioned into
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different racial categories and provided different opportunities for and material rewards
from these categories such as jobs and income, these categories encourage different
degrees of agency. Therefore, it is obvious that race and class positioning are intertwined.
Thus, in understanding dyadic interpersonal discourses regarding immigration/foreign
workers in the U.S. and in Japan, it is important to pay attention to how dominant group
members in the respective country avow and negotiate their own intersecting identities,
as well as what kind of identities they ascribe to racial “Others.”
Positioning of Self and Others
In the previous section about dyadic interpersonal discourses, referring to the
concept of racialized social systems, I argue that systems of racial inequality and
dominance are sustained and protected partly through the process of discursive
reproduction of dominant racial ideologies. People achieve this by drawing on certain
interpretive repertoires or themes. Another mechanism that sustains the social system of
racism is the positioning of “self” and “Others.” These positionings construct and
perpetuate dominant ideologies, while the dominant ideologies constrain the process of
positioning; this dual structure keeps reproducing hegemonic systems of racial inequality.
It is important to investigate the positioning of self and Others in understanding
the reproduction process of the system of racial inequality and domination due to the
hegemonic nature of the systems. As Bonilla-Silva (1996; 2001; 2006) argues,
contemporary racial domination and control is achieved in a hegemonic way, that is, by
consent rather than coercion or violence (Gramsci, 1971). In order to maintain hegemony,
social structures require people to accept their positioning in the system (Bonilla-Silva,
1996; 2001; 2006), which is not a neutral process but a hierarchical one. Namely,
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hegemonic social systems of race relations always produce “positive us” and “negative
Others” and they reinforce dominant ideologies in society.
As well as the reproduction of racial ideologies, positioning is also practiced at
both macro and micro level. In terms of macro-level positioning, van Dijk (1992; 1993)
contends that the strategy of constructing “positive self” and “negative Others” is
commonly used in various institutional discourses. For example, in his study of “elite
discourse” in Great Britain, van Dijk (1992; 1993) argues that in media messages
favorable terms are mostly used for whites, while foreigners are represented as strange,
dangerous, and criminals. It is because elite groups in society have a social/political
position that allows access to the process of meaning making and gives the right to make
institutional decisions, whereas marginalized groups do not have access to the institutions
and resources to represent themselves (van Dijk, 1992; 1993). In a similar light, van Dijk
(1995) argues that Dutch educational discourses produce whites as positive, tolerant, and
normal, while immigrants are portrayed as conducting criminal activities and deviant in
society. This occurs through the production and selection of textbooks, educational TV
programs, children’s books, and school curriculums designed predominantly by white
educational administrators. In another study, van Dijk (2000a) investigated political
debate on immigration and asylum seekers at British House of Commons in 1997, and his
analysis revealed that “positive us” and “negative Others” was a common form in use.
While asylum seekers were constructed as “bogus, illegal, criminal, parasites that cost ‘us’
and break ‘our’ norms,” British people were constructed as “poor old taxpayers” (p.104)
and any British behaviors that could be considered negative were blurred with
euphemisms or legalism.
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The research of van Dijk (1992; 1995; 2000a, 2000b) demonstrates that it is a
common strategy to position self as positive and Others as negative in public institutional
levels, such as political discourses. However, this strategy is also employed at the micro
interpersonal level to justify and legitimate the racial status quo and to maintain social
systems of inequality and domination. For example, Bonilla-Silva’s (2006) interview
study reveals that many white U.S. participants use the strategy of “blaming the victim”
in explaining the racial inequalities, in which speakers argue that “we” are tolerant and
understanding “non-racists” and “they” are the ones who make up racist issues, which
actually do not exist. This finding corresponds with the finding of Wetherell and Potter
(1992) that white Pakeha New Zealanders position themselves as “non-racists” and
“positive” by using the disclaimers such as “I’m not a racist but…” or “I have nothing
against Maoris” while constructing Maoris as negative by saying they are the actual
racists or “alcoholics,” “backwards,” or “welfare dependents.” In the same vein, Moss
and Faux (2006) in their study on discourses of 34 paired white U.S. American college
students, demonstrated that when students talk about scholarships for minority students,
they constructed themselves as “intelligent and qualified” while producing minority
students as “unqualified but the system privileges them.”
The studies cited above not only demonstrate how dominant racial group
members position themselves and racial Others at both macro and micro levels, but they
also reveal the consequences of the use of “positive-self” and “negative Other” strategy
in discourses. Namely, by positioning the dominant group as “positive” and Others as
“negative” in everyday interpersonal discourses as well as institutional discourses, the
dominant group members can remain unnamed and invisible (Billig, 1988). By keeping
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the dominant position as unnamed, naturalized, and invisible in society, dominant group
members can maintain their unearned privileges (McIntosh, 1988).
In investigating the positioning of “self” and “Others,” it is important to pay
attention to the intersecting multiple identities. As Essed (1991) argues, individuals
negotiate intersecting positions in certain discourses, and power is exercised in the
negotiation of multiple positions. For example, a white male U.S. American who is from
an upper-class family may position himself differently from a white female U.S.
American who is from lower-class family. Therefore, it is reductionist to lump together
all white U.S. Americans or Japanese in investigations of their views of self and Others.
Though there are group categorizations that are positioned as more dominant given that
these result from being structural beneficiaries of a racialized social system (Mills, 1997),
essentializing the dominant group (or the subordinant group) might make researchers fail
to find discursive points of resistance, or moments of reification of the status quo. Further
such essentializing may pre-empt identifying contested and contradictory discursive
positions based on multiple categorizations of immigrant or naturalized status, level of
professional status, race, and sex.
It is important to note here that I recognize the need to connect the findings
regarding discursive construction and reproduction of racial ideologies and positioning of
self and Others at the dyadic interpersonal micro level to the reproduction of the system
of racial inequality and dominance at macro-institutional level. I give attention to
macro-level discourses of immigration/foreign workers in the U.S. and in Japan as
contextual features to situate the interpersonal dyadic discourses into macro-contexts.
Also, given my role as an interpretive/critical researcher, I articulate and critique the
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negative consequences of particular discursive practices in terms of immigration/foreign
workers in the U.S. and in Japan. In this way I can contribute to knowledge that may
destabilize academic discourse that has not sufficiently established the link between
macro and micro discourses regarding immigration/foreign workers.
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Chapter II: Contexts of Immigration/Foreign Workers in the U.S. and in Japan
In order to connect interpersonal dyadic discourses regarding the issues and the
contexts to which the discourses belong, it is imperative to understand the social and
historical contexts of immigration and admission of foreign workers. Therefore, I first
summarize the contexts of immigration/admission of foreign workers in the U.S. and in
Japan in this section. More specifically, I describe the current situation of
immigration/admission of foreign workers, historical background of today’s immigration,
and immigration policies in both countries. In doing so, I show the applicability of the
concept of racialized social systems to each society regarding its immigration issues.
Social and Historical Contexts of Immigration
In this section, first, I describe the current situation of immigration/admission of
foreign workers in the U.S. Then, I put focus on the history of the U.S. immigration
policy, while discussing how immigration in the U.S. has been racialized in dominant
institutional discourses. Second, I delineate the history and current social conditions
regarding immigration/admission of foreign workers in Japan, and then I argue how
immigrants/foreign workers in Japan are actually racialized in a “race-less” society by
applying the framework of a racialized social system.
The United States
Current immigration demographics in the U.S. Since the first arrival of
Puritans from Europe in the early 17th century, the U.S., as a country of immigrants, has
opened its gates to immigrants who are seeking freedom and opportunity. However, it
does not mean that the U.S. has welcomed all immigrants from different racial groups
equally (Martin, 2003). While many U.S. Americans are proud of the fact that their nation
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is built upon immigration, it is the earlier wave of immigration from Europe which is
considered as “preferred” immigration (Leonhardt, 2008; Martin, 2003). The later
immigration waves, including Irish immigrants and Chinese immigrants during the 19th
century, became threats to national/racial identity and sovereignty.
Currently, the U.S. is facing one of the biggest waves of immigration since
records of immigration began to be kept in 1820 (Congressional Budget Office: CBO,
2004; Martin, 2003; Pantoja, 2006). Approximately, 1.1 million immigrants on average
are admitted annually (the U.S. Census Bureau, 2006), and 1.13 million immigrants were
admitted as permanent residents in 2009 (Department of Homeland Security, 2009).
According to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service records, the U.S. legally
admitted 5.7 million immigrants during the 1990s, and more than 7.4 million people were
admitted during the last decade (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010b). The population of
immigrants in the U.S. increased from 31.1 million to 38.5 million or 24% between 2000
and 2009. This corresponds with 12.5 % of the entire population of the U.S. (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2010b). This rapid expansion of immigrant population in the present period has
become a central issue related to national identity, sovereignty, security and the national
economy.
The legal status of foreign-born residents in the U.S. can be categorized into five
groups: Legal permanent residents (LPRs), naturalized citizens, legal temporary residents,
refugees/asylum seekers, and unauthorized/undocumented immigrants (Fortuny, Capps,
& Passel, 2007): Legal permanent residents are those who are legally admitted to stay in
the U.S. permanently by being issued immigrant visas abroad and obtaining green cards
later in the U.S. For legal permanent residents to become naturalized citizens, they need
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to be in the U.S. for more than five years (three years for those who marry U.S. American
citizens) and to pass the citizenship test and background checks. Those who are admitted
to enter the U.S. for a temporary period as workers or as students without attaining
permanent residency are called temporary legal residents. Refugee status is granted to
individuals who are under persecution or a fear of persecution in their home countries,
while asylum seekers, who are also under persecution or fear of it, usually enter the
country without authorization and claim asylum. Unauthorized/undocumented
immigrants refer to those who enter the U.S. illegally or overstay after their temporal visa
expired (Fortuny et. al, 2007).
One of the reasons why the U.S. regards the current wave of immigration as
“problematic” is the fact that the majority of current immigration population is from
non-European countries or non-white racial groups. As Irish and Chinese have been
excluded due to their race in past centuries, Mexican and Latin American immigrants are
often constructed as criminals or terrorists in newspapers (Flores, 2003) and in public
blogs (Collier & Mudambi, 2010), they are likely to be regarded as “problems” to the
nation in the present period. Among legal permanent residents in 2009, the largest
number of immigrants were born in Mexico (29.8%) followed by those from China,
(5.2%), Philippines (4.5 %), India (4.3 %), El Salvador (3.0%) among other countries
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2010b). In terms of the entire legal foreign-born population in 2010
including LPRs, naturalized citizens, refugees, and temporary resident immigrants, 53 %
of the foreign-born population came from Latin America, 28 % from Asia, and 12.7 %
from Europe (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010b). Regarding unauthorized immigrants, the Pew
Hispanic Center estimates that there were approximately 11.5 million to 12 million
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unauthorized/undocumented immigrants in the U.S. in 2006, which is almost 30 % of all
immigrant population (Passel, 2006). The Urban Institute estimates that 57 % of all
unauthorized immigrants came from Mexico, and the majority of them arrived in the U.S.
in the past decade (Fortuny et al, 2007). The same study indicates that the population of
unauthorized immigrants is highly concentrated in the metropolitan areas, such as Los
Angeles (1 million), New York (520, 000), Dallas (460, 000), and Chicago (400,000). The
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2010) estimated that there were 10.8 million
unauthorized immigrants in 2009. They also reported that the unauthorized population
increased by 250,000 annually in the last decade (Department of Homeland Security,
2010).
The rapid increase of immigrants, both legal and illegal, from Mexico and Latin
American countries in the last decade has located the U.S. immigration politics in the
dialectical tension between the desire to meet national economic needs and the desire to
protect its border and sovereignty (Martin, 2003). As mentioned earlier, U.S. Americans
tend to be less favorable toward current immigration, while they tend to regard the early
waves of immigration as positive (Martin, 2003; Pantoja, 2006). For example, a Gallup
survey in 1993 indicated that 59 % of respondents answered that immigration was
beneficial for the U.S., while 60 % believed that it is bad for the country today (Pantoja,
2006). In a similar light, the 1994 General Social Survey demonstrates that 83 %
answered that continuing immigration would cause high unemployment rates and 63 %
said it would prevent the country from uniting (Pantoja, 2006). More recently survey
conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2011 shows that 40% of 1,385 participants
answered that their biggest immigration concern is that illegal immigrants are a drain on
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government services, and 20% said that they threaten the employment rates of American
citizens (Pew Research Center, 2011). The existence of anti-immigration organizations at
grass-root levels across the U.S. reflects such negative attitudes toward current
immigration. For example, FAIR, a large anti-immigrant organization, contrasts past
immigration and present immigration in the following way:
Immigration in the past did bring benefits – in the past, the U.S. needed large
numbers of people to settle the frontiers, cut forests, build railroads, mine gold,
and much more. Today’s priorities are preserving our remaining wilderness areas,
conserving our natural resources, and ensuring a better quality of life for future
generations (FAIR, n.d.)
Implicitly, this statement constructs the present immigrants as contributing to
environmental pollution, scarce natural resources, and worsening quality of life in U.S.
society. Not only public opinion, but also the U.S. government has shown its ambivalent
or even negative attitudes toward immigration. The ambivalent attitudes toward
immigrants and immigrants’ rights and underlying nativistic racism that confirms an
anti-immigration political agenda are manifest in the past and present U.S. immigration
policy (Cornelius, 2005; Demo, 2005; Martin, 2003; Pantoja, 2006).
History of immigration policy in the U.S. Immigration policy in the U.S. has
been always a racialized process; it has been underpinned by white supremacist ideology
and practices (Muwakkil, 2006). The decisions about who can be admitted, who can be
citizens of the U.S., and who can have the same rights as citizens have been made based
on the immigrants’ racial categories, while the racialized aspects are often hidden under
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the guise of cultural or religious differences, moral issues, and economic crisis (Cornelius,
2005; Flores, 2003; Martin, 2003; Pantoja, 2006).
Martin (2003) describes four perspectives to immigration based on her analysis of
past U.S. immigration policies. In the next section I overview these perspectives. Then, I
introduce four past political movements regarding immigration, which have relatively
explicit white supremacist, nativistic racist orientation: the 1790 Naturalization Act,
Know Nothing Movement during the mid 19th century, the Chinese Exclusion act at the
end of the 19th century, and the Johnson-Reed Act in 1924. Then I point out the
similarities between these past movements and the current U.S. immigration policy that is
primarily geared toward controlling immigrants from Mexico and Latin American
countries.
Four political perspectives regarding immigration. In her analysis of the politics
of U.S. immigration policies, Martin (2003) describes four different actors characterized
with their attitudes toward immigration and attitudes toward the rights of immigrants:
advocates, free-marketeers, restrictionists, and integrationists. Advocates refer to the
groups of people who favor a large numbers of immigrants and are willing to bestow
legal immigrants with full rights and access to public services and benefits. Though they
are against illegal immigration, they support policies that make the legalization process
easier if the immigrants meet the criteria. When the U.S. was in its infancy, the majority
of the discourse on immigration might have been rooted in the idea of Advocates.
The slogan of free-marketeers is “Immigration Yes, Welfare, No” (Martin, 2003.
p.136). They are not against admitting foreigners as temporary workers for their
contribution to the U.S. economy, but they are unwilling to provide full rights to
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immigrants. For example, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, prevented Chinese laborers
who were engaging in rail-road construction from gaining U.S. citizenship (Demo, 2005);
this is a policy that reflects the free-marketeers’ beliefs. Also, the Bracero program that
admitted Mexicans as temporal workers due to the labor shortage after the war (Demo,
2005; Martin, 2003), as well as President Bush’s guest worker program, are consistent
with the free-marketeers’ opinions (Martinez, 2004).
Restrictionists oppose admitting large number of both legal and illegal
immigrants as well as oppose their access to benefits and legal rights. Thus, restrictionists
are likely to regard immigration as problematic, and they support strict restrictions on
illegal immigration with reasons such as the need to prevent crime, concerns

about the

labor and economic market, the fiscal cost of immigration, and so on (Martin, 2003).
Therefore, the popular U.S. discourses on immigration in recent years and the
government immigration policies reflect and recreate the idea of restrictionists.
Integrationists support full rights, benefits, and permanent admission for legal
immigrants, leading to full economic, social and political integration. This group is
strongly against illegal immigration as a violation of the law and as a negative influence
on legal immigrants and unskilled native-born residents (Martin, 2003). The number of
US permanent-resident visas shows that the U.S. immigration policy is against the
integrationists’ idea: Though approximately 100,000 low-skilled temporary workers
receive their visas annually, only 10,000 of them receive a permanent-resident visa,
which is merely 6 % of the total number of permanent-resident visas (Cornelius, 2005).
In terms of the past immigration policies in the U.S., free-marketeers and
restrictionists seem to be the dominant voice. In the following sections, I summarize how
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these political perspectives are reflected in the specific immigration policies as well as
how they are racialized.
The 1790 Naturalization Act. The very first Naturalization Act which was
implemented in 1790 clearly indicates that the legislation back then privileged white
racial groups by limiting citizenship to free white persons. The 1790 Naturalization Act
states that “any alien, being a free white person” who is of “good character” and who has
resided in the U.S. for at least two years is eligible to apply for American citizenship (The
Library of Congress, n.d.). This act prevented Africans who were brought as slaves and
Asian immigrants who came later to work in the country from becoming U.S. American
citizens and having the same rights as white citizens, including voting and owning
property. African Americans were not eligible for U.S. citizenship until the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution was enacted in 1868, and Asian immigrants were
ineligible for American citizenship until the McCarran-Walter Act in 1954 abolished
racial restriction in naturalization process (PBS California Newsreel, 2003). In his article
about the construction of American national identity, Thomas Ricento (2003) argues that
the late 18th century, when this Naturalization Act was implemented, was the time in
which white U.S. Americans with British ancestry, who were a numerical minority, were
striving to maintain their powerful status by establishing shared “American” identity with
other white European Americans. By doing so, British Americans persuaded other white
European Americans that their needs and interests represent the national needs and
interests. Therefore, even though British Americans were numerically a minority in the
society, they could maintain their access to political power (Ricento, 2003). However, one
of the racial groups among non-British European Americans were Irish immigrants, who
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were mostly Catholic. Though they were once regarded as one of “good” immigrants who
were eligible for citizenship, the U.S. reduced them into a “threat” to the nation when the
number of Irish immigrants exploded. In the mid 19th century, the anti-Irish immigrant
movement, called Know Nothing movement was born (Phillips, 2007).
Know Nothing movement. This nativist, anti-immigration political movement
during the mid 19th century was accelerated by the sudden increase of Irish immigrants in
the U.S. in the1840s due to the famine caused by the severe drought in Northern Europe
(Holt, n.d.; Phillips, 2007). Know-Nothing is the semi-secret organization of the
American Republican Party, which was originally formed as the Order of the Star
Spangled Banner in New York in 1843 (Holt, n.d.). Its members were required to be
native-born and Protestant (Holt, n.d.). The primary aim of this anti-immigration,
anti-Catholic party was to prolong the naturalization period for Irish immigrants from
five years to twenty-one years and to exclude Catholic Irish from public offices (Holt,
n.d.). They claimed that the Irish immigrants had a negative impact on the U.S. economy
by lowering American workers’ wages by being involved in low-wage jobs with bad
working conditions (Phillips, 2007). Their accusation toward Irish immigrants was rooted
in the public discourses that constructed the Catholic Irish immigrants as cultural and
religious invaders, who would not accept “American” values, based on the fear that they
would overtake the country if levels of immigration continued (Phillips, 2007). The fact
that Irish was not considered as part of the white race then indicates that this political
movement was not only a national economic issue but a racial issue.
Chinese Exclusion Act. Similarly, Chinese immigrants who came to the country
as construction workers to build the transcontinental railroad during the 19th century
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became another threat to the nation, and the political reactions toward the increasing
number of Chinese immigrants was racist practices. The massive import of Chinese
laborers was deeply rooted in the anti-Irish and ant-black racism in the U.S. (Wu, 2002).
After the Civil War, plantation owners in the South brought over thousands of Chinese
workers, called “Coolies.” Its true aim, however, was to prevent hiring freed black slaves
(Wu, 2002). To make this “punishment” process legitimate and non-racist, media
discourses constructed Chinese workers as more obedient and industrious than blacks
(Wu, 2002). In the northern and western part of the U.S., Chinese workers were evaluated
as morally better compared with Irish workers; the media emphasized that Chinese did
not drink as much as Irish and they were not as violent as Irish (Wu, 2002). Such racial
comparison among Chinese, Irish, and blacks, thus accelerated the immigration from
China. By 1860s, 41,000 Chinese had arrived in the U.S. (Zia, 2000).
Although Chinese immigrants were welcomed in the beginning, they were not
treated well in the U.S. in the end. On the contrary, Chinese workers suffered from
institutional discrimination as well as discrimination at the interpersonal level due to the
racial hierarchical system in the U.S. In California, where majority of Chinese
immigrants first settled, the state legislature employed overtly racist practices and
policies toward Chinese immigrants by singling out Chinese immigrants for a
foreign-miners tax, prohibiting Chinese to testify in court, and not admitting them into
public schools (Zia, 2000). The transcontinental railroad construction is another site in
which the American nativistic racism manifested. Though 90 % of the company’s
workforce was Chinese, their working condition and wages were worse than those of
white workers: One in 10 Chinese died during the construction and they were paid 60%
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as much as white counterparts (Zia, 2000). These cases indicate how a racialized social
system in the U.S. provided more rewards for whites than other racial groups.
Once the railroad was finished, Chinese immigrants, who were treated as a
disposable workforce, were fired (Zia, 2000). After the completion of the railroad,
Chinese workers in low-wage jobs became a threat toward other European white and
black workers. In the late 1870s, anti-Chinese “Yellow-Peril” movement spread across
the nation (Zia, 2000). Houses and shops owned by Chinese were burned down, Chinese
workers were lynched and killed, women were molested and killed, and many Chinese
immigrants were expelled from the cities in which they had settled (Wu, 2002; Zia, 2000).
The media constructed Chinese as uncivilized and filthy opium-smokers who were a
negative influence on the people and economy of the nation (Zia, 2000). This
anti-Chinese movement led Congress to pass the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which
suspended immigration from China and prevented legal Chinese residents to become
American citizens (Zia, 2000).
The 1924 Johnson-Reed Act. Another exclusionary immigration act which barred
non-white immigrants was implemented in 1924. This act limited the number of
immigrants admitted into the nation based on the national census in 1890; the
government issued visas to two percent of the total population with each national origin
(Jacobson, 1998; U.S. Department of State, n.d.). One of the goals of this act was
excluding immigrants from Asian countries, and another one was limiting the immigrants
from eastern and southern Europe, while maintaining those from “favorable” nations such
as England and Germany in order to enhance the homogeneity of white-America
(Jacobson, 1998; Roediger, 2005). Going back to the 1890 census, the government erased
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unwanted racial groups from the history and demography of the nation (Roediger, 2005).
Italian immigrants are one of the groups that this act targeted. Though Italian
Americans are currently categorized as white Americans both in legal and common
discourse (Roediger, 2005), they were associated with nonwhites for a long time. First,
Italian immigrants were racialized in relation to Africans. The term “Guinea,” which was
originally used to refer to African-born slaves, started to be applied to Italian immigrants,
especially southern Italians whose skin tone is darker, around the 1890s (Roediger, 2005).
Italian immigrants’ children were sent to black schools in some southern education
systems, and Italian mining workers in western states were actually “Jim-Crowed”
(Roediger, 2005, p.45). They were also targeted for violent hate crime—eleven Italian
Americans were killed in Louisiana in 1891, and mass media blamed Italian Americans
for their “southern Italian biology and habits” (Roediger, 2005, p.52). Later on, Italian
immigrants were also racialized as the Chinese of Europe, and the Chinese Exclusion Act
was considered to be an appropriate model to control and expel Italians from the nation
(Lee, 2003).
As briefly summarized above, U.S. American political reactions toward increasing
numbers of non-white immigrants have historically been exclusionary ones based on
nativistic racism underpinned by white-supremacist ideology. In recent decades, the
target immigrant group of such racist practices in the U.S. is Mexican immigrants. The
number of Mexican immigrants has rapidly increased since the Immigration Act of 1965,
which is also known as Hart-Celler Act, was implemented. Under the influence of Civil
Rights Movements and liberalism in the U.S., the Immigration Act of 1965 abolished the
nationality/race-based quota system employed in the Immigration Act of 1924 (Roger,
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2008). As a result, more and more non-white immigrants, especially those from Mexico,
emigrated to the U.S., and they have been constructed as threatening “aliens” to the
nation.
Immigration policy toward Mexican immigrants: Past and present. Since the
Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty was signed in 1848, which established the U.S.-Mexican
border and provided Mexican residents in New Mexico and California U.S. citizenship,
the U.S-Mexico borderland has been a problematic space (Beckham, 2005). Among the
three aspects of immigration policy, i.e. reduction in the number of immigration,
immigrants’ eligibility and access to public services, and border enforcement (Pantoja,
2006), the U.S administration has put major focus on border enforcement in terms of
immigration from Mexico (Cornelius, 2005).
Since regulation of immigration became a federal responsibility in 1875, the U.S.
has deployed various policies to control the border and people crossing the border to
maintain its sovereignty (Demo, 2005). For example, the passage of Immigration Act of
1917 required Mexicans to pass a literacy test and pay a head-tax when they crossed the
border, though they could cross the border without any restriction before this act (Demo,
2005).
One of the border enforcement policies and practices the U.S. government has
employed is the Border Patrol. The United States Border Patrol was established in 1924,
four year after the Prohibition law was implemented, to control the people who attempted
to smuggle liquor in the “dry” U.S. from “wet” Mexico (US Custom and Border
Protection; CBP, n.d.). The early Border Patrol was a small group with 450 officers in
Texas (CBP, n.d.). As the number of immigrants from Mexico, both legal and “illegal,”
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increased, the number of officers has dramatically increased and their roles as agents
have expanded. There were 1,531 officers during WWII (CBP, n.d.), 4881 agents were
deployed in 1995, and 9,200 agents were on duty in 2000 (Nevins, 2002), more than
13,000 border patrol agents were deployed along the U.S. border in 2006 (CBP, n.d.) and
the number of agents is now more than 20,000 at the end of Fiscal Year of 2009 (CBP,
2011).
In addition to protecting the border, the U.S. has implemented various
immigration projects to limit the number of immigrants from Mexico and to exclude
those who already reside in the nation. As Chinese immigrants were imported as a labor
force, Mexican immigrants were imported due to the labor shortage during WWII, when
many farmers were working for military or the war industry. To maintain domestic food
production, the U.S. and Mexico had an agreement in 1942 that allowed Mexicans to
work in the U.S. (CBP, 2007). Along with this agreement, not only legal workers but
“illegal” workers from Mexico increased. To deal with this issue, the U.S. administration
launched projects such as Operation Wetback, which sent back over 100,000 Mexicans
living in the U.S. in 1958 (Demo, 2005); Operation Hold the Line in 1993 and Operation
Gatekeeper in 1994 that increased Border Patrol agents along the U.S.-Mexico border.
These were followed by Operation Safeguard in Arizona and Operation Rio Grande in
Texas in 1997 (Cornelius, 2005); and Operation Jump Start in 2006 that constructed miles
of pedestrian and vehicle fencing to arrest illegal border crossing immigrants (CBP, 2007).
The annual report of the U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement initiative (ICE)
indicates that 276, 912 illegal immigrants were deported (ICE, 2007). In addition to these
border enforcement projects, the immigrants’ access to public service has been also
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controlled institutionally. For example, in 1994, California state legislature passed
Proposition187, also called as “Save Our State (SOS) initiative,” which denies “illegal”
immigrants’ access to all public services, such as public education and medical care. This
proposition was later ruled unconstitutional by a District Court (Cornelius, 2005; Demo,
2005; Pantoja, 2006). Also, the immigration bill signed by Arizona in 2010 allows law
enforcement personnel to stop anyone suspected of being undocumented.
These immigration practices and policies regarding Mexican immigrants also
demonstrate how a racialized social system justifies and legitimatizes racist practices as
non-racist ones. Similar to the case of Irish immigrants and Chinese immigrants in the
past, the U.S. political discourses emphasize economic aspects of immigration (i.e.
“Mexicans take jobs away from native born workers”) (Passel, Capps & Fix, 2004) and
they also construct Mexican immigrants as “threats” to the nation by emphasizing the
need to control illegality, criminality and immorality of Mexican immigrants (Cornelius,
2005; Demo, 2005; Flores, 2003).
As has been noted, recent immigration policies and legislative practices geared
toward Mexican immigrants are mainly aiming at enforcing the border and protecting
sovereignty of the United States by controlling and limiting incoming population from
Mexico. As immigration policies and practices have always been in U.S. history, this is
also a racialized process.

Evidence of the racialized aspects in recent immigration

politics is the contrast between visibility of Mexican immigrants and invisibility of white
immigrants. Almost exclusive focus on Mexican immigrants is manifested in the
increasing budget for the border patrol guarding along the U.S.-Mexico border, numbers
of operations and propositions across many states regarding illegal immigrants from
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Mexico, and immigration reform plans explicitly pointing out Mexican immigrants as
problematic. On the other hand, immigrants from European countries are rarely subjected
to the heated debates on immigration in the U.S. According to the U.S. census in 2000,
the number of non-U.S. citizens born in Latin America is almost five times as many as
those who were born in Europe. However, I am not referring to the mere numbers, since
racial stratification and positioning of immigrants has little to do with whether they are
numerical majority or not. In fact, “free white persons” who were eligible for

full

citizenship in the 18th century were a numerical minority.
As scholars argue, U.S. history of immigration is also a history of rewriting
“whiteness,” which is almost identical with “American-ness” (Jacobson, 1998; Roediger,
2005). Therefore, restrictive and exclusionary practices against Mexican immigrants in
the past decades accompany construction and positioning of white immigrants. The
positioning of recent white immigrants and their whiteness are apparent in their
invisibility compared to Mexican immigrants who are considered threats to the nation.
White immigrants’ existence and their bodies are rarely contested in society, and their
privilege lies in the fact that they can “blend in” to the white-centered society as “normal”
members without their morality or cultural discrepancy with the U.S. standard being
questioned (McIntosh, 1988).
Public discourse on immigration. U.S. society as a racialized social system has
been maintained and reproduced by public discourses regarding immigration. In the
previous chapter, I described Bonilla-Silva’s argument that one of the mechanisms of a
racialized social system to reproduce itself is generating racial ideologies that are
constructed and employed by white dominant members as “common sense” to
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legitimatize and justify their domination and racial status-quo (Bonilla-Silva, 1996; 2001;
2006). Institutional discourses play a significant role in constructing and perpetuating
these racial ideologies, because it is the dominant racial group that has access to political,
administrative, and media discourses that can reproduce a racialized social system (van
Dijk, 1995, 2000a, 200b). Such racist “elite” discourses produce, maintain, and reinforce
systemic power relations, and they are used to justify racist practices which sustain power
and domination (van Dijk, 2000a; Wetherell & Potter, 1992).
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the dominant ideologies and racist
discourses that produce and sustain the ideology in this contemporary period are less
blatant, and less overt, but still hegemonic (Bonilla-Silva, 1996; 2001; 2006, Omi &
Winant, 1994). Such new or contemporary racism is characterized by the negative
representation of “Others” and discursive denial of being “racists” (Billig, 1988; Every &
Augoustinus, 2007). One of the contemporary racial ideologies in the U.S. is color-blind
ideology. Color-blind ideology reproduces and sustains the white racial group’s
dominance first by erasing the concept of race by employing a non-racial focus, such as
labor market, economy, class and cultural differences, so that white group can openly
express their prejudicial world views without appearing as “racists” (Bonilla-Silva, 2001;
2006). Over the decades, the U.S. has legitimatized its racist treatment toward non-white
immigrants by diverting its focus from race to the labor market and economy, and
secondly by positioning immigrants as negative racial “Others” and “us” as positive.
Focus on non-racial factors. Due to the rapid increase of Mexican immigrant
population, both legal and illegal, since the 1990s, much of the political and public debate
on immigration has centered on its economic costs and benefits. Specifically, immigrant
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workers in low-wage jobs and their influence on the U.S. economy, which is intertwined
with illegal immigration, have captured national attention (Capps, Fortuny & Fix, 2007).
From 2007- 2011, while I was conducting this study, low-wage immigrant labor force and
illegal immigration from Mexico were some of the central issues in the Comprehensive
Immigration Reform bill and temporary worker program during the Bush administration,
and also during the Obama administration. Comparing the exclusionary and racist
immigration history and the present immigration situation, it seems that the current public
discourses are repeating the past immigration discourses. As well as Irish and Chinese
immigrants, Mexican immigrants are being constructed as having a negative influence on
the U.S. American economy by lowering wages and taking jobs away from citizens,
though their labor force is necessary to meet national economic needs.
The data released by Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2010) shows that
immigrants represent 16% of the U.S. labor force population in 2009, and 40% of them
are from Mexico and Central America. The data clearly shows that immigrants,
especially those from Mexico and Central America, are likely to have low-wage jobs
that require minimum educational attainment. For example, 53% of those immigrants
between 25 to 64 are employed in low-wage sections such as construction, food services
and manufacturing, landscaping and agriculture, while 14% of native-born U.S.
Americans had these jobs in 2009 (CBO, 2010). Also, the average annual growth rate of
the foreign-born labor force (4.2%) between 1994 and 2009 is greater than that of native
born labor force (0.7%) (CBO, 2010). Thus, immigrants’ share of the labor market has
been increasing. However, the decline in the number of U.S. born workers in low-wage
jobs cannot be attributed only to immigration; other factors such as educational
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attainment of native born workers, economic growth, and job creation also play a
significant role in terms of this issue (Capps et al, 2007). Of importance here is not the
increasing number of immigrants in low-wage labor, in fact, these numbers negatively
affect the employment of citizens, but the fact that institutional discourses have
constructed immigrants, especially those from Mexico, as economic threats to the nation.
This discourse functions to benefit the dominant group in two ways: avoiding the
criticism of the current exclusionary immigration policy as racist by focusing on the
economic aspects of immigration, and creating the negative image of Mexican
immigrants to justify the policy to expel “Others” out of the nation. As a result, the
dominant racial group can maintain their status and position as “normal” and keep
reproducing a hierarchical system.
This strategy of putting focus on non-racial factors is common in public
discourses about “Others” not only in the U.S. but also in other countries. For example,
Dixon, Foster, Durreheim and Wilbraham’s (1994) discourse analysis study demonstrates
that white South Africans emphasized ecological aspects in letters to the editor protesting
expansion of a black squatter camp. Dixon and his colleagues (1994) analyzed the
arguments against expansion that were founded in ecology as well as destructions of
beautiful scenery. Given the history of apartheid in South Africa, overt
segregationist/racist remarks or practices were not acceptable. Therefore, whites argued
that a larger black community could have an ecologically negative impact on the natural
landscape, and showed their concern for increasing crime rate and the possibility that the
value and price of their land would decrease (Dixon et al, 1994). By using these
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discourses, white South Africans avoided appearing racist and perpetuated color-blind
ideology as well.
In a similar way, Every and Augoustinos’ (2007) discourse analysis of the
written record of the Australian parliamentary speeches about asylum seekers reveals that
politicians tended to use “national sovereignty talk” or “cultural difference talk” to
legitimate their new stricter asylum policies. National sovereignty talk functions to
express exclusivist positions toward asylum seekers as “patriotic,” not racist. In cultural
difference talk, they construct their objection to asylum seekers by talking about the core
cultural differences, not racial differences. For example, an Australian Senator said that
the asylum-seeker issue is not about a question of color but a question of “difference in
civilization.” He clearly stated that he is afraid that Australian civilization will be
“permanently injured by contact with a large number of persons of races belonging to a
different civilization” (Every & Augoustinos, 2007, p.427).
These discursive strategies of a “new” racism can be observed in political
discourse in the UK, also. Van Dijk’s discourse analysis (2000a) on a debate in the British
House of Commons in 1997 about asylum seekers illustrates that political discourses
about racial “Others” reproduce the ideology of legalism (van Dijk, 2000a). Legalism
focuses on the belief that the law, including immigration rules and restrictions, must be
respected, whatever happens (van Dijk, 2000a). In addition to color-blind ideology,
legalism in the British political discourses (as well as U.S. discourses) divert attention
from race to non-race factors and to normalize racist practices without appearing racist.
Negative “Others” and positive “us.” Another common discursive strategy of
institutional racist discourses that reproduces and maintains power relations in society is
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negative positioning of racial “Others,” accompanied with positive positioning of “us”
(van Dijk, 1992, 1995, 2000a, 2000b). The relationship between a racialized social
system and the positioning of self and Others is a dual structure. Positioning of self and
Others constructs and perpetuates dominant ideologies, while dominant ideologies
constrain the process of positioning. This system keeps reproducing a hegemonic system
of racial inequality. It is hegemonic, because positioning of self and Others in
institutional discourses becomes “common sense,” which perpetuates the dominant
ideology, and both privileged and disadvantaged groups internalize and accept their
position established in the discourses as “normal” (Bonilla-Silva, 1996; 2001; 2006).
Numerous discourse studies have proved that this discursive strategy is commonly
used in institutional discourses in the Western countries, including political and media
discourses that keeps reproducing contemporary racism. For example, van Dijk’s (1992;
1995) study about elite discourse in the UK reveals that favorable terms are mostly used
for white British people, while immigrants, asylum seekers and resident minorities are
represented as strange, dangerous and criminals who are the source of the national
problems in news media. He attributes this positioning to the fact that media is dominated
by white elites and minority racial groups have much less control over representations in
media (van Dijk, 1992; 1995). In a similar vein, van Dijk (1995) argues that educational
discourses also reproduce and maintain hegemonic racism by connecting “Others” to
immigration, cultural differences, crime and deviance in society, as well as by blaming
minority groups for discrimination and racism, rather than the white dominant group.
In terms of the parliamentary debates on immigration in the UK, van Dijk (2000a)
identifies several discursive strategies and rhetorical moves that are typical for debate on
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immigration. For example, immigrants and asylum seekers are positioned as
illegal-criminal-parasites who cost “us” and break “our norms,” while British people are
positioned as “good taxpayers” who are “victims” of the problems that immigrants and
asylum seekers cause to the nation (van Dijk, 2000a). Such positive-us and
negative-Others positioning is accomplished by deploying extreme case formulation,
national self-glorification, a numbers game and self-victimization (van Dijk, 2000a).
Similar discursive patterns were found in other studies on the British newspaper media
representation of asylum seekers (Lynn & Lee, 2003), and also in the political discourse
on asylum seekers in Australia, in which immigrants/asylum seekers from Asia and the
Middle East have become the central political issues (Every & Augoustinos, 2007), as
well as in the right-wing parliamentary discourse on immigration in France, which
emphasizes the superiority of French nationality and political system (Van der Valk,
2003).
Exactly the same phenomena can be observed in U.S. dominant discourses,
including media and political debates, on Mexican immigrants. Mexican immigrants,
especially those who are undocumented, are negatively positioned as racial “Others”
through the overemphasis on illegality and criminality, negative metaphors, and negative
media representation (Demo, 2005; Flores, 2003; Santa Ana, 1999). Though the reverse is
the case, strong public and media emphasis on illegal immigrants as a national problem
constructs the pervasive belief that the majority of immigrants, specifically those who
entered through the U.S.-Mexico border, are illegal or unauthorized immigrants (Martin,
2003). According to the estimate reported by the Department of Homeland Security, there
were approximately 10.8 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. in January 2009 (CBO,
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2010). It is also estimated that as much as a half of unauthorized immigrants were
admitted legally and overstayed after the visa expired, while the other half entered the
U.S. without proper visas or border crossing cards (Pew Hispanic Center, 2006). Since
the free-marketeers’ approach toward immigrants is pervasive in the contemporary U.S.
(Martin, 2003), there are popular myths that undocumented immigrants came to the U.S.
for welfare without paying taxes (Capps & Fix, 2005). However, undocumented
immigrants are not eligible for national welfare including food stamps and most of public
benefits, even though they pay the same sales taxes as native born residents (Capps & Fix,
2005). Additionally, the U.S. Social Security Administration reports that they estimate
three quarters of unauthorized immigrants pay payroll taxes (Porter, 2005). Immigrants
from Mexico have been constructed as racial “Others” in various forms of dominant
institutional discourses, which functions to maintain and justify such biased assumptions.
In her rhetorical study on media representation of Mexican immigrants in 1920s
and 1930s, Lisa Flores (2003) argues that Mexican immigrants’ bodies and the symbolic
national border became the rhetorical space in which racial Others have been
ideologically positioned. This is actually the first time that the term “illegal alien”
became widely used, and she points out that rhetorical construction of Mexicans has
changed over time (Flores, 2003). Based on the rhetorical analysis of over 200 texts from
the regional and national presses from 1920s to 1930s, she found a trend of representing
Mexicans as docile workers interested only in temporary jobs in the U.S. to Mexicans as
diseased and criminals who threaten the national border (Flores, 2003). Flores (2003)
claims that dehumanizing metaphors frequently used for immigrants from Mexico are
powerful rhetorical and ideological forces that establish and sustain hegemonic
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domination. As Flores’s (2003) study shows, everyday metaphors are not merely a
reflection of the common world-view; they function to establish a conceptual framework
that is widely shared, and the use of certain metaphors reproduces and maintains the
racial status quo (Flores, 2003; Santa Ana, 1999).
In his metaphoric analysis, Santa Ana (1999) analyzed 107 articles about
immigration that were published in Los Angeles Times from 1993 to 1994, when the
Proposition 187 campaign was held in California. He catalogued over 1900 metaphors of
immigrants and found the patterns that describe immigrants as animal, criminal, weed,
burden, disease, dirt, and natural disaster such as flood. He claims that the current covert
and hegemonic racism is constructed in public discourses through the use of these
metaphors (Santa Ana, 1999). The racist metaphorical mapping of immigrants, which can
be seen in Flores’s (2003) and Santa Ana’s (1999) studies, has become common sense,
and the users of these metaphors and readers rarely notice the consequences; they achieve
perpetuation and reproduction of racist ideology in a hegemonic way.
Another example of the negative positioning of Mexican immigrants is Anne
Demo’s (2005) study that shows how institutional discourses scapegoat illegal
immigrants. She examines how Mexican immigrants and the U.S.-Mexico border are
represented in the eight videos produced by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) to promote border enforcement funding and INS’s border enforcement initiative,
such as Operation Hold the Line and Operation Gatekeeper (Demo, 2005). One video that
demonstrates the effectiveness of the border enforcement by INS shows the borderland
before and after the plan was implemented. The borderland before the INS’s border
protection plan is depicted as chaotic, lawless ground (Demo, 2005). Undocumented
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Mexican immigrants are represented as undesirable criminals who are “transvestites,”
“gang members,” “prostitutes,” “drug smugglers,” and “border bandits” in the videos
(Demo, 2005). Demo (2005) claims that the representation of illegal Mexican immigrants
constructs a “ready-scapegoat for social problems that plague many urban areas” (p.300).
It is scapegoating, because the crime rate is actually lower on average in the borderland
compared with other U.S. metropolitan areas according to the U.S. Commission on
Immigration Reform report (Demo, 2005). It is important to note here that such negative
positioning of illegal Mexican immigrants as racial “Others” simultaneously positions
native-born U.S. residents as positive or at least neutral. In terms of this specific case of
INS’s videos, the U.S. and its people are positioned as victims of pollution and
contamination that illegal immigrants bring into the nation, and also the border patrol
agents and INS are portrayed as heroic figures that protect the nation from the flow of
“criminals” and “epidemics” (Demo, 2005).
The negative “Others” and positive “self” contrast is also evident in President
Bush’s plan for comprehensive immigration reform, which is documented in the 2007
State of the Union Policy Initiatives (http://www.whitehoue.gov/stateofthe union/2007
initiatives). In the immigration reform initiative, illegal immigration and undocumented
workers are the central issue. Under the section titled “We must bring undocumented
workers already in the country out of the shadows,” it is described that “Illegal
immigration causes serious problems, putting pressure on public schools and hospitals
and straining State and local budgets” (The White House, 2007, p.3). This corresponds
with van Dijk’s findings of British parliamentary discourse on immigration that
constructs immigrants as the national “costs” and the sources of problems (van Dijk,
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1995; 2000a). Also, in the discussion of border security, the President Bush states, “there
are many people on the other side of our borders who will do anything to come to
America to work and build a better life” (The White House, 2007, p.2). This statement
indicates that immigrants are the ones who would break the law, while the U.S. is the
place for a “better” life. Such nativist “elite” discourses sustain hegemonic power
relations.
Pantoja (2006) argues that there are three ideologies that underpin the restrictive
U.S. American immigration policies: economic individualism, egalitarianism, and
humanitarianism. Economic individualism refers to the belief that individuals should
manage their lives based on the distribution of rewards in society without any
government assistance (Pantoja, 2006). This ideology can be employed to justify the
discourses that blame immigrants for their poverty and low-wage occupations, as well as
racist policies such as Proposition 187 which was intended to restrict illegal immigrants’
access to any public welfare system, education and healthcare. Though the latter two
ideologies on the surface seem to relate to pro-immigration attitudes and practices,
Pantoja’s study (2006) shows otherwise. Egalitarianism advocates for equal opportunity
for all racial groups (Funk, 2000), and more specifically, this ideology claims that all
individuals should be equal. This focus on individuals allows inequalities across racial
groups to be unquestioned, neglects contextual factors, and results in maintaining a racist
social system. Humanitarianism is also an individual-centered ideology, which puts
emphasis on the responsibility of individuals to help those who are in need (Pantoja,
2006). Employing humanitarianism allows people to overlook power imbalance across
racial groups, status differences, historical/socioeconomic contexts, and existence of
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institutional discrimination. Therefore, these two ideologies may also serve to justify and
legitimatize racist discourses and practices.
In summary, the history of the U.S. immigration policies and political
movements regarding immigration, specifically those from non-white racial groups,
demonstrate their roots in white-supremacist, nativistic racist ideologies that reproduce
dominance and racial hierarchical system in the U.S. (Cornelius, 2005; Demo, 2005;
Pantoja, 2006). The rapid increase of a non-white immigrant population has been often
referred to as economic or moral threats to the nation in the U.S., and its racial aspects are
manifested in dominant institutional discourses about immigration and immigrants.
Unauthorized immigration is overemphasized in media and public discourses (Martin,
2003), negative metaphors are frequently used for Mexican immigrants (Flores, 2003;
Santa Ana, 1999), and the contrast between negative “Others” and positive “self”
representation is obvious in U.S. political and public discourses on immigration (Demo,
2005; The White House, 2007).
These discourses act to protect the dominant white elite group’s status and
position in society, to maintain racial status quo, and to produce and reproduce racial
ideologies (Bonilla-Silva, 1996; 2001; 2006). Discourse analysis of FAIR’s (Federation
for American Immigration Reform) website reveals that nativist ideology and
protectionism are repeatedly produced; these ideologies are employed in justifying and
rationalizing their anti-immigration perspective without creating the appearance of racism
(Torigoe & Collier, 2008).
Japan
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Current immigration/admission of foreign workers in Japan. In the following
sections I lay out the historical and sociopolitical contexts of immigration/admission of
foreign workers in Japan, while arguing the transitivity of the concept of a racialized
social system to Japanese society, as well as reviewing the literature on public discourses
about Japanese immigration/admission of foreign workers. Compared with the number of
foreign-born residents in the country and the number of visas that are issued annually to
immigrants in the U.S., Japan is a much more closed society to foreign born individuals
with a very small percentage of foreign-born residents in the nation. On top of that, there
is a pervasive myth of ethnic homogeneity in Japan and that constructs Japan as raceless.
However, I argue that Japanese society is as racialized as U.S. society, and the issue of
immigration/admission of foreign workers manifests the racial aspects of this so-called
“race-less” or “monoracial” country.
The distinct difference between the U.S. and Japan regarding immigration is that
there is a persistent belief that Japan is a nation without any history of immigration,
whereas the U.S. is a nation of immigrants (Douglas & Roberts, 2003). Actually, when I
talked with my family members and friends in Japan about my dissertation topic, most of
them said “I know that there are some foreign workers, but are there immigrants in
Japan?” Douglas and Roberts (2003), scholars who conducted a critical study on past and
present immigration in Japan, attribute this wrong assumption to the Japanese ideology of
racial purity. Based on the mono-racial myth and racial purity ideology, Japanese
immigration policies have been designed to control foreign-born workers as a temporal
labor force rather than immigrants who reside in the nation permanently (Douglas &
Roberts, 2003; Hirowatari, 1998). The exception may be Nikkei-Imin or Nikkeijin,
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foreign-born Japanese descent mostly from Latin American countries. Due to their
“Japanese blood,” the Japanese government and citizens consider them as “immigrants”
in Japan. Thus, the criteria for naturalization or permanent residence are based on
Japanese blood line or racial/cultural proximity with the Japanese race. I believe this
primordial assumption is a key to understand Japanese immigration policies and public
discourses about immigration.
Demographics and categories of foreign born residents in Japan. The
Japanese Immigration Bureau reported that there were 2,186,121 people who registered
as foreign residents in Japan at the end of fiscal year of 2009, and this comprises 1.71%
of the total population in Japan (Immigration Bureau of Japan :IBJ, 2010). Among all the
registered foreign residents, the largest national group is Chinese (31.1%) followed by
Koreans (26.5%), Brazilians (12.2%), Filipinos (9.7%), and Peruvians (2.6%) (IBJ, 2010).
These foreign residents in Japan can be divided into five categories: Zainichi gaikokujin
(Japan-residing Koreans and Chinese), Nikkeijin (foreign-born Japanese), technical
trainees, entertainers, and undocumented workers (Ishikida, 2005; Shipper, 2002;
Shikama, 2005). Though I will offer in later sections more detailed historical and
sociopolitical contexts behind each group, I briefly describe each category here.
Although they are likely to be considered as non-immigrant population in Japan
(Douglas & Roberts, 2003), I regard Zainichi gaikokujin as immigrants in Japan. Among
other groups of foreign residents, they have the longest history in Japan. When Japan
colonized the Korean Peninsula and a part of China under the imperialism of the early
20th century, the Japanese government displaced a significant number of Koreans and
Chinese by force as a supply for the labor during the war. Though they were liberated
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when WWII ended in 1945, many of them did not have a choice to go home due to the
Japanese governmental restriction on the currency and belongings they could bring
outside Japan (Matsunaga, 2007; Paku, 2005). Those who were brought from China and
Korea and stayed after 1945 are the first generation of Zainichi Koreans and Zainichi
Chinese, and they were provided legal status of “permanent alien” that gives them a
permit to work but not full rights of Japanese citizens (Yamanaka, 1993).
Nikkeijin immigrants or workers are the descendants of Japanese who migrated to
Latin American countries during the population control implemented from 1924-1931
and 1953-1973 (Shipper, 2002). When the Japanese economy started rising in the 1980s,
many of them came to Japan to work (Shipper, 2002). The stream of “Japanese blood” in
them privileged them to work almost without any restriction, but due to the lack of
language ability, more than 80% of Nikkeijin worked in law-wage occupations with 3D
working conditions, that is, demanding, dangerous, and dirty (Ishikida, 2005).
Most technical trainees are from East and Southeast Asian countries, including
China, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. The training program allows them to
learn the skills in public and private organizations and bring the skills and knowledge
back to their home countries (Ishikida, 2005). Though this program was officially started
in 1981, similar practices have been done in private since the 1960s (Bartram, 2004;
Ishikida, 2005).
Entertainers, those who reside in Japan with an entertainer visa, are mostly
women from Philippines and Thailand (Douglas, 2003). The majority of these women
work in the sexual service industry as hostesses at a bar, strip dancers, and prostitutes. In
his historical analysis of migration of women in Japan, Douglas (2003) argues that
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Japanese patriarchy has legitimatized and institutionally integrated the sex industry into
Japanese society by using the euphemism “entertainment” (Douglas, 2003).
The topic of undocumented workers started appearing as a national concern
since the late 1980s, when the number of foreign-born workers increased along with the
economic development (Yamanaka, 1993). As well as undocumented workers in the U.S.,
most undocumented workers in Japan are those who overstay after their short-term visa
expires. The country of origin of these undocumented workers includes Korea (21.4%),
China (16.3%), Philippines (15.3%), and Thailand (5.3%) (IBJ, 2010a). Another survey
by the IBJ (2010b) shows that almost 80% of illegal foreign residents have short term
visas, and 32,471 undocumented workers have been deported from the country.
It was during the 1980s when the first wave of foreign workers hit Japan due to
the rapid expansion of its economy called the “bubble-economy” (Yamanaka, 1993;
Shikama, 2005; Taki, 2005). Due to this wave of immigration, the population of foreign
residents in Japan has doubled in 20 years, from 0.78 million in 1980 to 1.68 million in
2000 (Ministry of Justice, 2000). Even after the economic recession in the late 1990s,
there has been a consistent number of foreign workers and their families from various
countries in Asia and South America to fulfill the labor shortages in Japan (Ishikida,
2005; Shikama, 2005). The Ministry of Health, Labor & Welfare (hereafter MHLW,
2009) reported in 2009 that there were 486,398 foreign workers from China (43.3%),
Brazil (20.4%), Philippines (8.3%), and Korea (4.2%), and more than a half of these
immigrants were working in manufacturing.
Upon this increasing number of foreign workers in Japan, the Japanese
government has struggled with the dialectical tension between their concern about labor
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shortages due to the worsening economic condition with the aging population and low
birth rate and the desire of excluding foreign workers from the country to maintain
Japanese national sovereignty and identity. Shoshika (low birth rate) and Koreika (aging
population) are the two underlying factors for the continuing need for the foreign workers
(Douglass & Roberts, 2003). As of 2008, 13.2% of total population is children below 15
years old (Statistic Bureau of Japan, 2011), and The National Institute of Population and
Social Security Research (hereafter NIPSSR) (2002) estimated that the percentage of
people aged over 65 years will become 36 % by 2025 (NIPSSR, 2002). Given the size of
the labor force and the problem of working age population, the percentage of foreign
workers in Japan is strikingly small (Bartram, 2004). The United Nation Population
Division once reported that Japan need to admit 600,000 foreign workers annually for the
next fifty years to sustain the economic level in the mid 1990s (UN Population Division,
2000). However, the number of foreign workers accepted annually in Japan is far from
the number that the UN suggested. Moreover, the Project Team Regarding Future
Acceptance of Foreigners, which was the committee established in the Ministry of Justice
in Japan in 2005, announced their plan to limit the maximum number of foreign residents
in Japan to 3% of the total population (Ministry of Justice, 2006). Thus, even in the
desperate economic needs for foreign workers as labor forces in the nation, Japanese
society hesitates, or refuses, to admit as many foreign workers as it actually needs.
I attribute the reluctance of Japanese government and society to admit foreign
workers and immigrants to the nativistic racism that is hidden but prevalent in Japanese
society. It is hidden, because the dominant popular discourse and the majority of
academic discourse regard Japan as a race-less or mono-racial society, and the myth of
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racial/ethnic and linguistic homogeneity is pervasive among Japanese people. However, I
believe that Japanese society is a racialized social system and Japanese society maintains
the system by hiding and mystifying the existence of “race” in the nation. One reason that
the dominant discourse constructs Japan as a race-less society is based on the fact that
Japanese rarely use the term “race” when they talk about themselves. However, as
Dikotter (1997) claims, the existence of race or racialized nature of society should not be
reduced to the use of the word “race” in discourse.
My main argument in this section is that Japanese society is also a racialized
social system as some scholars insist (Bartram, 2004; Douglass & Roberts, 2003; Jung,
2004; Lie, 2003; Shipper, 2002). More specifically, I discuss below how Japanese society
constructs, reproduces, and locates itself in the two different systems, that is, a global
white supremacist racialized social system and Yamato racialized social system.
Japanese society as a racialized social system. In his book, the Racial Contract,
Mills (1997) argues that “whiteness” is not an actual color but relations of power. Based
on his argument, Japanese are yellow in the white supremacist racial contract but “white”
in the local Japanese supremacist racial contract. The concept of racial contract overlaps
with that of a racialized social system. According to Mills (1997), a racial contract is the
“real” exploitation contract that creates the “white” race as superior and “non-white” race
as “sub-human.” It determines the distribution of wealth and rewards according to the
racial category, and justifies and legitimatizes conquest, subordination, and exploitation.
On the other hand, the social contract is an ideal and unreal one that is employed to
establish the nation state and national identity based on the assumption of equal rights,
equal agency, and meritocracy. Since the “real” contract that constructs and reconstructs
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the social system is a racial contract, not a social contract, it “races” the spaces – both
macro level spaces such as nations or regions and micro level spaces such as immigrants’
or non-whites body – and it also determines distribution of rewards that systemically
benefits the “white” race at global level (Mills, 1997). Based on Mills’s (1997) concept of
a white supremacist racial contract and Bonilla-Silva’s (1999, 2001, 2006) concept of a
racialized social system, I argue that Japanese society is partially a global white
supremacist system.
Global white supremacist system in Japan. A global white supremacist system
refers to the system that globally privileges white races in terms of allocation of resources,
mobility, wealth, and poverty (Mills, 1997). Japan was first exposed to the global white
supremacist system when it opened the country to the West in 1853 after the 200 years of
closure. Soon after opening the country, Japan was introduced to scientific racism
represented by social Darwinism through interactions with Western nations. Japan
internalized the racial hierarchy that places whites on the top and blacks on the bottom,
which is the European imperialist perspective on “race.” People learned the position of
the yellow race as “non-white” in this system (Dikotter, 1997; Weiner, 1997). One
example of such internalization of the white-supremacist racial categorization was the
article called “Transformation of Japanese Race [Nihon jinshu kaizou ron]” written by
Yoshio Takahashi in 1883. In his article, Takahashi argues that Japanese should
intermarry with Westerners to improve their intellectual and physical abilities (Weiner,
1997). This shows how Japanese internalized the yellow race’s inferiority and white
race’s superiority as the dominant global ideology that is enforced in a hegemonic way.
On the other hand, however, Japan has developed a local supremacist system alongside
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the global white supremacist system. I refer to the local system as Yamato supremacist
system.
Emergence of Yamato supremacist social system. Until the end of 19th century
or the very beginning of 20th century, the global white supremacist system was
predominant in Japanese society. Japanese internalized their racial position as “yellow”
and accepted their rewards according to their position in white supremacist social system.
Based on this racial categorization originated in the West, Japanese did not differentiate
themselves from other yellow races such as Chinese and Koreans with whom Japanese
have interacted for thousands of years throughout history (Sato, 1997; Young, 1997).
When Japan was engaging in the Russo-Japan war in 1904, Japan even attempted to unite
other yellow races to fight against “white races” (Sato, 1997).
However, the position of Japanese as one of the yellow races in Asia and its
inferiority were gradually replaced by the new concept of “Yamato minzoku [Yamato
ethnicity]” (Weiner, 1997). Construction of Yamato minzoku is actually derived from the
global white supremacist system. After opening the country to the West, Japan had
developed the desire to be recognized as civilized a nation as Western countries (Sato,
1997). Even though Japan had been historically and culturally influenced by China for
thousands of years, when the U.S. expressed their prejudicial attitudes toward Chinese
people through the implementation of the Chinese Exclusion Act in the late 19th century,
Japanese public discourses took the side of the U.S. and started expressing their contempt
toward Chinese that they were uncivilized, immoral, and inferior (Sato, 1997).
It was during the 1910s to 1930s when Japan started establishing Yamato identity
and its superiority among yellow races in Asia along with development of nationalism
58

and imperialism (Dikotter, 1997; Weiner, 1997). During this time period, Japan colonized
the Korean peninsula and a part of China, as acts of imperialism. At this time the
construction of Yamato supremacist social system fulfilled two major purposes: 1)
perpetuation of nationalism and imperialism, and 2) justification of colonizing other
yellow races by establishing a “superior” Yamato minzoku (ethnic group) (Dikotter, 1997;
Weiner, 1997).
“Yamato” is the name of the first imperial period in Japanese history, and it is
deeply embedded in Japanese local religion, Shintoism. In Shintoism, it is believed in
Japan that the first emperor was a descendant of a god. Construction of the Yamato ethnic
group contributes to the perpetuation of nationalism and imperialism because it
ideologically constructs that all Japanese people have common ancestry with the imperial
family, referred to as “Kazoku Kokka [family nation].” It also established strong ties
among Japanese people and national identity based on the racial/cultural homogeneity of
the Japanese people (Dikotter, 1997; Weiner, 1997). To sustain the strong national
identity and sovereignty of Japan during the colonial era, nationalism supported by
imperial power was vital (Weiner, 1997). Thus, the construction of Yamato minzoku was a
mixture of religion, nationalism, and imperialism, and it was why the term “minzoku” is
often used as a synonym for Japanese ethnicity, race, and nation state (Weiner, 1997).
Ideologically, Japanese people and nation have been racialized by the construction of
Yamato minzoku since this time.
The use of the term “minzoku [ethnicity]” instead of “jinshu [race]” was also
purposeful. The word “ethnicity” was more convenient to differentiate Japanese from
other yellow races, including Chinese and Koreans who were categorized in the same
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race group according to the Western system (Dikotter, 1997; Weiner, 1997). Japan
attempted to justify colonization and exploitation of Chinese and Koreans not only by
using the term “minzoku” to differentiate Japanese from other yellow races in Asia, but
also by attempts of scientifically proving the superiority of Yamato minzoku. The
differences in economic and political condition of China and Korea were attributed to
biological laws such as social Darwinism, and a number of scientific studies were
conducted to demonstrate the genetic and physical superiority of Yamato minzoku
(Dikotter, 1997; Sato, 1997; Weiner, 1997; Young, 1997). Both public and academic
discourse rejected the racial or genetic resemblance between Japanese and
Chinese/Koreans, and there was even an argument that Japanese were racially closer to
the Caucasoid race than to the yellow race in the late 19th century (Sato, 1997). Such a
construction of Yamato minzoku and its superiority were used to produce the dominant
ideology of “the fittest survives” (Dikotter, 1997; Sato, 1997; Weiner, 1997), and it
results in the common belief that Yamato minzoku is a leading race, and non-Yamato
people are backward groups. Young (1997) contends that Japanese colonization as an
expansion of imperial territory was actually a racial expansion to try out the superiority of
Japanese race. By the late 1920s, the contrast between “civilized and modern” Japanese
and inferior “colonized” races became a part of popular discourse (Dikotter, 1997). Since
the colonial era, cultural/racial homogeneity of the Japanese people, a pure shared blood
line among Japanese, and Yamato supremacy in Asia became the dominant ideology that
operates in constructing national identity and sovereignty of Japan.
As briefly summarized above, Japanese society has located itself in two different
racialized social systems, that is, a global white supremacist social system and a Yamato
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supremacist social system. Though Yamato supremacist social system seemed to be more
predominant than the global white supremacist social system during the colonial period in
Japanese history, both systems have been reproduced and sustained through various
practices that define and establish racial/national identities and sovereignty of Japan. Not
only post-1853 and during the colonial period, can these racialized social systems also
explain the systemic and structural process in which contemporary Japanese society
locates themselves and racial “Others.” The history of Japanese immigration policies and
the literatures about dominant discourses of immigration/admission of foreign workers in
Japan illustrate how these systems have been maintained in Japanese society.
Japanese immigration policies in a racialized social system. Although
Japanese immigration policies and governmental regulations against foreign-born
residents and workers reflect and reproduce more of Yamato supremacist racialized social
system that places Japanese on the top rather than the white supremacist system that
privileges white racial group, it is important to understand the existence of whiteness in
Japan to grasp complex race relations in Japan. Though the number of studies that focus
on whiteness in Japan is limited because it is still an understudied field, I briefly review
several of them to present the evidence of the white supremacist racialized social system
in contemporary Japanese society.
Whiteness in contemporary Japan. After World War II, the high regard for
European countries since the mid 19th century was replaced by extremely high regard for
the United States (Lie, 2003). For many Japanese, the image of foreigners was equivalent
to English speaking Americans with blond hair and blue eyes, and they were the target of
admiration and respect. Perpetuation of global whiteness in Japan has been fostered by
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the media representations of white people as attractive and desirable (Darling-Wolf,
2003; Hagiwara, 2004; Lie, 2003). In her analysis on Japanese internalization and
whiteness ideology, Fujimoto (2002) argues that Japanese media has internalized and
reproduced U.S. race relations through globalization of media. Positive media
representations of white people and negative representations of other racial groups are
echoed in Japanese media (Fujimoto, 2002). In accordance with Fujimoto’s study (2002),
some research findings indicate Japanese media’s tendency to portray foreign models,
mostly white models, in advertisements (e.g. FCT, 1991; Hagiwara, 1994; 2004; Hiyoshi,
2001; Ramparasad & Hasegawa, 1990; Yasutake, 1983). The first TV commercial that
portrayed a white American model was the advertisement of a beauty product for men: In
1969, the advertisement that employed the U.S. American actor, Charles Bronson,
became a big hit in Japan (Yasutake, 1983). Since then, it became popular to use white
models in TV advertisements. FCT’s (Forum for Citizen’s Television) (1991) research
reveals that among 2,219 TV commercials that were aired between 7pm and 9pm in 1991,
more than 80% of the foreign models in the commercials that portrayed foreign models
(19% of the total TV commercials) were white models. A similar study conducted 10
years later had almost the same results that more than 70% of the foreign models used in
the TV commercials were whites (Hiyoshi, 2001).
Not only TV advertisements, but also Japanese print media shows a similar
tendency. Darling-Wolf’s (2003) ethnographic study of white representation in Japanese
print media and Japanese women’s reactions demonstrate the omnipresence of media
representations of white females as the standard or ideal beauty. Since media discourse is
considered as one of the elite discourses according to van Dijk (2000b),
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over-representation of white as positive, attractive, and desirable by Japanese media plays
a significant role in constructing and reconstructing the system of racial relations in
Japan.
Thus has been noted, due to the globalization of media and the
historical/political relationship between Japan and the U.S. after WWII, Japanese society
keeps internalizing and maintaining a global white supremacist racialized social system
via dominant discourses. Fujimoto (2002) contends that Japanese favoritism toward the
white racial group has hegemonic force to make Japanese internalize and justify their
discriminatory practices toward non-white foreign residents in Japan. I believe that not
only has there been an internalization of a white-supremacist racialized social system but
also the production and reproduction of its own Yamato supremacist racialized social
system from Japanese nativistic practices, both at the macro and micro levels, toward
non-white foreign workers and immigrants, acts to stratify different racial groups in Japan.
The systems of racial hierarchy in Japan are manifested in the histories and discourses of
Japanese immigration policy.
Yamato supremacist system and history of immigration in Japan. Though
many of Japanese people and institutions may deny it, some scholars who focus on
Japanese immigration history and policies agree on the racialized aspects of Japanese
society. They posit that the Japanese xenophobic immigration policy is deeply rooted in
racial purity ideology in Japan (Bartram, 2004; Douglass & Roberts, 2003; Jung, 2004;
Lie, 2003; Shipper, 2002). In similar ways to the U.S., Japanese government and public
discourses have focused on national economic needs, costs of immigrants/foreign
workers to society, and Japanese sovereignty.
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Japanese government policy explicitly states that highly skilled workers in
professional and technical fields and highly educated individuals are welcomed, while
unskilled low-wage laborers are not allowed to enter the country (Ministry of Justice,
2006; Shipper, 2002). However, looking closely at the past immigration policies and
practices toward foreign-born residents and workers in Japan, a color-line in Japanese
society manifests itself. First, I summarize the history of immigration policy and practices
toward four different groups of foreign-residents in Japan, i.e., Zainichi Koreans and
Chinese, female “entertainers” from Asian countries, Trainees, and Nikkeijin workers.
Alien registration law and Zainichi foreigners. The first immigration policy in
Japan was designed to control Korean migrants. As mentioned above, the Japanese
government forcefully brought people from Korea as a labor force after Japan colonized
the Korean Peninsula in 1910. To make this massive kidnapping process smoother and
legal, the Japanese government established a labor migration policy in 1939, and by the
end of WWII, more than two million Koreans were relocated by the Japanese government
to work as a military force or in the war industry (Taki, 2005). Two years after the war
ended, the Japanese government enacted the Alien Registration Law in 1947. This law
was established to control Koreans and Chinese workers and their families who were
brought during the colonial period by placing them under strict surveillance and forcing
them to assimilate into Japanese society. However, assimilation of Koreans and Chinese
to Japanese society does not mean that Japanese integrated them as members of society.
On the contrary, this law legally mapped them as “outsiders” in society. The Alien
Registration Law was revised in 1952, and the foreign status of Zainichi Koreans and
Chinese were formally declared. This new law required them to register their fingerprints
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and to carry an alien registration card at any time in Japan (Shipper, 2002). Though the
fingerprint system was abolished, Zainichi foreigners are still required to carry their alien
registration card. Due to the Yamato supremacist racialized social system that was
established during colonial times, Zainichi Koreans and Chinese are still regarded as
inferior to Japanese and they struggle with their racial status and institutional
discrimination against them in Japanese society (Fukuoka, 1993; Fukuoka & Kim, 1997).
Female migrants from Asia. When it comes to Japanese colonization and
imperial expansion throughout East and Southeast Asian countries, one of the most
controversial topics is the issue of “comfort women.” During World War II, the Japanese
government forcefully brought more than 200,000 “Ianfu [comfort women]” from Asian
countries including Korea, China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to
serve the Japanese military (Douglass, 2003). The term “comfort women” is actually a
euphemism for sexual slavery (Douglass, 2003). Even after the end of WWII, the
majority of foreign workers from Asian countries to Japan were female until the late
1980s, and the vast majority of these women were hired in the sex industry (Douglass,
2003; Taki, 2005). Currently, Japanese government issues an “entertainers visa,” and
Filipino and Thai women comprise the large percentage of foreign workers who come to
Japan with the entertainer visa.
Technical training program. As mentioned earlier, the Japanese immigration
policy clearly demarcates skilled workers and low-skilled/low-wage laborers with an
explicit rejection against the entry of low-wage foreign workers (Shipper, 2002).
However, gradual economic development from the 1960s required many companies to
hire laborers in low-wage jobs that Japanese people did not want anymore, including
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construction, mining, and manufacturing (Bartram, 2004). Many small companies already
started employing foreign workers as “trainees” with low wages in the 1960s, even
though the government did not officially allow the entry of low-wage laborers from
overseas (Bartram, 2004). When Japanese society faced the severe labor shortage in the
1970s, Japanese financial organizations, such as Japanese Chamber of Commerce,
requested Japanese government’s permission to legally import cheap labor from overseas
(Bartram, 2004; Terasawa, 2003).
In response to their request, the Japanese government established a training
program and granted legal status to trainees in 1981 (Ishikida, 2005). This program was
designed to promote international collaboration by allowing trainees to obtain knowledge
and skills while they are working in Japanese companies for a relatively short period of
time (Ishikida, 2005). However, as the social context behind this policy indicates, this is
legal exploitation of a low-wage labor force under the guise of a “training program.”
Japanese companies take advantage of these trainees because they are not protected under
Japanese labor law. It is not illegal for Japanese employers to pay lower wages than the
minimum wage that is set by the labor law (Bartram 2004; Ishikida, 2005; Lee & Park,
2005; Shipper, 2002).
The racial composition of trainees in Japan reflects the color-line that exists in
Japanese society. Most trainees are from East and Southeast Asian countries, such as
China, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines (Ishikida, 2005). In Yamato supremacist
racialized social system, the Japanese race is considered as better and superior to other
Asian yellow races. Lie (2003) argues that many Japanese even in the present era still
consider Japan not to be a part of Asia; the word “Asia” used to be written in kanji
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(Chinese letters that Japanese use for domestic things and phenomena) before the colonial
period, while it is now written in katakana (Japanese alphabet used for foreign words and
names). The institutional exploitation of Asian trainees by the implementation of the
training program reproduces this racial domination in Japan.
New Immigration Control Act and Nikkeijin. One of the immigration policies
and practices that obviously reproduces Japanese racial purity ideology may be that
toward Nikkeijin workers. As briefly introduced in the previous section, Nikkeijin workers
refer to the descendants of Japanese who migrated to Latin American countries due to the
population control during the 20th century (Shipper, 2002). Most Nikkeijin workers are
second or third generation who were born and raised in South America, and most of them
are from Brazil or Peru (Shipper, 2002).
In the late 1980s, the need for more low-wage laborers became a national
concern. Along with economic expansion, there was a dilemma due to the possibility that
the increasing foreign residents may threaten the Japanese mono-racial myth. As a
remedy for this issue, on the one hand, the Japanese government accepted Asian trainees
as a temporary low-wage work force; and on the other hand, the Japanese government
decided to allow foreign workers who have a Japanese bloodline to work as unskilled
workers for a longer term than the Asian trainees (Yamanaka, 1993).
In order to accept Nikkeijin as unskilled, low-wage workers, the Ministry of
Justice suggested revising the original Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act,
which was implemented in 1951 to exclude unskilled low-wage foreign workers from
Japan (Lee & Park, 2005; Shikama, 2005; Yamanaka, 1993; 2005). This plan was passed
in 1989, and the New Immigration Control Act was enacted in 1990 (Yamanaka, 1993;
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2005). The New Immigration Control Act established the new legal status of “long-term
residence” and set the new rule that Nikkeijin workers, regardless of their skills and
education, were legally admitted in Japan with unlimited access to labor markets
(Yamanaka, 2005; Shikama, 2005). To attract more Nikkeijin workers, the new law also
simplified the process of visa application for Nikkeijin workers (Yamanaka, 1993). While
the amendment of the Immigration Control Act in 1990 relaxed the regulations against
Nikkeijin workers in unskilled low-wage jobs, however, it tightened the policy against
other unskilled low-wage laborers by implementing criminal penalties for Japanese
employers who hire illegal unskilled foreign workers (Yamanaka, 1993).
Because of the new Immigration Control Act, there was a rapid increase in
Nikkeijin population during the 1990s (Yamanaka, 2003). As had been originally planned,
the majority of Nikkeijin workers were in low-wage occupations such as manufacturing
and construction due to their lack of Japanese language skills (Ishikida, 2005). Thus, by
the reform of the Immigration Control Act, Japanese society succeeded to keep the supply
of low-wage laborers, while maintaining its racial purity (Douglass & Roberts, 2003).
The selective inclusion based on Japanese bloodlines institutionally privileged the
Japanese race over other races, and it systemically perpetuated and keeps reproducing
Japanese racial purity ideologies.
Japanese racial purity ideologies are also manifested in the recent governmental
initiative about the admission of foreigners in Japan. In the statement made in September
2006 by the Japanese Ministry of Justice, it is suggested that the admission policy of
Nikkeijin workers should be revised (Ministry of Justice, 2006). This initiative claims that
the special admission of Nikkeijin workers based on bloodline should be abolished and
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Nikkeijin workers should be admitted as normal, middle-skilled laborers (Ministry of
Justice, 2006). I believe that this suggested amendment, which intends to eliminate the
race-based selection, was actually a race-based decision. Since the blood connection
between Japanese and Nikkeijin working population is getting weaker over generations,
Nikkeijin can be a threat to Japanese racial purity. Roth (2002), who is a Nikkeijin himself,
wrote in his anthropological field study on Nikkeijin in Japan, “Japanese immigration
policy implied that the ‘Japanese-ness’ of Nikkeijin diminished with each generation”
(p.26). In the procedure of visa application, Roth (2002) witnessed that the application
process for the second generation Nikkeijin is much simpler compared with that for the
third generation. Both the initiative for the new admission policy for Nikkeijin and Roth’s
(2002) case demonstrate that Japan has tried to protect its racial purity by defining
Nikkeijin as racial “Others.”
Institutional racism against foreign workers in Japan. Thus far, I have
reviewed Japanese history of immigration policies and practices and discussed how these
institutional processes construct racial “Others” in Japanese society, as well as how these
practices maintain and reproduce the Yamato supremacist racialized social system. In the
next section, I delineate how the Yamato supremacist racialized social system provides
different rewards to different groups to sustain and perpetuate racial relations and
domination in Japanese society.
One of the functions of a racialized social system to maintain the society’s racial
status quo and the domination of the white group in the unequal distribution of rewards to
different racial categories; members of the dominant racial group receive more rewards
than members of disadvantaged racial groups in society (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; 2006).
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Japanese society, as a Yamato supremacist racialized social system, institutionally
privileges the Japanese racial group over other racial groups in society. However, of
importance here is that there is a racial hierarchy among non-Japanese racial groups in
Japan, which has been established and perpetuated to maintain the dominance of
Japanese race.
Japanese policies and practices regarding foreign workers have established the
racialized hierarchy that places Zainichi gaikokujin and Nikkeijin below Japanese, while
locating other Asian workers on the bottom (Shipper, 2002). Usually, foreign workers’
wages are 30%-70% less than those of Japanese and the working conditions for foreign
workers’ and legal protection for them are generally less adequate compared with those
for Japanese workers (Terasawa, 2003). Several studies illustrate that many foreign
workers face institutional obstacles in employment, housing, and social services (e.g.
Komai, 1995; Itoh, 1996; Tsuda, 1997). However, among all foreign workers in Japan,
Zainichi Koreans and Chinese and Nikkeijin workers have been more privileged due to
their racial/cultural proximity and Japanese bloodline. For example, due to their
permanent resident status, Zainichi Koreans and Chinese have full access to the Japanese
labor market (Shipper, 2002). However, many Zainichi foreigners report that they have
faced institutional discrimination related to employment, marriage, and housing (Fukuoka,
1993; Fukuoka & Kim, 1997). Such discriminatory practices oftentimes force them to use
a Japanese alias and pass as “Japanese.” Since most of working age Zainichi foreigners
were born in Japan and speak fluent Japanese and their physical features are similar to
that of Japanese, they have a choice to “pass” as Japanese. Japanese institutional
discriminatory practices that force Zainichi foreigners to pass actually reproduce and
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maintain Japanese racial dominance – being a Japanese is constructed as a desirable
standard.
In a similar way, Nikkeijin workers have been privileged by receiving “long-term
resident” status that allows them to work without any restriction despite the fact that
many of them are unskilled workers without an adequate level of Japanese language
skills (Yamanaka, 1993; 2005). Their blood connection with the Japanese race allows
them to work in the low-wage jobs that are not allowed for other foreign workers.
Though they are privileged in entry to Japan, their working conditions and income level
do not evidence privilege. Between 1997 and 2001, there was 20% decrease in the
number of Nikkeijin employed (Kashiwazaki, 2000). According to the governmental
survey in 2001 on Nikkeijin workers (Japanese Brazilian workers), one quarter of them
were unemployed and 40 % reported that they were not receiving appropriate social
welfare, including health insurance (Matsubara, 2002).
The most disadvantaged racial group is trainees from East and Southeast Asian
countries. As mentioned earlier, they are allowed to stay in Japan for a limited amount of
time, and their wages are usually much lower than the legally set minimum wages. It is
common that these trainees are forced to carry an illegal work load without any payment
(Asahi Shinbun, 2008). Due to the maltreatment from Japanese employers, an increasing
number of trainees tend to quit their jobs and disappear from their workplace. In 1999,
513 trainees could not be accounted for and the number increased up to 2,200 in 2006
(Asahi Shinbun, 2008).
Another disadvantaged group is undocumented workers in Japan. Since
economic expansion in the 1980s, the increasing number of illegal immigrants has
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become a national concern. Importation and employment of undocumented workers in
Japan have become more intertwined with the international crime syndicate in Asian
countries or/and Japanese mafias (Cornelius et al, 1994). Due to this fear, not only
Immigration Control Act established by the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health
and Welfare (hereafter MOHW) also established a policy to exclude illegal immigrants by
making it difficult for them to sustain their safety and health in Japan (Shipper, 2002). In
1990, MOHW prohibited illegal immigrants to have any access to public welfare system,
including medical assistance and medical insurance. This policy is almost the same as the
Proposition 187 in California, which was abolished due to its unconstitutional nature.
As has been noted, there is a clear color-line in Japanese institutional practices
toward foreign-born residents and workers in Japan. Shipper (2002) calls this Japanese
policy hierarchical because it is based on racial purity ideologies, “state-sponsored racism
based on a xenophobic idea of mono-ethnicism” (p.59). In addition to these institutional
policies and practices toward foreigners, public discourses regarding foreign workers and
immigrants in Japan play a significant role in constructing and sustaining Japanese
racialized social system.
Public discourses on foreign workers and immigrants in Japan. Even though
Japan and the U.S. are very different in terms of the number of foreign-born population in
the nation and historical background of immigration/admission of foreign workers,
Japanese public discourses regarding foreign workers are surprisingly similar to U.S.
discourses about immigration. In both countries, public discourses often divert their
attention from race to non-race factors in society and they construct immigrants/foreign
workers as racial “Others” by negatively positioning them. Although not as many studies
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have been done on Japanese discourses about foreign workers as those of the U.S., below
I review literature that demonstrates how Japanese society discursively reproduces and
perpetuates the Japanese race’s domination and its racialized social systems.
Focus on non-racial factors. As well as in the U.S., a pervasive discursive
strategy is to put focus on the economic influence of foreign workers in Japan. Foreign
workers play a key role in the Japanese economy by engaging in unskilled low-wage jobs,
such as operating electric machinery, working in chemical processing industries, and
construction, which Japanese workers now try to avoid. However, Japanese public
discourses construct low-wage foreign workers as threats to the national economy
(Douglass & Roberts, 2003). Even though it is the positions vacated by Japanese workers
that most low-wage foreign workers take, mainstream labor union discourses construct
foreign workers as “job stealers” who negatively influence the Japanese economy by
taking away jobs from native Japanese workers and lowering wages (Asahi Shinbun,
2001; Douglass & Roberts, 2003). The focus on the economic costs of foreign workers in
Japan corresponds with that of the U.S.
Non-white foreigners as negative “Others.” Another similarity between the U.S.
public discourses about immigrants and Japanese public discourses regarding foreign
workers, specifically non-white workers, is that they both create racial “Others” by
associating them with social problems such as high crime rate and disease. Douglass and
Roberts (2003) argue that increasing numbers of foreign-born residents in Japan have
been constructed as the cause of the increasing criminal cases. However, the analysis of
the cases of foreigners’ crimes does not prove that foreigners are more likely to commit
crimes than Japanese citizens. Further, violating visa status is viewed with a large share
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of apprehension among foreigners in Japan (Douglass & Roberts, 2003). Contrary to
these negative representations of non-white foreigners in Japan, public images of white
foreigners are mostly positive. As I mentioned before, white people are frequently
represented as attractive and desirable in Japanese media (Darling-Wolf, 2003; Hagiwara,
2004), and it is quite common that TV commercials portray white models (FCT, 1991;
Hagiwara, 1994, 2004; Hiyoshi, 2001). Thus, there is a clear distinction and contrast of
“good white foreigners” and “bad non-white foreigners” in Japanese discourses and
society.
I believe that Japanese media contribute to the production and perpetuation of
the negative positioning of racial “Others,” in addition to positive positioning of whites.
The negative positioning of “Others” may be achieved in two different ways; there is an
absence of non-white representation in Japanese media, and there is a media emphasis on
foreign worker’s illegality and criminality. While the white racial group is
overrepresented in Japanese media, Zainichi Koreans and Chinese, Nikkeijin, and other
non-white foreign residents are rarely portrayed in Japanese media. The over
representation of whites and Japanese and under-representation of non-white foreign
residents in Japanese media reproduce and maintain the white supremacist racialized
social system and Yamato supremacist racialized social system.
The exception to the under-representation of non-white foreigners in Japan is the
media’s emphasis on the criminal cases committed by foreigners. For example, Chinese
exchange students killed a Japanese family, including their children, to rob them of a
small amount of money in 2003. This homicide case was highly showcased by Japanese
news media, and many Chinese students living in Japan faced various cases of
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institutional discrimination in employment and housing, in addition to hate crimes. In a
similar way, criminal cases of trainees and Nikkeijin workers have caught Japanese
people’s attention. In August 2008, a trainee from China who was working at a pig farm
killed his employer because of the maltreatment he experienced at the farm (Asahi
Shinbun, January 2008). This incident became a turning point that sparked questions
about the existence and the realities of the training program (Asahi Shinbun, January,
2008). However, at the same time, this case has been employed to create a negative image
of foreign workers in order to justify Japanese exclusionary and restrictive immigration
policy and practices.
For example, “Crusade against Foreigners’ Crimes: CFC [Gaikokujin Hanzai
Tsuihou Unodou]” (http://www.geocities.jp/gaitsui/page006.html), a Japanese non-profit
organization that appeals to the Japanese government for stricter immigration control
policy, justified their exclusionist viewpoint toward immigrants/foreigners by
emphasizing illegality and criminality of foreigners in Japan in the following way:
In most cases, foreigners’ crimes are committed by illegal residents, who are not
supposed to be in Japan. Namely, foreigners’ crimes have increased due to the
increase of illegal residents, and this causality is new social fear which did not
exist in Japan before. (CFC, n.d.)
Though the racialized aspects of Japanese immigration/admission of foreign workers are
still understudied, the studies and cases reviewed above demonstrate Japan has a
racialized social system with underlying ideology of racial purity (Bartram, 2004;
Douglass & Roberts, 2003; Jung, 2004; Lie, 2003; Shipper, 2002). I also argue that Japan
has established and maintains two different racialized social systems, that is, a global
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white supremacist racialized social system and Yamato supremacist racialized social
system. These systems have been reproduced by institutionalized policies and practices,
and are reinforced by public discourses regarding foreign residents and foreign workers
in the nation.
Summary
Thus far, I have summarized historical and sociopolitical contexts of
immigration/admission of foreign workers in the U.S. and in Japan, and I argued how
racial ideologies that sustain the system of racial dominance are reproduced and
perpetuated through public discourses including governmental discourses and media
discourses in both countries. Researchers who study discursive reproduction of racism
argue (Essed, 1991; Moss & Faux, 2006; van Dijk, 1992, 1993, 1995, 2000a; 2000b;
Wetherell & Potter, 1992) that reproduction of the system of racial inequality and
domination is practiced at both macro-institutional and micro interpersonal levels. As I
have mentioned in the previous chapter, practices at macro and micro contexts are
interdependent (Essed, 1991). A racialized social system is reproduced, perpetuated, or
challenged through micro level interpersonal discourses, and micro-level practices are
constrained by social structure. Therefore, the major theoretical goal of this study is to
establish a connection between macro-level discourses and micro-interpersonal level
discourses about immigration/admission of foreign workers in the U.S. and Japan by
taking both critical and interpretive perspectives.
Discursive Reproduction of a Racialized Social System in Interpersonal Discourses
In understanding the discursive process of reproducing the system of inequality
and dominance, discursive patterns and specific rhetorical moves in interpersonal
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discourses should be analyzed in addition to the historical and social contexts in which
these interpersonal discourses reside (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). As Essed (1991) claims,
it is everyday interpersonal discursive practices that reproduce and reinforce systems of
inequality in society. Thus, interpersonal discourses work to recreate and perpetuate
dominant racial ideologies through various interpretative repertoires (Potter & Wetherell,
1987). An interpretative repertoire is a set of images, symbols and rhetoric that
individuals can use to justify and legitimate their version of reality (Potter & Wetherell,
1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and is a key construct in the present study.
Racist interpretative repertoires in the U.S. A part of Bonilla-Silva’s study
(2006), which is based on in-depth interviews with 66 whites and 17 blacks living in
Detroit area, demonstrated that whites in the U.S. tend to draw on four interpretative
repertoires in reproducing color-blind ideology in the U.S.: abstract liberalism,
naturalization, cultural racism, and minimization of racism. Abstract liberalism is the
interpretative repertoire in which individuals employ the concept of political liberalism
and economic liberalism in an abstract manner. Participants who draw on this theme are
likely to refer to the value of equal rights, equal opportunity, freedom of choice, and
individual meritocracy in explaining racial issues in society (Bonilla-Silva, 2006).
Statements such as “I am against affirmative action because I believe in equality” is an
example of this repertoire. Bonilla-Silva (2006) argues that this theme is based on the
false assumption that all racial groups in the U.S. have the same level of agency.
Naturalization as an interpretative repertoire allows individuals to construct racial
phenomena and inequality/disparities as “natural” (Bonilla-Silva, 2006). Interview
responses that are categorized into this theme include statements like “residential
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segregation is natural, because similarity attracts,” or “blacks have a choice and freedom
to move into whites’ neighborhoods, but they choose to live where they live. It is natural
that people like to live with others of their own racial group.” Bonilla-Silva (2006)
contends that it is “natural” that whites make these comments, because racial segregation
in society is one of “the natural consequences of a white socialization process” (p.39).
The next repertoire, cultural racism, attributes racial problems in society to the
marginalized group’s cultures (Bonilla-Silva, 2006), namely, whites can avoid referring to
race by focusing on or blaming minority groups’ cultural values or norms. This “blaming
the victim” repertoire is reflected in the statement such as “Mexicans have the highest
school drop-out rate because their culture does not value education” (Bonilla-Silva,
2006).
The last repertoire, minimization of racism, denies the significance of race in
social problems and constructs racism as a thing of the past or the extreme practices of
radical right wing or white supremacist groups such as KKK (Bonilla-Silva, 2006). This
repertoire may also produce discourses that blame victims, such as “it is black people
who are actually racists. They make things racial even though they are actually not”
(Bonilla-Silva, 2006). This interpretative repertoire corresponds with the findings of
van-Dijk (1992; 1995) and Essed (1991) that white people reproduce their dominant
position through the interpretative repertoire of “denial of racism.”
In addition to these four interpretative repertoires, Bonilla-Silva’s study (2006)
also illustrates that whites are likely use specific rhetorical strategies that allow them to
express their racist opinions without appearing to be racists. Bonilla-Silva (2006) lists
strategies such as avoiding direct racial references, using disclaimers such as “I’m not
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prejudiced but…,” “I’m not a black so I don’t know but…,” or using diminutives (using
“just” “a little bit” etc). He also refers to the common story lines that white people follow
to justify and defend current racial discourses. The story lines are diverse and include
“the past is past,” “I don’t own any slaves,” “if other minorities made it, how come blacks
have not?” and “I didn’t get a job because of a minority.”
In a similar light, Moss and Faux’s study (2006) revealed that dominant
ideologies are reproduced in interpersonal discourses and they are employed by people to
justify their biased opinions in the U.S. Moss and Faux (2006) collected conversational
discourses from of 34 dyads and one triad of college students about hate crimes,
immigration, and scholarship for students of ethnic minority groups. Their findings
indicated that whiteness ideologies and meritocracy are reconstructed in white
respondents’ conversations through the use of the interpretative repertoire that is similar
to abstract liberalism in Bonilla-Silva’s study (2006). For example, respondents
demonstrated their assumption that ethnic minority students are generally less-qualified
for scholarships compared to white counterparts. They argued that these students are
given scholarships because of their ethnicity not their accomplishments. They argued for
an ideology of individual meritocracy and claimed that race-based preferences are not fair
(Moss & Faux, 2006). In terms of reproducing dominant ideologies in interpersonal
conversations, Moss and Faux (2006) also discuss contrastive positioning of positive-self
and negative-other. Their findings showed that racial Others are positioned negatively by
relying on stereotypes and prejudicial images in society, while white groups are
positioned positively by identifying themselves as “well-qualified” students who “worked
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hard” for their status. Such self/other comparison clearly demonstrates how racial
ideologies and unearned privileged status are reproduced in interpersonal conversations.
Research Questions
The studies cited above set an important foundation for this study. Given the
conclusions listed above, there is a need to investigate if and how current interpersonal
discourses regarding immigration/foreign workers in the U.S. and Japan reproduce the
same ideologies by employing similar interpretative repertoires or people draw on
different interpretative repertoires or use unique rhetorical strategies regarding self-other
positionings. Since the process of reproducing racial ideologies that sustain racialized
systems of inequality and domination is context specific and fluid, I believe it is
important to explore the interpretative repertoires and discursive strategies employed in
the current period in both nations.
Given the fact that interpersonal discourses have not attracted much attention
from researchers as a site of reproduction of racial ideologies even in the U.S. where a
plethora of studies have been conducted on racial inequalities and racist practices, it is
not surprising that it is also an understudied area in Japan. Though more and more
researchers have recognized and problematized the racialized nature of Japanese society
and offered insights into how racist hierarchies are constructed in non-U.S. contexts, the
majority of studies focus on macro-contexts of Japanese society (e.g. Dikotter, 1997;
Fujimoto, 2001; Ishikida, 2005; Shikama, 2005; Shipper, 2002; Weiner, 1997; Yamanaka,
1993; Young, 1997) or aim at gaining ethnographic understandings of non-Japanese racial
groups in Japan by conducting interviews (e.g. Lie, 2000; Roth, 2002; Yamanaka, 2000).
Only a handful of studies put emphasis on how Japanese people communicate their
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opinions about foreigners or how they position themselves and others at an interpersonal
level (e.g. Darling-Wolf, 2003). Therefore, more research is necessary to understand how
interpersonal discourses reproduce, maintain, and challenge racialized systems of
inequality or domination in Japan as well as in the U.S.
Broad questions that are essential to the current study include the following. How
do interpersonal discourses in Japan and the U.S. reproduce racial ideologies? What kinds
of racial ideologies are reproduced in interpersonal dyadic discourses in Japan, as well as
in the U.S.? What do these discourses accomplish? What are the consequences of these
discourses? What interpretative repertoires are evident in interpersonal discourses in
these countries? These questions should be answered to understand the connections
between macro-institutional and micro-interpersonal level discourses in Japanese and U.S.
societies regarding immigration/foreign workers issues.
Therefore, the following research questions are posed for this study.
RQ1. What kinds of interpretative repertoires emerge in majority members’ (i.e.
whites in the U.S. and Japanese in Japan) dyadic interpersonal discourses
about immigration/foreign workers in the U.S. and in Japan?
RQ2. How do these interpretative repertoires work in reproducing, perpetuating
and/or challenging dominant racial ideologies and social systems of
dominance in the U.S. and in Japan?
RQ3. How do majority group members position themselves in relationship to
racial “Others” in their dyadic interpersonal discourses about
immigration/foreign workers in the U.S. and in Japan?
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RQ4. How do these discursive relationships between self and Others reproduce,
reinforce and/or challenge dominant racial ideologies and social systems of
dominance in the U.S. and in Japan?
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Chapter III: Methods
In the previous chapter, I delineated the primary objectives of this study:
investigating how racial ideologies are reproduced, maintained, and/or challenged in
dyadic interpersonal discourses regarding immigration/foreign workers in the U.S. and in
Japan. I specifically put focus on interpretative repertoires and discursive positioning of
self and Others that sustain the hegemonic system of dominance and inequality in
respective societies. In this chapter, I outline the use of Potter & Wetherell’s (1987)
discursive psychology as my methodology by describing the conformity between this
paradigm and my theoretical perspectives in this study. First, I briefly summarize
discourse analysis in general. Second, I describe the theoretical assumptions of discursive
psychology, as well as explaining the unique characteristics of Potter and Wetherell’s
(1987) discursive psychology. Lastly, I outline the procedures of this study.
Discourse Analysis in General
Based on its interdisciplinary nature and origins, there are various approaches to
discourse analysis. For example, ethnomethodology and conversational analysis are
derived from sociology, ethnography of speaking from anthropology, critical discourse
analysis from the combination of structural linguistics and critical theory, and discursive
psychology from social psychology (Wetherell, Taylor & Yates, 2001). Though
“discourse” is oftentimes defined as a specific way of speaking and writing, it has a more
specific definition in discourse analysis. Discourse is a set of texts, as well as processes
of production and consumption of them, that construct social realities and positionings
(Phillips & Hardy, 2002; Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002; Wetherell et al. 2001). As can be
seen in this definition, the basic assumption that most discourse analytical approaches
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share is that discourse is not a mere reflection of pre-existing realities or pre-determined
identities. On the contrary, discourse constructs realities, meanings, and identities
(Gergen, 1985; Phillips & Hardy, 2002; Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002; Wetherell et al.
2001). Therefore, discourse analysis aims at investigating the process of constructing
intersubjective meanings, identities and realities through the detailed analysis of specific
language use in certain contexts; whereas many interpretive analyses investigate how
specific language use reflects realities, meanings, and identities (Phillips & Hardy, 2002;
Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002).
Of importance here is that discourse analysis is not just a method or tool to
analyze language use. Discourse analysis is both theory and method at the same time
(Phillips & Hardy, 2002; Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). Discourse analysis includes
philosophical assumptions regarding the relationship between discourse and reality,
discourse and subjectivity, discourse and knowledge, and discourse and power, while it
provides theoretical guidelines for researchers to approach their research subjects and a
set of tools to analyze discourses (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). Thus, researchers are
required to follow the theoretical assumptions of the selected approach in conducting
discourse analysis.
Common Theoretical Assumptions in Discourse Analysis
Although the extent to which each discourse analytical approach emphasizes
constitutive aspects of discourses and macro-structural contexts may vary, most
approaches in discourse analysis share the assumptions that discourses are constitutive
and contextual. In other words, discourse analytical approaches share the foundations of
social constructionism and poststructuralism.
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Social constructionism and poststructuralism. Social constructionism
assumes that realities, meanings, and individuals’ positionings are constructed through
the use of language. As Kenneth Gergen (1985) argues, social constructionism is based
on the rejection of; objective truth, objective/authentic self, totalistic concepts,
essentialized notions of self and determinism. Thus, most discourse analysts dissent from
traditional social scientific research and universal theories, such as Marxism, about the
relationship among language, society, knowledge, and self. Poststructuralism is a
subcategory of social constructionism, and it is developed from the critique against
structuralist linguistics that is represented by Saussure (Kress, 2001; Phillips & Hardy,
2002; Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). Poststructuralists argue that the structure of meanings
is constructed in actual language use in interaction.
Foucault defines discourse as production of knowledge and subjectivities in
relations of power (Hall, 1997). Many discourse analysts do not agree with his idea that
only one “regime of truth” exists in one historical period and that determines what is true
or not/ what is meaningful or not. However, Foucault’s theorization of the relationships
among discourse, knowledge/power, and history had a large impact on many discourse
analytical approaches (Phillips & Hardy, 2002; Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). Specifically,
many discourse analytical approaches are informed by Foucault’s conceptualization of
power; power is pervasive in social structures and institutional discourses, and it is both
productive and oppressive (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). Thus, social constructionism,
poststructuralism, and Foucaudian notions of the relationship between discourse and
power are the assumptions that most discourse analysts share.
Differences among Discourse Analysis Approaches
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Sharing social constructionist and poststructuralist theoretical assumptions, what
makes various discourse analytical approaches differ is their relative focus along the two
axes: the dynamics of power relations in society and the process of constructing
meanings and realities, and texts or distal contexts (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). The
approaches with relative focus on the power dynamics in society and macro contexts are
considered as more critical, while those with relative focus on the constructive process
and texts are regarded as constructivist paradigms (Phillips & Hardy, 2002).
Constructivist paradigm. The major purpose of research in this paradigm is to
understand the lived experiences and situated meanings in specific contexts from the
actor’s point of view (Shwandt, 1998; Guba & Lincoln, 1998). With its assumption that
realities, meanings, and identities are constructed through discourse (Gergen, 1985),
discourse analysts in this paradigm put focus on the process of generating intersubjective
meanings, realities, and individual/group positioning. Despite its assumptions,
constructivists do not necessarily reject realist ontology, because one can still assume that
processes of constructing meanings, realities and identities are constrained by the social
structures that are previously constructed (Shwandt, 1998; Miller, 2005).
Critical paradigm. The major concern of this paradigm is the dynamics of
power relations in macro-contexts rather than in micro-interpersonal contexts (Martin &
Nakayama, 2004). Thus, discourse analysis from this paradigm often focuses on,
ideologies, exploitation, and domination (Collier, 2005; Martin & Nakayama, 2004).
Since this paradigm contains constructivist and materialist ontology, as well as historical
realism (Guba & Lincoln, 1998), researchers from this paradigm assume that realities,
meanings, and positioning are socially, historically, and ideologically constructed, and the
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process of construction is constrained by social structural forces, such as ideologies,
hierarchy, and differing degrees of agency.
One of the approaches that represents this paradigm is critical discourse analysis.
Critical discourse analysis has a strong basis in a critical paradigm. The focus is on the
discursive reproduction of a hegemonic social structure that protects inequality in society
(Fairclough, 1989; 1992). What makes this approach “critical” is its clear distinction
between discursive and non-discursive practices in society (Fairclough, 1989; 1992). This
approach assumes that there is a dialectical relationship between discourse and
non-discursive (social) practices; that is, discursive practices reproduce non-discursive
practices or structures, while non-discursive practices and social structures constrain
discursive practices (Fairclough, 1989; 1992).
The discourse analytical approach I employ must be consistent with the
objectives of this dissertation research. One of the primary goals of this study is to
identify links between the reproduction of systems of racial inequality at
macro-institutional levels and micro-interpersonal-levels through analyzing specific
language use and positioning of self and “Others.” Namely, I investigate the relationship
between informal dyadic discourse about immigration and social structural forces. I am
interested in the process in which interpersonal discourse generates meanings, realities,
and positioning of self and others, as well as how the dyadic discourses are constrained
by and/or reinforce existing dynamics of power relations in institutional policies and
discourses in the U.S. and Japan. Therefore, this research requires a discourse analytical
approach that entails both constructivist and critical paradigms. The analytical approach
that fulfills the need is Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) discursive psychology.
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Potter and Wetherell’s Discursive Psychology
Discursive psychology is strongly informed by a constructivist paradigm, and
some approaches do not take macro contexts or power dynamics in society into account
(Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). However, the discursive psychology of Potter and Wetherell
(1987) is critically informed, while it maintains a strong foundation in constructivist
paradigm. I believe Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) discursive psychology is a helpful
approach to investigate discourses at an interpersonal level, while focusing on the
connection between interpersonal discourses and macro-level discourses and social
structures.
Discursive psychology was developed in the 1980s in the UK with its rejection
of a cognitivist approach, which was the predominant perspective in social psychology
(Wetherell, 2001). A cognitivist approach assumes that language use is a true reflection of
individuals’ psychological states or realities. On the other hand, discursive psychologists
take a social constructionist perspective, assuming that realities, meanings, identities as
well as psychological phenomena are discursively constructed, rather than pre-existing or
pre-determined (Wetherell, 2001). With the influence of Wittgenstein’s concept of
“language game” and Kenneth Gergen’s rejection of an essentialist notion of self (Potter,
2001), discursive psychology investigates how individuals use discourses as resources
that are available to them to construct and negotiate their realities and positionalities by
analyzing specific language use in everyday situated contexts (Phillips & Jorgensen,
2002; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Discourse in this approach is
thus defined as specific language use in context that constructs realities and identities
(Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). One
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unique feature of Potter & Wetherell’s (1987) discursive psychological approach is that it
recognizes the importance of structural forces outside the situated discourse in addition to
that of specific texts. This approach thus focuses on how interpersonal discourses in
everyday life reproduce hegemonic social systems of inequality and domination
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992), and produce inclusion and exclusion.
The two primary analytical focuses in Potter & Wetherell’s (1987) discursive
psychological approach are interpretative repertoires and positioning. An interpretative
repertoire is a set of images and language that individuals use to construct, justify, and
legitimatize their version of realities and positioning (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell
& Potter, 1992). Potter and Wetherell (1987; 1992) argue that dominant ideologies are
reproduced through various uses of interpretative repertories. To understand the
interpretative repertoires that people draw on as resources to justify and reproduce
hegemonic social structures, discursive psychology provides a tool to analyze specific
rhetorical moves in these patterns of discourse. For example, Wetherell and Potter (1992)
contend that ambivalence, contradiction, and specific kinds of variation in the same
discourse are signs of interpretative repertoires people use to construct their views and
reproduce dominant ideologies. They found that ambivalence and inconsistency in
positioning of Others in the same discourses can be seen in comments that describe Maori
as an important cultural heritage of New Zealand on one hand, and Maori as radical,
irrational activists on the other hand. Based on their interviews with Pakeha (white) New
Zealanders, Wetherell and Potter (1992) contend that liberalism as an ideology, which is
actually illiberal, emerges from the use of different interpretative repertoires and allows
whites to justify their racist positions toward Maoris.
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The other analytical focus of Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) approach is
positioning. Positioning theory (Davis & Harre, 1990) explains that positioning is a
process in which individuals construct and negotiate their identities in interactions with
others. According to this theory, individuals’ identities and positionings are constructed
through the use of language, and the discursive positioning of self and others is
constrained and limited by the discourses that are available to different positions in the
specific contexts (Davis & Harre, 1990; Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). Therefore,
individuals’ positioning is relational, contextual, and ideological. Given this assumption,
Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) discursive approach recognizes that individuals’ discursive
positioning of “self” and “Others” in society emerges as discursive practices in which
power relations are constructed or challenged. Researchers in this approach thus focus on
the specific rhetorical moves or the use of metaphors in discourses that position “self”
and “Others.” For instance, Wetherell and Potter’s interview study (1992) illustrates that
Pakeha New Zealanders positions Maori as racial “Others” by reducing them to a
commodity of “cultural heritage.” The Pakeha can consume or appropriate this heritage in
learning the Maori language or buying their artifacts, while Pakeha position themselves
as a “culture-less” group. This invisibility of the white group in discourses positions
Pakeha a “normal” and “standard” in New Zealand (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) in similar
ways to how whites in the U.S. become un-named and invisible in public discourses
(Martin & Nakayama, 1999).
In summary, Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) discursive psychology is based on a
combination of constructivist and critical paradigms, and its primary objective is to reveal
ideological functions of interpersonal/everyday discourses, that reproduce and sustain
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hegemonic social systems of inequality/dominance. To achieve the goal, this approach
specifically focuses on interpretative repertoires as discursive resources, as well as
discursive positioning of “self” and “Others.” Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) approach
perfectly fits my theoretical approach, a combination of interpretive and critical
theoretical perspectives, as well as my focus on dyadic interpersonal discursive forms and
their functions that reproduce hegemonic systems of domination and inequality in the U.S.
and in Japan.
Procedures
In this section, I describe the specific procedures of recruitment of participants,
production of texts, and coding and analysis. I also refer to issues of reliability and
validity in the study.
Participants
The participants of this study were fourteen pairs of White U.S. American
college students and their conversational partners who also identified as white /
Caucasian adults, and seventeen pairs of Japanese college students and their
conversational partners who were also Japanese adults. The participants' racial group,
ethnic group and nationality were determined by their self-report of the categorization
they wrote on the demographic information sheet that I provided with the consent form of
this study.
The U.S. American participants were recruited from several undergraduate
communication courses at a public university in the southwestern part of the U.S. during
fall semester 2008. The participants consisted of 17 females and 11 males, ranging from
18 to 68 years old (see Table 1). Japanese participants were recruited from undergraduate
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communication/ English courses at a private university in the southwestern part of Japan
in the summer of 2008. Twenty six females and eight males participated. Their ages
ranged from 18 to 39 years (See Table 2).
Procedures
In conducting discursive psychological research, naturally occurring texts are
most appropriate (Cameron, 2001; Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002; Wetherell & Potter, 1992).
The following procedures have been used successfully by Moss & Faux (2006). In their
research, students who volunteered to participate were instructed to meet with a friend or
a classmate of their choice and to record their conversations. In order to obtain
interpersonal, naturally occurring discourses, I asked participants to talk about the issue
of immigration/foreign workers for 30 to 60 minutes in a site they chose. Participants
were asked to tape record their conversation with a tape recorder I provided (for
instructions to students, see Appendix A and B). Both students were required to sign an
informed consent form (See Appendix D). I asked instructors in the U.S. and Japan to
assign the dyadic discussion as an extra credit activity. I also asked them to design a
comparable alternative activity for students who declined to participate in the study so
that participation was fully voluntary.
First, I asked participants to discuss three points of view listed below related to
immigration/foreign workers, in a quiet place where they felt comfortable. The three
statements were constructed from predominant views reflected in public discourses about
immigration/foreign workers. For the U.S. participants, the following three statements
were provided:
I. Immigrants are harmful to the U.S. They take jobs away from U.S. citizens, and
illegal immigrants exploit our welfare, healthcare, and educational systems
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without paying taxes. Also, when there are high numbers of immigrants, the crime
rate often goes up and cities become overpopulated. High numbers of immigrants
may threaten our traditional American values because most do not learn to speak
English and they do not want to assimilate to the U.S. culture or lifestyle.
II. Immigrants contribute in many positive ways. The U.S. has a long history of
opening its doors to immigrants. They help our economy by taking jobs that many
U.S. citizens are unwilling to do, and they provide a much needed labor force in
U.S. companies and in the field of agriculture. Many immigrants have knowledge
and specialized training that is needed in fields like higher education. Immigrants
also help the U.S. participate more effectively in a global economy and add to
valued diversity in our country.
III. Immigrants are both good and bad; it depends on what they contribute to the
country. Legal immigrants who learn English and make efforts to adjust to U.S.
culture and lifestyle might be able to contribute in a positive way. Our economy
can’t support too many immigrants though, so it would be best for the country if
only the most qualified, in small numbers, were allowed into the country.

In a similar way, Japanese participants were asked to discuss based on the following three
statements written in Japanese (translated by the author):
I.

We have been facing various issues due to the recent increase of foreign workers
in Japan. For example, the increasing cases of theft, robbery, assaults, homicide,
over-staying, illegal labor, and false marriage are noticeable. Also, employing a
low-skill cheap labor force from foreign countries may lead to an increasing
number of unemployed in Japan. Given these issues, the Japanese government
should set a limit on the number of foreign workers to protect the Japanese nation
and its citizens.

II. Due to the low birth rate and aging population in Japan, the demand for a young
labor force has been rising. Immigrants and foreign workers play an important
role to support Japanese economy by filling the void and they also accelerate
internationalization of the country. For example, foreign workers are absolutely
necessary in areas lacking in the labor force such as nursing care. Also in
academic or technical fields, fruitful and successful international exchange can be
achieved by inviting skilled people including engineers, instructors, or foreign
students to work together. In order to achieve national advancement and
internationalization, the Japanese government should implement policies that
facilitate the admission process of foreign workers.
III. Though Japan should not accept an unlimited number of immigrants and foreign
workers, we should actively accept foreign workers with knowledge, talent and
skills that our nation needs. In order to achieve that, Japan should reconsider the
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treatment of foreign workers: They should not be regarded as merely unskilled
labor force but should be eligible for some protection, such as Minimum Wage
Act, Labor Standard Act, and labor insurance. In addition, the Japanese
government should implement stricter policies to punish Japanese companies that
hire illegal immigrants, in order to reduce the number of illegal workers and
illegal residents.
These statements were constructed in a systematic way. During spring term 2008,
students in communication classes in the U.S. and communication/ English classes in
Japan were asked to participate in an activity to identify common views on immigration/
foreign workers. First, in groups they were asked to agree on the three most common
views they had heard on immigration/foreign workers. Second, the students were asked to
read the list of factors, such as financial needs, economic issues, labor market,
environment, etc, and add to the list of three views. Based on their suggestions I
synthesized these into three different views (See Appendix A and B).
I provided these three competing views as suggestions for discussion regarding
immigrants/foreign workers, because I believe participants’ dyadic conversational talk
about common views might reveal similar interpretative repertoires, positioning and also
dialectical tensions of inclusion and exclusion as macro-level discourses do. Along with
these views, I also provided a few suggested open ended questions to help individuals
elaborate on their views (For the specific questions, see Appendix A and B).
At the end of the conversation, both participants were asked to fill out a short
demographic survey about their age, gender, racial/ethnic identities, and their parents’
occupations (See Appendix C). I transcribed each tape-recorded conversation. In terms of
the Japanese version, I transcribed them first in Japanese, and then translated them into
English. To establish translation equality, I asked a Japanese-English bilingual student to
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check my translation. To protect participants’ privacy, I assigned pseudonyms for all
participants.
Coding and Analysis
In order to grasp the interpretative repertories that participants draw on to justify
and perpetuate or challenge dominant ideologies in dyadic interpersonal discourses, I
started with reading and re-reading all the transcripts of the discourses. From an
interpretive point of view, it is important to look for general themes and categories of
discourse that emerge from the data. First I identified broad categories such as views,
claims, stories/narratives and discussion of significant factors affecting immigrants/
foreign workers. I also looked for cultural identity avowals and ascriptions and noted
us-them comparisons. Since I employed both interpretive and critical perspectives, next, I
looked for discursive patterns that have been identified in past research to be indicators of
racial ideologies and positioning, including abstract liberalism, naturalization, color-blind
ideologies, and so forth. Identifying themes that corresponded with those, as well as
being open to new themes in the conversational discourses, I attempted to capture how
and what kinds of ideologies were reproduced across the discourses. During the coding
process, I made files of examples of different themes by copying excerpts from the
transcripts, and I went back to the original transcripts again to look for more examples to
develop or redefine the themes. Wetherell and Potter (1992) argue that this cyclic coding
process is imperative.
Once I identified some primary themes across the discourses, I put focus on the
specific rhetorical moves frequently used by participants. For example, Wetherell and
Potter (1992) contend that variability is one of the key elements in identifying
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interpretative repertories. Variability here refers to the situation in which people describe
the same event, processes, or group of people in different ways to achieve different
effects (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). For example, people may express racist opinions or
attitudes and later they may use the terms or statements that appear anti-racist. In a
discursive psychological approach, such inconsistency is considered natural and also a
rich resource. Investigating the patterns and forms of variation on the certain topics or
issues in discourses, such as ambivalence of views, allow researchers to grasp the
patterns of interpretative repertoires (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). After identifying
interpretative repertories and specific patterns, I analyzed the discursive practices and
what these discursive practices achieved. Specifically, I examined how interpretative
repertories in interpersonal dyadic discourses reproduce and perpetuate systems of racial
inequality and dominance that are also evident in institutional and public discourses.
In terms of examining discursive positioning in the dyadic discourses, I put
focus on the use of pronouns, metaphors, and other rhetorical moves that constructed the
speakers’ identity positions and those of “Others.” To make the connections between
macro-level discourse patterns already identified and these micro-interpersonal level
discourses, I looked for “positive-self” and “negative-Other” positioning in the
participants’ conversations regarding immigrants/foreign workers in each country. I then
analyzed the ideological role of such positioning in interpersonal discourses. For example
I explored how these relationships between self and Others contributed to and/or
challenged the maintenance of systems of racial hierarchy and inclusion/exclusion.
In writing up the findings of this study, I gave attention to the issues of reliability
and validity. While reliability and validity are criteria of quantitative/ social scientific
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research, qualitative research also includes these issues. In qualitative research, reliability
can be established by describing the process and context of the study in detail so that
readers can follow the same trail of the study (Kirk & Miller, 1985). In discourse analysis,
it is also important to include a sufficient amount of excerpts from actual texts (Phillips &
Jorgensen, 2002) in order to allow other researchers to assess the validity of
interpretations. Potter and Wetherell (1987) describe two dimensions of validity:
coherence and fruitfulness. To establish coherence, in the following chapters I included
multiple examples of discourse to illustrate themes and analyzed consistency with others’
findings regarding discursive reproduction of systems of inequality/dominance (e.g.
Essed, 1991; Dixon et al, 1994; Moss & Faux, 2006; Wetherell & Potter, 1992).
Fruitfulness, on the other hand, refers to the ability of the study to produce new
knowledge and interpretation of the phenomena under study (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). I
add new insights into the literature about conversational themes and the discursive
reproduction of hegemonic social systems of race relations in the U.S. and in Japan.
Reflexivity
Given the constructionist/poststructuralist assumptions about the relationship
between discourses and realities, as a researcher, I am also participating in constructing
these particular dyadic discourses. Therefore, in the process of analyzing and interpreting
the data for this study, recognizing my position and its influence on this study is
important. Though I did not physically converse with participants and did not co-produce
the conversational texts with them, my role as a researcher still makes me an actor
interacting with the texts. Specifically, in interpreting and analyzing the dyadic discourses
and writing up the analysis, I entered into a “dialogue” with the texts and produced
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discourses (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). As Wetherell and Potter (1992) argue, it is
impossible to detach researchers’ knowledge, perceptions, opinions, and positionalities
from their research, especially in research attempting to capture ideological practices and
functions. To make my positioning clear, I briefly describe my background here.
I am a Japanese female Ph.D. student in communication at a university in the
southwestern part of the U.S. Until I left the U.S. in December 2008, I had lived in the
U.S. for almost three and a half years to study intercultural communication in a graduate
program. Currently, while working on this study, I am back in Japan and teaching English
as a foreign language to non-English majors at the college from which I graduated.
I was raised as an only child in a middle-class family from the southwestern part
of Japan. After finishing my compulsory education, I went to a private high school,
obtained bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree at a private college. Thinking of myself
as a “typical” Japanese woman from a country where common views are that “there
exists one single ethnic group” and “everybody is middle-class,” I did not question my
racial/ethnic and class identities while I was in Japan. Though I felt that being a woman
was not as privileged as being a man in patriarchal Japanese society, I viewed my
identities as “standard” and “normal” in society.
When I moved to the U.S., it did not take long to notice that I was not “standard”
anymore. I suddenly became a “foreigner” and a racial “Other” in society. Gradually, I
developed interests in communication issues related to racial “Others” in the U.S. and
then I encountered the concept of systemic racism. As I leaned about systems of racial
inequality and dominance in the U.S., I started seeing that similar systems also exist in
Japan.
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Becoming aware of the existence of the hegemonic systems of racial inequality
and domination in the societies where I have lived and belong, I felt the need to study
how we, as individuals, perhaps unconsciously, contribute to the reproduction and
perpetuation of hegemonic systems through our everyday discourses. As I mentioned in
the previous chapter, racial ideologies, such as color-blind ideologies, whiteness
ideologies, and racial purity ideologies are constructed and sustained at macro-level
practices, and the same ideologies are reproduced at micro-interpersonal level discourses.
This assumption, therefore, is a key element of the framework that I hold when I
approach the interpretation and analysis of participants’ discourses about
immigrants/foreign workers.
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Chapter IV: Interview Discourse on Immigration in the U.S.
In chapter three, I discussed why I believe Potter and Wetherell’s (1987)
discursive psychology is an appropriate analytical approach for this study. This particular
methodology is rooted in the combination of a constructivist and critical paradigm, and
its major goal is revealing the ideological role that specific language use in interpersonal
relationships has in maintaining social systems of inequality and dominance. Therefore,
this approach is suitable for my focus on both dyadic everyday discourse and its
ideological relationship with discourse on the institutional/societal level. As I mentioned
in the previous chapter, Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) discursive psychological approach
has two primary analytical foci: interpretative repertoires and positioning. In this chapter,
I demonstrate my analysis of dyadic discourse on immigration in the U.S. regarding
interpretative repertoires and positioning of self and Others. First, I briefly summarize the
concept of interpretative repertoire and positioning that I reviewed in the previous
chapters.
An interpretative repertoire is considered a set of language and images that
people use to construct, justify, and legitimate their version of realities and positioning
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). The set of language and images
people use in their talk are the ones that are made available to them culturally, historically,
and ideologically (Billig, 1997). Potter and Wetherell (1987) argue that people draw on
certain interpretative repertoires to express their views on specific topics, but at the same
time, ideological force makes certain interpretative repertories available to people to use
as resources so that the system of inequality/dominance can be justified and maintained
in a hegemonic way. Thus, exploring what kind of interpretative repertories people use as
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their resources in discussing race-laden topics may reveal pervasive ideologies in society
and how systems of inequality are reproduced or challenged.
The concept of positioning is closely related to that of interpretative repertoires,
and it is also a key to reveal discursive production and maintenance of inequality and
domination. Positioning is a discursive process in which cultural groups (e.g.
identifications and representations based on race, ethnicity, gender, class) are constructed
and positioned in relation to others in different contexts; positioning can be practiced in
public/media discourse or by selves through interpersonal conversations (Davis & Harre,
1990; Harre & Langenhov, 1999). As well as any other discursive practices, positioning
of selves or others is constrained by social forces. Since people use specific terms and
images that are available to them within certain discourses, the positioning process is
limited by the discursive resources in certain cultural, historical, and ideological frames –
that is where power operates discursively (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2004). Since the cultural,
historical and ideological frames that provide discursive resources to people usually work
for dominant group members in society, certain types of positioning of self and Others
become common and “normal” in society. Discursive positioning of self and Others,
therefore, also constructs and maintains power relations in society. For example, as I
reviewed in chapter one and two, it is common that dominant white group members are
positively positioned while non-white group members tend to be negatively positioned in
discourse at the macro-institutional level, including media, educational, and political
discourse (e.g. van Dijk, 1992, 1993, 1995, 2000). In addition to these macro-level
discourses, positive-self and negative-Other positioning is also a common strategy
employed at the interpersonal levels to protect the system of dominance (e.g.
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Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Moss & Faux, 2006; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Investigating what
kinds of discursive resources participants of this study use to position themselves and
racial Others thus may reveal how racialized social systems are reproduced or challenged
in discourses at the interpersonal level.
In the following section, I illustrate some prominent interpretative repertories
that participants of this study employed, as well as how participants positioned “us” and
“them.”

I would like to note here that some of the repertoires are overlapping: some

examples can be categorized under two repertoires. In many cases individuals drew on
multiple repertoires, or multiple repertoires could be intertwined in one discourse.
Though I tried to showcase examples that can highlight one specific repertoire, each
category of interpretative repertoire is not mutually exclusive. With multiple examples of
each repertoire and positioning therein, I also examine what these repertoires/positionings
achieve in reproducing, perpetuating and /or challenging dominant racial ideologies and
social systems of dominance in the U.S.
Before moving on to the analyses of participants’ accounts, however, I need to
clarify that my intention in this study is not about criticizing individuals’ characters,
personalities, or intentions in their accounts. With my theoretical point of view,
individuals’ racial accounts are not manifestations of their personality or personal racist
attitudes; on the contrary, I consider these accounts to be the outcome of ideological
processes in social systems of racial inequality/dominance. Namely, the system of
domination/inequality produces and perpetuates racial ideologies that make certain
discursive resources (discursive themes, styles, vocabularies, metaphors among others)
available to people, and these resources act to protect the dominant racial group’s position
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and privileges. The dominant group members are thus more likely to construct race-laden
events or racial groups (including themselves) with the discursive resources that conform
to the dominant racial ideologies. My research interest here is what kinds of discursive
resources are made available and are engaged by the dominant racial groups in the U.S
and Japan, and how their discourses recreate, maintain, or challenge dominant racial
ideologies in the respective society. The intentions of individuals, their personalities and
attitudes are rather insignificant in this study. Lastly, as mentioned in the previous chapter,
all participants were assigned pseudonyms to protect their privacy. The demographic
terms (e.g. race, ethnicity, occupation, etc) used in the following sections are based on the
labels or categories each respondent used in their dyadic conversation or wrote on the
demographic information sheet that they turned in with their recorded audio tape.
Interpretative Repertoires and Positioning in the U.S. Interview Discourse
In chapter two, I reviewed past and present immigration practices and policies in
the U.S., and argued that U.S. political/institutional discourse regarding immigration has
justified and legitimatized racist practices by emphasizing non-racial factors such as the
economy or immigrants’ culture, as well as positioning white members positively and
non-white immigrants members negatively. This discursive erasing of race from the issue
reinforces dominant racial ideologies, including color-blind ideology, and helps maintain
the ideologies as “common sense” or “normal” frameworks (Bonilla-Silva, 1996, 2001,
2006; 1995, 2000). Positive-self and negative-Other comparisons in macro-level
discourse enable dominant racial group members to remain unnamed and invisible, which
protects their unearned privilege (Billig, 1997, Flores, 2003; van Dijk, 1992, 1993). Such
a mechanism ensures that the system of inequality and domination maintains itself in a
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hegemonic way, and this can be observed in interpersonal, everyday discourse (see Moss
& Faux, 2006; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). As Essed (1991) argues, racist practices at the
macro-public levels and micro-interpersonal levels are interrelated; macro-social
structures constrain and enable everyday interpersonal practices, while the interpersonal
practices reinforce or challenge the underlying power dynamics produced by the social
systems of inequality and domination (Essed, 1991).
In the following section, I describe four major interpretative repertoires that
participants employed as their discursive resources when they talked about immigration
in the U.S. The four interpretative repertoires are 1) we are a nation of particular/ select
immigrants who have benefited from the melting pot, 2) the American dream can be
achieved only by qualified and hardworking individuals, 3) being American means
speaking English, and 4) we should consider the context of racist policies and practices
and what’s “normal” and expected, when thinking about immigration. In addition to
providing multiple examples of these repertories, I examine how each repertoire,
positioning of self and Others, and specific language use, therein facilitate or challenge
ideological tasks of reproducing and maintaining racialized social systems. Finally, I list
some examples of discourse that challenge dominant racial discourses and the
white-centered social system.
As I explained in chapter three, participants carried on their conversations based
on the three discussion statements provided on their discussion guideline. Briefly
summarized, each statement offers following views: 1) Immigrants are harmful to the U.S.
and they cause various social problems, 2) Immigrants contribute to U.S. society in many
positive ways, and 3) Since immigrants are both good and bad, only the most qualified, in
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small numbers, should be allowed into the country. . For the complete scripts of these
three statements, please refer to Appendix A.
We are a Nation of Paricular/Select Immigrants who have Benfited from the
Melting Pot
Participants drew on this repertoire most frequently among others; out of 14
pairs, 13 pairs employed this repertoire, and most participants used this resource more
than once in their conversation. This repertoire can be spotted by the phrases such as “the
United States is an immigration nation,” “everyone in the United States besides Native
Americans are immigrants,” “this country is a melting pot,” and “the melting pot makes
this country unique and strong.” By employing these phrases, individuals can positively
present themselves as pro-immigration and tolerant of diversity. Closely examined,
however, it is evident that participants use these resources to justify, rationalize, or buffer
their not-so-positive construction of immigration/ immigrants. This view of immigrants
both endorses and is restrained by restrictionist or assimilationist ideology but valorizes
the myth of pluralism. In fact, there emerges a clear demarcation between immigrants
who are on “our side” and others on “their side,” and this discourse may try to keep those
on “their side” out, or expect “them” to be like “us.” For example, some individuals
insisted that everybody should assimilate into “the American culture” because this is a
melting pot; or they also stated that “we are all immigrants and this country is a melting
pot” while later negatively positioning non-white immigrants as criminals or welfare
dependent who destroy the unity of the melting pot. Since many cases of this
interpretative repertoire are characterized by ambivalence, and praise and criticism of
immigrants emerged in participants’ discourse, I roughly categorized examples into four
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sub-groups. In the first group, participants positioned themselves as “standard,” “normal,”
or a “culture-less” group that lost their past culture and assimilated into “the American
culture,” while expecting immigrants to do the same. In the second category, participants
constructed immigrants as groups with cultures that can be consumed or enjoyed by “us.”
The third group exemplifies rather blatant negative positioning of immigrants as racial
Others; specifically, criminality and illegality are emphasized in participants’
conversations. The last category is comprised of examples of discourse that support
color-blind ideology by focusing on individual meritocracy.
“We” assimilated and lost our past culture; immigrants should do the same.
The following statement was made by Peter, a 53 year old accountant who identified
himself as White Roman catholic. He was asked by his daughter, Illiana, with which of
the three statements on the discussion guideline he identified.
Peter: Um, I think there are some valuable points in each one of them. The
whole topic of immigrants and immigration, especially in this country brings a
different light to everything. I think this country was formed essentially from a
good number of immigrants. People from all different countries coming here and
the country building up and growing stronger as a result of many different
people from different backgrounds. That’s what makes this country so
unique…Um, immigrants from different societies, from different countries that
help contribute by forming small communities throughout this country.
Though Peter employed this “nation of immigrants” frame and constructed
immigration in general in a positive matter, a couple of minutes later, he mentioned that
this melting pot was malfunctioning because a lot of people were not willing to melt in
the pot together.
Peter: …it’s more a country, that has to be a united country. And this country has
to pull together and it’s gonna bring a lot of ideas together. The fact that they
come from different ground, backgrounds and different countries or different
thoughts, or different, you know, different ways of doing things. It’s good. It
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creates a new perspective and looking that how you solve the problem or how
you move forward in society. So, I think that part of it could be positive, if
everyone is pulling together. Unfortunately, it looks like a lot of people are
pulling apart, wanting to create and make their home individual culture, their
own individual country, or background becomes the only thing that, in that
particular area.

According to van Dijk’s (2000b) study on parliamentary debates on immigration,
expressing a wish for a unified nation or claim the country is a unified nation is a
common discursive strategy that justifies racial accounts without appearing racist. He
calls this strategy “consensus” (van Dijk, 2000b), and Peter’s statement exemplifies that
“consensus” is used at the interpersonal level. Drawing on this repertoire, Peter cushioned
his negative view that there are a lot of immigrants who refuse to assimilate into
American culture and they are not the ones that contribute to make the country unique
and strong. Who was not included in the group he had referred to as “a lot of people who
are pulling apart” becomes apparent in the later conversation. When Illiana said, “I think,
in a way, everyone here is an immigrant…because we came over on the Mayflower…and
I would guess that after one or two generations, we become Americans no matter what,”
Peter agreed and then replied:
Peter: From a cultural standpoint, the further, the more generations that passed,
the more they tend to lose that wherever the founded country or where you come
from. You lose that, um, that insight and, or cultures and, or the, whatever types
of practices…they become less and less, um, part of your life. Certain people
like us, like I mean, our culture is completely gone. It’s been too many years, I
think. Since our great grand grandparents [came] so far back that I can’t even
associate anymore with where we come from… and it’s really hard to try to
distinguish that. But I think that’s natural for anyone who immigrates to this
country.
As can be seen above, “we” are the ones who assimilated and melted into the unified
culture as Americans, but “they” in the previous statement are the ones who were pulling
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apart and threatening the unity of the nation by maintaining their cultures. Discursive
comparison between an assimilated “us,” and a resisting “them,” reproduces an
assimilationist ideology in society. This conveys that it is natural, beneficial, and required
to assimilate into “the American culture,” which actually is white culture. This is
demonstrated in multiple examples and subsequent analysis. Also in this example,
“certain people like us” were positioned as “culture-less” and it is a “natural” process to
lose one’s own culture and “become Americans.” The discourses in which “we” were
positioned as culture-less, while “they” were positioned as the ones that bring and
maintain cultures in the U.S, were common among participants in this study. Such a
discursive positioning not only clearly demarcates “us” and “them” but also maintains
white members’ invisibility and normativity. The maintenance of whites’ unnamed
position can be recognized more clearly in the following example, a conversation
between Kathy and Brittney, two classmates who identified themselves as
White/Caucasian. They were reading the three statements on the discussion guideline
sentence by sentence.
Brittney: Oh, “they don’t want to assimilate into the U.S. culture or lifestyle.”
Do they not want to?
Kathy: Do we, do we necessarily have, like, culture?
Britney: I doubt we do, ‘cause everyone doesn’t think they have an accent or
something.
Kathy: That’s true.
Brittney: I don’t know, so maybe we have culture. I just don’t know what it is.
Kathy: Our culture is just normal. Like, nothing-ness.

Brittney’s first statement, “do they not want to [assimilate into the U.S. culture or
lifestyle?]” reproduces the myth of assimilation as Peter’s does; and at the same time the
assumption that “they” must want to assimilate to “us,” positions “us,” white Americans,
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as the standard and the norm for “them.” Their following comments also demonstrate the
typical pattern of whiteness in discourse. Brittney’s doubt of the existence of “our”
culture, and Kathy’s comment, “our” culture is just normal. Like, nothing-ness”
constructs the essence of whiteness: Whites are the norm, standard, and invisible
(McIntosh, 1988). They can claim their invisibility and “nothing-ness” because the social
system of dominance produces the racial consensus that white group members are the
standard and thus the system and its ideological processes are “natural” for them. As
Billig (1997) argues, white identity possesses an “absent center” and whites can be an
“unnamed standard” in positioning of self and Others.
Some consumable cultural products offered by immigrants are acceptable.
In contrast to the positioning of “us” as standard and invisible in the discourse of a nation
of immigrants, immigrants were constructed as agents that deliver either “good”
consumable cultures or different language to the “culture-less” country in Kathy &
Brittney’s discourse.
Brittney: I think it’s good to see other cultures and experience them.
Kathy: I think it’s awesome. Like, how can we, like, I can’t even imagine this
country without different cultures.
Brittney: Yeah, I don’t [overlapping]
Kathy: Like, so many of our foods are from other places.
Brittney: Oh, I love food. Food is good.
Kathy: [laughter] yeah. So many foods are from other places, like, we all, well
not all, but I guess we do, we have different languages. I guess we don’t learn it,
but…

In the previous excerpt, Kathy said that their culture was just “normal” and
“nothing-ness”; in this example, she said that she “can’t even imagine this country
without different cultures.” Therefore, “cultures” for Kathy are something that non-white
groups brought/bring into the country. Also, according to Brittney’s statement, non-white
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cultures are something to “see” and “experience,” like food “from other places.” Britney
and Kathy positioned immigrants as carriers of cultures; constructing immigrant culture
as something consumable was common in the participants’ discourse. The following
excerpt is from Meg, a 29 year old Anglo1 American student.
Meg: Um, as far as immigrants moving to the U.S., and changing their lifestyle
and things like that, that’s not really important to me. I’m actually kind of glad
that, like, first generation immigrants who move here bring their culture with
them, and kind of share with their community. Um, if that didn’t happen, we
would be, it would be pretty boring to go out to eat. Because it would be slim
pickings and um, I really enjoy the fact that there are foreign restaurants
available. It would be sad not to have that, you know, so especially, oh boy, I can
think of how many our dietary, um, our diet would be just horrible if we didn’t
have immigrants here to kind of spice things up.
As Kathy and Brittney did, Meg’s discourse also positioned immigrants who move here
as useful to “spice things up” with their exotic foods. Another example is from Steve, a
22 year old White/Irish/Catholic student, and his best friend Betty, an 18 year old
White/Spanish student, who also talked about culture as food that immigrants introduce.
Steve: All I know is, burrito is delicious.
Betty: [laughter]
Steve: I’m serious [laughter]. No, no, that’s true. Think about it. If we didn’t
have the cultural influences, we wouldn’t have the varieties in our cuisine, and
that’s just one contribution.
Betty: And they could do it, legally.
Betty’s last comment, “they could do it, legally” may be interpreted as a negative
positioning of Others, because her comments imply that immigrants tend to engage in
illegal activities except bringing a variety of food to the country. These statements of
constructing immigrants’ cultures as a commodity that whites can enjoy may be viewed
as examples of positive-Other positioning, because these participants say they like the
foods brought into the country by immigrants. However, reducing immigrants’ cultures
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into one commodity also can be considered as exoticizing and subjugating racial Others
(Hall, 1997; Said, 1978). As Sorrells (2003) argues appropriation and consumption of
Pueblo and Navajo women’s artifacts is a form of exercising dominant white power over
them. Therefore imposing limited stereotypical cultural representations on immigrants as
producers of particular food positions them in a limited way and constrains their agency
and their voices.
Immigrants are illegal, criminals, non taxpayers, and non contributors;
these are not acceptable in the U.S. Compared to the excerpts cited above, the
following examples of discourse position immigrants negatively in a relatively explicit
way. By employing this interpretative repertoire, however, participants can soften their
rather straightforward negative statements about immigrants and immigration, while
being able to claim to be non-racist. In his discussion of elite discourse and systems of
racism, van Dijk (1995) contends that elites strategically protect their positive self-image
as tolerant citizens while positioning “others” negatively and denying racism in a variety
of discourses such as media, political, and educational discourse. As he further argues,
interpersonal talk also plays an important role in enacting and reinforcing what elites
institutionally implement (van Dijk, 1995). Examples of interpersonal-versions of elite
discourse are reported below. The first example is Brandon and Jake’s conversation,
where their assimilationist view is justified by this repertoire, and contradiction and
ambivalence are clearly demonstrated. Brandon is a 42 year old Caucasian male who is
working in the field of computers, and his friend Jake is a 23 year old White/ Caucasian
college student.
Brandon: I identify mostly with statement number three. I see both good and
bad points of immigration, Some immigrants, if they get benefits of the United
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States without contributing, they for sure are a drain on us. But a lot of
immigrants, the diversity they provide, their special skills, and just creating a
better relationships with the United States is important.
Jake: I agree with that statement for the most part, and a little bit in the middle. I
tend to believe that an open immigration policy is pretty dangerous. You
shouldn’t let a mass to flood in and there’s a lot of reasons for that. Mostly due
to population control, and other reasons like that. But at the same time, it is also
important that our country is founded almost exclusively upon immigration, and
that’s the heritage that we need to continue, and we should not prevent. It’s
definitely important that if we are going to continue with immigration, people
need to be able to meld into the society, and be contributing members, pay taxes
if they expect to be granted the same access to health care and all the facilities
that normal tax payers have build, like using public transportation, roads, things
like that in nature.
This example describes that participants cushion their negative positioning of immigrants
(e.g. some immigrants can be a drain on “us” or the implication that “they” reap the
benefits from “us”) by inserting phrases taken from this repertoire and juxtaposing
positive and negative positioning of immigrants. For example, Jake’s statement can be
interpreted as an implication of immigrants not paying taxes while being granted the
same access as “us.” At the same time, this statement thus positions “us” as good
taxpayers who obey the rules. Such a positive-self and negative-other comparison and his
rather assertive, restrictionist/assimilationist views on immigration are softened by the
statement such as “our country is founded almost exclusively upon immigration, and
that’s the heritage that we need to continue, and we should not prevent.” Thus, this
interpretative repertoire serves to provide a discursive buffer to make contradicting and
ambivalent articulation possible and unquestioned (Billig et al., 1988).
In this example, it is also noticeable that the concreteness of the statements is
different between the phrases from the repertoire and the negative positioning. The
statement such as “that’s the heritage that we need to continue, and we should not prevent”
is more abstract compared to “pay taxes if they expect to be granted the same access to
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health care and all the facilities that normal tax payers have built, like using public
transportation, roads, things like that in nature.” It is actually the abstract nature of the
repertoire that allows people to use this resource in various different ways to achieve
different effects. Because the interpretative repertoire is abstract in a consistent manner,
people can draw on it in order to weave the same issues, events, actions and groups of
people in different but justifiable ways. Wetherell and Potter (1992) contend that this
variability is important signal of the existence of an interpretative repertoire.
Another example that demonstrates how interpretative repertoires allow people
to make ambivalent or contradicting statements is the exchange between two friends,
Allen and Ed, who are both 20 year old Caucasian undergraduate students.
Ed: I could see, I could see immigrants being sort of harmful to our system, you
know. Just taking that social security and stuff, without giving back. ‘Cause I
mean you have to give back. If you’re gonna be a part of America, you gonna
put in something. That’s the whole idea.
Allen: That’s America.
Ed: Yep.
Allen: It’s a collective conglomerate. We’re definitely showing that. And
honestly, our melting pot has made us the strongest nation.

In the beginning, Allen and Ed’s discourse positioned immigrants as “harmful to our
system” because they commit crimes and do not contribute (or give back) to the U.S.
However, the positive image of “the strongest nation” described as a collaborating
conglomerate and the melting pot alleviate the impact that negative positioning of
“Others” may have.
The next example is Sarah’s discourse. Sarah is a 21 year old college student,
and she identified her race as Caucasian and her ethnicity Irish/ Scottish. She talked with
her friend Victor, who identified his race as White and his ethnicity as Italian. They were
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following the list of the potentially significant factors of immigration in the U.S., which
was provided on the discussion guideline.
Sarah: Um, let’s see. Race, as far as race, ethnicity and culture, we all know that
America is the melting pot, and I think that’ s why a lot of people love it and
wanna come here. And in that sense, I think it’s amazing to open up to different
races and different ethnicities as long as they are willing to go through the long
process of getting into the country and really becoming a citizen, not just coming
here to send money back to their family or um, whatever they are planning on
doing. Um, I think that the reason crime, crime rate goes up when there’s
immigrants because a lot of them do fly under the radar and untraceable and can
just be free. Because they are all, I mean, sorry, not all of them [are], but some of
them, use different social security numbers. I mean, I’ve seen it first-hand.
Sarah started her statement regarding race factors with a metaphor of the melting
pot. Given the pervasiveness of the myth of multi-culturalism/pluralism in the U.S., her
comments reproduce that it is natural that the participants in this study positioned
themselves as tolerant toward diversity. Sarah’s statement, “I think it’s amazing to open
up to different races and different ethnicities” demonstrates this tendency. However, after
that statement, She added a contingency, “as long as they are willing to…really becoming
a citizen,” which shows that the “they” she was talking about are people who have a
different race or ethnicity from hers, and only particular immigrants are welcome. Her
statements also positioned her own whiteness as the standard in comparison to “different
races and ethnicities” who “wanna come here.” Sarah’s discourse also constructed
immigrants as ones that do not obey the law and commit crimes. Even though Sarah did
not specify the race of the people she was criticizing, it is probable that she was talking
about immigrants from Mexico. “Just coming here to send money back to their family,”
“a lot of them do fly under the radar,” and “some of them use different social security
numbers” are some of the widely circulating representations of Mexican immigrants as
racial others, which often emerged the participants’ discourse in this study. Studies of
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macro-discourse on immigrants also demonstrate that it is a common strategy to construct
immigrants as a threat to the nation by focusing on criminality and illegality (e.g. Demo,
2005; Flores, 2003; Santa Ana, 1999; Torigoe & Collier, 2008; van Dijk, 1992; 1995;
2000).
Among participants’ comments in which immigrants were positioned negatively
as illegal or criminals, there emerged evidence of ambivalence; compassionate or
empathetic comments often accompanied negative positioning of immigrants, especially
those from Mexico. Such comments work to protect dominant racial members’ self image
of being non-racist and having compassion. This discursive pattern corresponds with a
strategy called “empathy”, that emerged in political debates on immigration in UK (van
Dijk, 2000b) and is also found in interpersonal discourse on race (Bonilla-Silva, 2001;
2006). For example, Julie, a 23 year old White/Caucasian graduate student, said, “I know
that they are coming from poor countries.” Showing her empathy toward economic
conditions in Mexico, however, she later continued:
Julie: Some people that are coming from other countries grow up with a whole
different set of values and morals and circumstances that they were brought up
in. Um, you know, that’s not just saying that everybody is like that, but a lot of
people are. There’s a lot of, you know, gang wars and crimes and the way that
they treat each other. Um, you know, they bring that over here. And they don’t
adapt to our laws, um, you know, I think that a lot of people that come over here
cause problems because they bring their culture and their morals here and they
don’t fit, you know, a lot of times.

In Julie’s statement, immigrants were constructed as the source of various negative
problems in the U.S. by saying “they bring that over here,” and, “they” are also
positioned as ones that “don’t adapt to our laws.” These statements negatively positioned
immigrants’ morality and cultures, and at the same time they positioned an “us” as
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victims of immigrants’ criminal acts and “our country” as a crime-less, morally good,
nation.
Various critical analyses of discourse and representations regarding immigration
at the macro-institutional level have revealed the use of discursive scapegoating (Demo,
2005; Flores, 2003; Martin, 2003; Santa Ana, 1999; van Dijk, 1992, 1993; 2000).
Immigration discourse at the macro-level often includes attribution of social problems to
immigrants and blaming them as if immigrants are a major source of the social problems
in the nation. Specifically, in the U.S., a major target of scapegoating has been Mexican
immigrants (Flores, 2003): Mexicans’ relocation to the U.S. has often been equated with
various criminal activities that range from illegal entry to the country, stealing Americans’
jobs, sending money back home without using it in the U.S., to drug and gang activity
(Collier & Mudambi, 2010). The same discursive process can be also seen in
interpersonal dyadic discourse in this study.
Damon, a 25 year old Anglo undergraduate student, also negatively positioned
immigrants within this framework.
Damon: Because things are so bad there and people illegally immigrate to
America, make some money, send it back home, their family can continue to
survive just above the starvation [level] or whatever…And I don’t know if we
are doing Mexico any favors by sort of enabling them to continue on the path
that they’ve been on.

Showing some empathy for poor economic conditions in Mexico, nevertheless, Damon
positioned Mexico as “so bad” with “starvation,” an extreme overgeneralization.
Immigrants in the U.S. were positioned as “illegal” and Mexico was also negatively
positioned as a nation that is not pursuing a positive economic policy. Additionally,
statements such as “I don’t know if we are doing Mexico any favors,” protects whites’
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positions, because they can express restrictionist views, as if these views are for the
benefit of both countries.
Race/ ethnicity/cultural difference shouldn’t matter, but…In response to
Sarah’s statement listed under the previous sub-category, her conversation partner, Victor,
offered a relatively straightforwardly negative view of the influence that immigrants have
on the nation, including political, economic, and labor market aspects. He expressed his
views against immigrants’ voting rights, saying, “That’s the bottom line. If they are not a
U.S. born or U.S. citizen, um, legally, then there should be no reason for them to be able
to vote.” He also stated that he did not believe in amnesty for immigrants who had been
already in the country, and his view that immigrants took jobs away from “homeless
people, the less fortunate people, lower income people.” When he referred to the factor of
race however, he employed the melting pot metaphor as Sarah did.
Victor: Um, race, ethnicity, culture and lifestyle, like Sarah said, America is a
melting pot. We need to accept everyone who they are, no matter, black, white,
whatever race. I mean, Hispanic, Asian, European, whatever.
In his reluctant view on immigration, this statement seemed to stand out, because
he abruptly addressed his attitude of the “need to accept” different racial groups. This
move from unwelcoming opinions toward immigrants to accepting ones of different races,
which emerged in quite a few dyadic discourses in this study, can be explained by the role
of interpretative repertoires. When some participants talked about political, economic, or
labor market factors of immigration, they were likely to express criticism or negative
views rather explicitly, because these are the discursive resource factors that are provided
for people to express their negative view on immigration. However, when discussing that
the topic of “race” was printed on the discussion guideline as one possible factor related
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to immigration issues in the U.S., they sounded careful about their views, drawing on the
“safe” repertoire that allowed them not to appear racist. One of the safe repertoires is this
repertoire emerged with a frame of color-blind ideology, the ideology that enables people
to openly express their view that everybody has the same opportunities, color does not
matter, and we all can assimilate into one culture. Employing this repertoire thus sustains
the racial status quo by denying the role of “race” in immigration issues while
subjugating racial “Others.”
We can clearly see this process of relying on a color-blind frame when talking
about race, in the conversation between Allen and Ed below. The following excerpts are
their responses to the question that asked them to talk about important factors of
immigration. In their conversation, they both claimed that they grew up in a liberal
household and they were taught acceptance and tolerance. The conversation started with
Allen’s statement, “Honestly, race and ethnicity have never been an issue in my life.” He
then continued that people become nervous when they see “homeless or gangsters roll
up…whether they are Hispanic or whether they are black.” Then Ed responded and the
conversation continued.
Ed: Yeah. And um, like, if they are immigrants, you know, they are most likely
not gonna be…you know, white or Caucasian or whatever, if they are
immigrants. So, like, you know, it shouldn’t be an issue. Immigrants are
immigrants. Let them in, no matter where they are from, as long as it’s legal.
Allen: Yeah, I agree.
Ed: You know, wherever they are coming from
Allen: Yeah.
Ed: It’s even disappointing that it’s even on there[listed on the discussion guide].
Because it shouldn’t be a topic. Sort of racist.

Their conversation cited above exemplifies two participants’ reactions when they saw the
term “race” on the discussion guideline and how their discursive moves reproduced
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color-blind ideology. Even though Allen said race had never been an issue for him, Allen
and Ed’s discourse reproduces a racially stratified social system. Their discourse
constructed non-white groups as racial Others by associating Hispanics and blacks with
“homeless or gangsters” and immigrants. However, they avoided sounding “racist” by
employing color-blind discourse, such as “immigrants are immigrants” and “it [race]
shouldn’t be a topic. Sort of racist.”
The last example of this repertoire with a frame of color-blind ideology, is
slightly different from others I cited above. In the previous discourse, there was a clear
storyline that claims “race does not matter because people are people,” which is an
obvious reproduction of color-blind ideology. However, the following example supported
and recreated color-blind ideology more subtly based on an argument of individual
meritocracy. As Bonilla-Silva (1996, 2001, 2006) contends, focusing on individual
meritocracy in a system that provides race-based rewards, allows dominant racial group
members to maintain their invisible privilege and to justify their racist accounts and
behaviors. The following example was offered by Amanda and her romantic partner
Rachel. They are both undergraduate students, and Amanda identified herself as
White/Russian/British, and Rachel identified herself as White/German/Italian.
Throughout the discourse, they rather explicitly addressed their view that immigrants
could be more harmful than good. Rachel said, “I don’t really understand how they can
be good, I mean, I guess.” As well as other participants, however, they explained their
belief that immigration is the foundation of the nation. Amanda noted, “I mean, we
certainly wouldn’t be America, the way we are, if we didn’t have immigration.” Rachel
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replied, “America definitely wouldn’t be America without immigration.” The following
conversation further demonstrates their ambivalent construction of immigration.
Amanda: But, yeah, it is really good to have that diversity. I mean, they used to
say that America was the big melting pot or whatever, but now they say it’s the
tossed salad.
Rachel: Really? I’ve never heard of that.
Amanda: Yeah, they say, because, um, you can still recognize the individual
pieces in the salad, as opposed to the melting pot where they are like, maybe
they get melted together. And um, I mean, it’s…yeah.
Rachel: That’s really interesting what we are talking about right here. So, it
would be best for the country if only the most qualified and small numbers are
allowed into the country.
Amanda: Um, yeah, that’s exactly what we are talking about. Um, I mean, it has
to be small numbers, has to be controlled. Can’t, we can’t just let anyone who
wants to come in come in. Because too many people would and we would not
have the opportunities to offer.
Rachel: Yeah, it wouldn’t be beneficial to anybody, not to us, not to them.

When they drew on the interpretative repertoire of “we are a nation of particular/select
immigrants,” they constructed immigrants as an essential portion of the country, saying
“we certainly wouldn’t be America if we didn’t have immigration.” However, later in the
conversation, they noted, “only the most qualified and small numbers” should be allowed
into the country. This is an example of discursive contradiction and ambivalence (Billig
et al., 1988). Wetherell and Potter (1992) argue that it is interpretative repertoires that
enable ambivalent, competing, and contradicting statements to exist in the same discourse
at the same time, and yet they sound reasonable. The abstractness of this interpretative
repertoire provides plenty of room for discussion that justifies the existence of a system
of domination, and maintains benefits for “us” and “them.”
In Rachel and Amanda’s case, contradicting statements that claimed immigration
is an essential part of the nation, yet also only the most qualified and small number
should be allowed into the country, are normalized by the use of a “tossed-salad”
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metaphor, which endorses individual meritocracy in a color-blind society. The tossed
salad metaphor “recognize(s) the individual pieces,” in contrast to the melting pot that
implies everyone “get(s) melted together.” Despite this difference in its appearance, the
ultimate goal of each metaphor is almost the same: recreating and supporting a
color-blind ideology. On the one hand, the melting pot metaphor allows individuals to
construct immigration as a race-less matter or to justify their assimilationist/ restrictionist
view on immigration without appearing as racists. This is consistent with “minimization
of racism” that Bonilla-Silva (1996, 2001) suggests as one of the discursive themes that
perpetuates and recreates color-blind ideology.
On the other hand, the tossed salad metaphor enables people to legitimatize their
construction of immigration with an argument of pluralism and individual meritocracy.
With this schema, even a restrictionist view can be justified because the tossed salad
metaphor could imply that if you are the cream of the crop or work really hard for it, you
can get into the country, and it is not a race-based selection. Bonilla-Silva (2001) argues
that individualism and meritocracy are major components of the discursive theme called
abstract liberalism. Supporting individual meritocracy and equality without admitting
racial inequality in society, dominant members can protect their privilege by reproducing
color-blind ideology, while sounding totally reasonable (Bonilla-Silva, 2001).
As seen in the examples of discourse cited above, this interpretative repertoire
was frequently employed by participants of this study, and what the repertoire actually
achieves is justifying, buffering, and reconstructing the racial accounts that also exist at
the macro-level. More specifically, drawing on the phrases such as “the U.S. is the nation
of immigrants,” “we are all immigrants,” or “this country is a melting pot” allow people
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to soften their restrictionist/ assimilationist views on immigration manifest in their
negative positioning of immigrants and positive positioning of “us.” Such a discursive
move reproduces false assumptions of equal access to power among different racial
groups, and constructs immigration as a race-less matter. The discourse within this frame
ideologically works to construct normal and standard “(White) Americans” with good
morals and tolerance for diversity, while positioning immigrants, especially those from
Mexico or Central America, as exotic racial Others who may hinder the unity of the
nation with their bad morals and criminal behavior, unwillingness to assimilate and
illegality. Consequently, “we” are the nation of “good” immigrants, but those from
Mexico, for instance, are not included in the “good immigrants.” Collier and Mudambi
(2010) also found that undocumented immigrants from Mexico were positioned as
immigrants that commit crimes and take rather than giving back to the U.S. system in
Liberty post.com blog postings.
The discourse about who can enter the nation is thus highly racialized, but the
fact that the selection is race-based is hidden by different racial ideologies such as
color-blindness and assimialtionist/restrictionist ideologies. The interpretative repertoire I
introduce in the next section is also constituted by and constitutive of color-blind
ideology. As well as the last example of the tossed salad, the next repertoire justifies
restrictionist views on immigration based on individual meritocracy, which is a part of
abstract liberalism (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; 2006).
The American Dream can be Achieved Only by Qualified and Hardworking
Individuals
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In chapter two, I referred to the President Bush’s plan for Comprehensive
Immigration Reform where he stated that “there are many people on the other side of our
borders who will do anything to come to America to work and build a better life” (The
White House, 2007, p.2). Because this claim was in the section on Security, I argued that
this is an example of elite discourse that sustains hegemonic power relations by
constructing immigrants as law-breakers, “who will do anything to come to America” and
the U.S. as the place for a “better life.” Similar discourse may be also recognized at the
interpersonal dyadic level. The basic concept of the American Dream is that anyone can
be successful in the U.S. regardless of his/her class, race, or nationality. It is related to the
Horatio Alger myth, that any immigrant who works hard has the opportunity to be
successful. In most cases, success in the American Dream is equalized with economic
success, and so it was in this study. When I collected all the statements revolving around
the American Dream discourse together, I noticed both variability and consistency in its
use; which is an important indicator of interpretative repertoires (Wetherell & Potter,
1992). Close analysis reveals that this interpretative repertoire enables the users the
following three discursive practices: 1) erasing race with the focus on economic aspects
of immigration, 2) negative positioning of immigrants and positive positioning of U.S.
Americans in terms of class and economy, and 3) blaming immigrants for their economic
standing based on individual meritocracy. Storylines cited below represent respective
discourses.
Immigrants who are drain on the economy do not deserve the American
Dream. In the macro-level discourse on immigration, racialized aspects of immigration
and immigrants are often disguised as economic or class aspects (Cornelius, 2005; Flores,
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2003; Martin, 2003; Pantoja, 2006). As I reviewed in chapter two, non-white immigrants
in the U.S. have been racialized while the centrality of race is kept hidden throughout U.S.
histories of immigration. The Know Nothing Movement demonstrates that Irish
immigrants were constructed as having a negative impact on the U.S. economy by
lowering wages and taking jobs away from U.S. Americans in the 19th century (Phillips,
2007). In a similar light, Chinese immigrants, who were welcomed at first to prevent the
hiring of freed black slaves and Irish workers, were later turned into a “Yellow Peril”
after the railroad project was accomplished (Wu, 2002; Zia, 2000). Similar positioning of
immigrants, especially those from Mexico, was apparent in participants’ conversations.
Mexican immigrants were often constructed as economic threats; their presence was
viewed to lower wages and take jobs away from U.S. American citizens; they were
viewed as taking advantage without paying taxes; and speakers said they send U.S.
dollars back home to Mexico without spending it in the country. Some of the examples of
the negative positioning of immigrants are listed below.
Alice: I wouldn’t say they are completely harmful, although I do think they tend
to take advantage as a generalization, they tend to take advantage of the welfare
system and they tend to exploit the United States in terms of taxes not paid.
Betty: …they can be harmful because they don’t pay taxes and they don’t
contribute to the society and therefore the other regular taxpayer has to carry that
dead weight, you know.
Brandon: …those people get pay checks [and] they should get the money back
before the border. And one thing you have to definitely consider is that it’s not
really promoting growth in the country. Maybe it’s promoting growth in another
country.
Sarah: I also believe that many think that they take jobs that many U.S. citizens
don’t want, such as hotel, housekeepers and things like that. But I think that, if
immigrants weren’t there to take the jobs, um, that maybe wages would be
higher and other people would want to take the job.
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Positioning immigrants as economic burdens or threats as can be seen in the examples
cited above is a common discursive strategy also used in public discourse on immigration
(van Dijk, 1992; 1993). This type of discursive practice positions immigrants as “Others”
while maintaining the race-less-ness of immigration issues and safeguarding citizens and
whites’ position in society. Also, due to the dialectical nature of positioning, “we” is
positioned as the victim of economic exploitation by immigrants or at most, neutral and
invisible tax payers (van Dijk, 1992; 1993). Though these examples are not within the
frame of the American Dream per se, such a discursive practice allows dominant
members to recreate and perpetuate the racial accounts and practices that construct
immigrants as undeserving of economic success and the American dream. This justifies
the discourse at the macro-public level. In a similar, yet more invisible and subtle way,
this interpretative repertoire makes it possible for the racially dominant members to
express their exclusionary views while focusing on class and economic aspects of
immigration and positioning a positive “us” and negative “them.”
The following excerpt was made by Tom, who identified his race as White and
his ethnicity as German American in the conversation with his daughter.
Tom: But anyway, there’s people, immigrants perceive that there’s better life to
begin in the United States. Although, with the economy going down, too,
supposedly immigration rate is going down, from what I’ve read. Economy
being down hinders everybody…Maybe better off staying home with your
family.

As in President Bush’s statement in the Comprehensive Immigration Reform plan, Tom
also constructed the U.S. as a place for a “better life” and immigrants’ countries as
economically worse off than the U.S. Though I would not go so far to say that Tom’s
statement supports a restrictionist view on immigration, he does argue that immigrants
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are “maybe better off staying home with your [their] family.” A restrictionist view was
evident in the statement below from Julie, a 23 year old graduate student, who identified
her race as White and her ethnicity as Caucasian.
Julie: It kind of worries me because we can’t even take care of the people that
have been born here and have problems that legitimately can’t find work.
There’re homeless, elderly, you know. I mean, we are having such a hard time
taking care of those people and that’s a burden on our economy and we have
people that are coming from all over the place.
Another example of positioning of self and Others regarding economic standing
in the frame of the American Dream is evident in comments by Sonia, a 55 year old
White Christian female, who had been to Mexico with her daughter Nancy, a 19 year old
White Christian undergraduate student.
Sonia: It’s just in my opinion, they’re just, they are coming here because it’s a
better life. Like you, especially taking a mission trip down to Mexico, see how
they live and stuff. They are really in a bad spot, and they really don’t make a lot
of money there, and the money that they do make doesn’t, can’t, take them to
other places. I mean, cause it’s basically, the pit of the world, I guess. From
seeing the United States and seeing Mexico, or wherever else, just like, they are
just trying to get by, just like we are. They just have a different way of doing it.
And in their country, they can’t.
Nancy: Yeah,
Sonia: So, they come here and try to step up the ladder just like the rest of us.
But they just started at the lower level because they don’t, they are not
accustomed to like we know in the United States.
Clear contrasting positioning of Mexico and the U.S. emerged in Sonia’s statement: The
U.S. is the place for “a better life” and Mexico is “a bad spot/ the pit of the world.” Not
only are two countries positioned in this way, a superior-inferior relationship between “us”
and “them” was recreated in the statement such as “they just started at the lower level
because they don’t, they are not accustomed to like we know in the United States.” As
Tom and Sonia did, many of the participants attributed immigrants’ intentions to come to
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the U.S. to economic mobility, while recreating the power relations between “us” and
“them.” For example, Kathy, a Caucasian/White undergraduate student said, “I know if I
was, like, in a third world country, I would feel like I wanna go to America.” Another
white student, Allen, who believes “American dream is not what it’s lived up to be” also
thinks, “it’s strange when you think about it. We looked at a map, pretty much a lot of
countries, most immigrants, if they have a choice, they probably go to America” because
of its economic prosperity. Generating economy as the central issue of immigration in the
U.S., the American Dream repertoire allows white members to construct “us” as an
economically superior country that draws on an economically inferior “them;” and this
becomes an assumption that it is natural for them to come to “us,” and for Others “there,”
to come “here.”
In addition to re-construction of power relations between white Americans and
non-white immigrants without naming race, the American Dream interpretative repertoire
is a strategic and powerful tool to reproduce and sustain the system of racial inequality
and domination in U.S. society. The discursive tool this repertoire makes available is
“blaming the victims.” This is actually a common discursive strategy in racist accounts at
both the macro-institutional and interpersonal levels (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; 2006; van Dijk,
1993; 1995; 2000). It is useful in sustaining the racial status quo, because by attributing
the problem to racial Others’ culture, lack of morals, or characteristics, white members
can maintain their positive self-image and remain in the privileged position.
In the American Dream discourse, such a hegemonic reproduction of the
racialized system of domination is achieved by the artful use of two storylines; success in
the U.S. is based on: “individual responsibility and effort,” and noting “so many have
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been successful so why can’t you?” Both storylines support individual meritocracy,
which is a significant component of color-blind ideology (Bonilla-Silva, 1996; 2001;
2006).
Individuals who come to the U.S. have to work hard and prove themselves
as worthy of the American Dream. The common theme of the first storyline is that the
American Dream can be achieved by only those who are qualified and work hard for it.
As well as the melting pot metaphor, the American Dream is a convenient discursive
resource to justify the false assumption of equal power relations and agency across
different racial groups. However, as statistics show, there is a clear indication that race
and income level correlate in U.S. society. For example, the median income of black
households is 60% as much as non-Hispanic white households; also, 25.8% of blacks and
25.3% of Hispanics live under the poverty line, while 9.4% of non-Hispanic whites do.
Since this concept of the American Dream itself strongly embodies individualistic
meritocracy in which individual success depends on individual’s quality and effort, it is
rather easy to hide racial factors of immigration and to attribute immigrants’ economic
and social standings to their own effort and qualifications. Thus, the American Dream
repertoire allows dominant group members to assume, “immigrants expect too much of
American dream without making any effort” or “working in low-wage jobs over
generations is due to the lack of effort.” By drawing on this repertoire, dominant
members can remain invisible with their “normal” economic and social standing and
believe their standing is due to individual effort in a color-blind society.
The following example is from Damon, a 25 year old Anglo undergraduate
student. He insisted that it was wrong to prioritize the admission of refugees over people
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from first world countries just because the refugees’ countries had “issues.” He said,
“Europeans or people from first world countries want to move here. Should we restrict
that? So that we have more space for more refugees?” In his argument, he employed the
American Dream repertoire.
Damon: So, I, I personally think, kind of ideal America is that, it is, it is a place
we can go and get a new chance, new opportunity and start over. But I think
what the factors that influence whether or not people should be allowed to enter
this country should have to do with whatever qualities that individual has and
whatever needs this country has, not whatever is going on in another country.
Because I think we have a problem with opening the doors of first world
countries to refugees from third world countries.
His basic argument was that admission of foreigners should be based on individual
qualities and the needs of the U.S. Therefore, the government should not prioritize
admission of refugees from third world countries over Europeans or people from first
world countries. This argument positioned refugees or people from third world countries
as less qualified and less wanted in terms of getting into the U.S. compared to people
from Europe or other first world countries. In this way, people from third world countries
were blamed for their lack of qualities that “we” need. Despite his exclusionary view
with a clear demarcating positioning of “people from first world countries” and “people
from third world countries,” his statement can appear reasonable because he structured
his argument around individual meritocracy. As mentioned before, individual meritocracy
can reproduce the false assumption of equal rights, equal opportunity, and equal access to
socio-economic mobility across different racial groups, and it also turns immigration into
an individual matter, not race/group based one. The American Dream interpretative
repertoire thus allows people to apply this concept internationally in immigration
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contexts. Damon’s comments also ignore structural factors such as histories, intercultural
human rights laws, and the global economy.
In a similar vein, the discourse between Brandon, who said “those who excelled
could follow the American dream,” and his friend Jake who described immigration as an
individual issue, demonstrated views that others should work hard for the American
Dream.
Jake: If you want to get something out of life, I think you need to work for it.
There shouldn’t be such a thing like a free lunch. If you are capable of earning it,
I think you should work for it…I guess, in the, in the case of immigration from
Mexico, people are coming here because they see the opportunities for a better
life. And I understand that. I understand why they want to do that, and I fully
agree that they should be able to do that. But if they want to come into this
country, and rip benefits off the system, they should have to contribute fully.
Brandon: And I agree with you about individual responsibilities. And there’re a
lot of immigrants who are, or potential immigrants who would gladly contribute
fully, and work very, very hard. And they are not necessarily granted visas.

Addressing that it is individual responsibility to achieve the American Dream,
this kind of discourse ends up blaming immigrants from Mexico saying that they do not
contribute fully and they “rip benefits off the system,” get “a free lunch,” and they are not
successful because they do not “work very, very hard.” As they are negatively positioning
immigrants, whites can maintain their positive-self image without appearing racist due to
the mask of individual meritocracy that sounds perfectly normal in conversations where
color-blind ideology circulates. This standpoint that the American Dream can be achieved
based on individuals’ quality and effort corresponds with that of economic individualism
(Pantoja, 2006). According to Pantoja (2006), it is one of the ideologies that supports
exclusionary U.S. immigration policies. Economic individualism assumes that
individuals should manage their lives based on the distribution of rewards in society
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without any government assistance (Pantoja, 2006). Using the frame of this ideology,
people can openly address their opposition against government policies that support
immigrants or discount discourse that challenges inequality between non-white
immigrants and white Americans, because within this framework, the economic
inequality between “us” and “them” is “their” fault. As long as there is a shield of
“equality for individuals,” the system of inequality can remain stable and racist accounts
and practices remain rational. Again, “blaming the victim” is a common discursive
strategy that dominant racial group members employ to maintain their unnamed position
and their privileges (Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Moss & Faux, 2006; Wetherell & Potter, 1992).
Another example that reifies economic individualism is the conversation
between Amanda and Rachel. They stated that the government should limit the number of
immigrants “because the American Dream can’t support everyone in the world.”
Amanda: Yeah, I mean, the American Dream is not that magical. We don’t hand
you this and give you a thousand dollars when you move there, but um, yeah,
you have to start off from something. And I think, I think a lot of people kind of
don’t consider that.
Rachel: Um-hum.
Amanda: They think that this is gonna be answered, all their problems, coming
here. It’s really not. You still have to, there is a lot of stuff you still have to figure
out.
Economic individualism is recreated in their interpersonal discourse in order to justify
blaming the victim for not considering their individual responsibilities.
I have thus far listed examples of discourse that described the American Dream
as that which could only be achieved if individuals are qualified and try hard. These
discourses also implied that immigrants, mostly those from Mexico, were not qualified
and not working hard. Such a focus on individual meritocracy enables people to blame
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immigrants from Mexico for their economic standing, while maintaining the speaker’s
white invisibility in society. Another way to blame the victim in the framework of the
American Dream interpretative repertoire is comparing recent immigrants from Mexico
to examples of successful immigrants from the past (for example, ancestors of
participants) or immigrants from other regions.
Some immigrants have achieved the American Dream; why can’t you? In
the 1960s, the U.S. witnessed the construction of a “model minority” Asian Americans.
Although they had been discriminated against as the “Yellow Peril,” suddenly they
became the proof of the American Dream and disappearance of racial discrimination (Wu,
2002; Zia, 2000). There was influx of media coverage of Asian Americans’ success
stories and they were praised for their hard work and high academic achievement (Wu,
2002). Despite the fact that many Asian ethnic group members, including Vietnamese and
Cambodians that were lumped all together as Asian, were living in poverty, media reports
kept producing the image of rich, highly-educated, and successful Asians who overcame
racial discrimination and economic challenges they faced (Tatum, 2003). The positive
façade of the model minority portrait worked as a macro-level discourse blaming other
racial groups’ economic and social standings as their own doing. What this discourse
came to imply was the argument that “Asian Americans, regardless of their race, are
achieving their American Dream because they worked hard for it.” Their race did not
prevent them from being successful. Therefore, the failure of other racial group members
to achieve is not due to race or racism. So the question asked by whites of non-Asians is,
“Why can’t you try as hard as Asian Americans?”
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This type of discourse was also common and reconstructed at the interpersonal
level. Bonilla-Silva’s interview study (2006) demonstrated that many white participants
used the storyline that implied blacks’ economic, educational, and social status are due to
their own doing, because other racial group members, such as Asians, Italian and Irish
immigrants, achieved despite experiences of racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2006). In a similar
manner, participants of this study also employed this storyline. In addition to referring to
the model minority myth, participants sometimes mentioned “exceptional” Mexican
immigrants and their own ancestors’ stories.
The following example is from Tricia, a White undergraduate student of German
descent, and her father, Tom. They were discussing that a lack of ambition in the younger
generation might be one reason why people complained about immigrants taking jobs
away from them.
Tom: Certainly there are ambitious people from your generation that are really
trying [to climb] the social and economic ladder. But on the other hand, talking
about the immigrants, the people coming over here to do those jobs from India
or China, Taiwan, are ambitious people.
Tricia: Yeah, very ambitious.
Tom: Yeah, exactly. They would go with whatever it takes. Is that the easy way
out?
Tricia: No.
Tom: You know what I mean. They can probably stay where they are and do
what they are going to do. Maybe they perceive the United States as once again
the land of opportunity and that’s why they are doing it.

If this conversation ended here, I would have overlooked what this discourse
was actually capable of achieving in reinforcing a color-blind society. I might have
assumed that this discourse positively positioned immigrants from Asia in the American
Dream repertoire. However, Tom later added the following statement when he and his
daughter were talking about what kind of jobs immigrants from Mexico could do,
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including “picking fruit or vegetables, or some of the construction around here, roofers,
that’s the kind of thing, for example.”
Tom: …they would seem to me to have been setting low standards for what you
hope to accomplish as far as, um, making much money. Once again, that’s
maybe the way their job, picking crops, is so much more than what they would
be able to get in their homeland. Maybe they are not thinking about it.

Combined with this statement, the aforementioned discourse on Asians reveals a
great deal. On the one hand, people from India, China or Taiwan are positioned as people
who do whatever it takes and establish themselves with their ambition in the land of
opportunity. On the other hand, Mexican immigrants’ are blamed for their lower
economic/social standing due to the “low standards” for jobs they set for themselves
without “thinking about it.” Therefore, this sort of discourse suggests that “Mexican
immigrants could have succeeded, but they chose not to” while ignoring racial lines that
clearly correspond with economic levels in the U.S. By referring to examples that imply
comparisons with the model minority, the false assumption of equal opportunity and
equal access to resources and status, which inherently accompanies whites’ invisibility,
was further reproduced and reinforced.
Another reference to a model minority, in order to blame immigrants for their
economic standing as their own doing, is “exceptional” immigrants. Mentioning
“exceptional Others” in racial accounts is quite common, according to Bonilla-Silva’s
(2006) interview study. In his interviews, white participants shared a number of stories of
their own “black friends” or “some” blacks who are not as bad as “most of them.”
Teresa, a 68 year old retired teacher, of French/Russian descent, mentioned the
story of a doctor she recently saw on TV.
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Teresa: The foremost brain surgeon in that area [U.S.] is a man who came here
illegal with his family from Mexico. He was a little boy, yet he’s grown up in
our system, was given our education. Now he’s giving back.
She referred back to the brain surgeon later in the conversation with her son’s
fiancée, Mary, who is an 18 year old White undergraduate student.
Teresa: This doctor that I was telling you about, I was so impressed. His mother
and father were migrant workers. They worked in the fields in California. And
yet, here he is, the foremost brain surgeon at John Hopkins. That’s one of the
most amazing things. And that’s what this country is all about.
Mary: Working up from nothing to something?
Teresa: Exactly. He could have been a migrant worker in, wherever he’s from,
Mexico, Guatemala, San Salvador. He would have been a migrant worker. But
here, this country gave him the opportunity…
What was prominent in Teresa’s talk, as well as others’, was her patronizing
positioning of self and Other. Her discourse positioned immigrants as those who need
help and guidance, while positioning the U.S. as the land of opportunity that helps,
provides, and enables them to be exceptional. She also shared multiple narratives that she
or her family members convinced their maids from Mexico to get an education and they
eventually gained social mobility. She said “they are not getting any benefits if you don’t
educate them. Then, what are you gonna have? You’re gonna have poverty you might
have never seen. You’re gonna have a class of people that have no chance to move
upwards.” Such discursive positioning of racial Others as helpless and inferior, who need
to be controlled and taken care of by whites, was pervasive during the Jim Crow era.
Asserting blacks’ physical and intellectual inferiority, whites justified their position of
control and dominance during that time (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; 2006).
Positioning Mexican immigrants in general as helpless and inferior, the success
stories of some exceptional Mexican immigrants act to blame those who are not willing
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to accept what the U.S. generously offers them to obtain economic success. In fact,
Teresa also shared another story of illegal Mexican woman who once worked for her, and
she expressed her resentment toward her lack of willingness to get an education and get
off of welfare. Patronizing positioning of self and Others with some exceptional success
story thus maintained unequal power relations: It allowed the dominant group members
to blame immigrants for not trying hard enough, and enabled the speakers to maintain
superior white positions by constructing themselves as “helper/ provider/ caretaker.”
Additionally, the contrast between “good exceptional immigrants” and “helpless and
uneducated immigrants” reproduced the myth of equality in society, addressing
“everyone can be successful as long as they are willing to get educated.”
Immigrants in the past were also described in ways that blamed immigrants for
their lower economic standing in the American Dream interpretative repertoire. These
references included participants’ own ancestors. Positive positioning of past immigrants
in the American Dream repertoire ideologically constructed recent immigrants, especially
those from Mexico, negatively. I already cited a pertinent example of the contrast
between the past and present immigrants, Illiana and Peter’s discourse within the frame
of “We are a Nation of Immigrants.” Illiana said “everybody here is an
immigrant...because we came over on the Mayflower…and I would guess that after one
or two generations, we become Americans no matter what.” And Peter replied, “certain
people like us, like I mean, our culture is completely gone…but I think that’s natural for
anyone who immigrates to this country.” Recall that Peter believed that recent immigrants
brought their cultures and maintained their cultures in the U.S. and that hindered the unity
of the nation. Thus, white immigrants who came over on the Mayflower were positioned
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as “good immigrants” who assimilated into “the American culture” and contributed to the
unity of the nation, whereas recent immigrants were constructed as “bad immigrants”
who refuse to assimilate and thus threaten the unity of the nation.
Similar contrasting positioning of “our ancestors” versus “them” also emerged in
other discourse within the frame of the American Dream repertoire. One of the examples
is the conversation between two family members, Julie and Cody, who are both 23 year
old White/ Caucasian graduate students.
Julie: Yeah, America is the land of free
Cody: Yeah, the land of opportunity and things like that.
Julie: I understand what you are saying and I think that originally when people
came to this country as immigrants, um, they came in and they brought stuff
with them. I mean I don’t think they came here dead broke. I mean, they had
something. They brought something to get started with. And they busted their
butts to make something. And I think what’s happening, I mean, not in all cases,
but in a lot of cases, people are coming over here, sneaking across the border
Cody: Um-hum
Julie: you know, and filing for food stamps and, I don’t know, whatever kind of
program.

In Julie’s statement, those who came to the U.S. originally were positioned positively:
They were constructed as well prepared and hard working people because “they brought
something to get started with” and “they busted their butts to make something.” In
contrast, however, new immigrants were negatively positioned “not in all cases, but in a
lot of cases” as unprepared, illegal, and lazy, through comments such as, “they came here
dead broke,” they are “sneaking across the border,” and they exploit “whatever kind of
program” the country has. Given the color of “original” immigrants and “new” ones, the
color line clearly demarcates these two groups. However, by employing the American
Dream interpretative repertoire, the discourse lumps them together as “immigrants.”
Ignoring unequal power relations between the two groups due to their racial
137

categorization, the discourse allowed dominant members to blame recent immigrants’
economic standing and their lack of willingness to work harder for it.
Yet another example of the contrast between past and present immigrants is from
Alice, a 22 year old Caucasian college student. She talked with her best friend John about
how important learning the language is for success in the U.S.
Alice: If you look just at the history of the United States, when we had
immigration as this paper mentions, back in 1820, and immigration was at a high.
At that point, people coming over to the United States were more than willing to
learn the language, to learn the customs, everything they could, [to] get into the
country. Because they saw the United States as an opportunity and privilege.
And I think that is getting skewed nowadays where more and more people are
expecting our country to conform to their needs. And I think it should be vice
versa.
As well as Julie’s, Alice’s statement constructed “good” past immigrants and
“bad” new immigrants. To achieve the American Dream, past immigrants “were more
than willing to learn the language, to learn the customs.” On the other hand, recent
immigrants “are expecting our country to conform to their needs.” Since Alice thinks “it
should be vice versa,” which means “they” should conform to “our” needs, this discourse
blamed new immigrants for not learning the language by referring to the group that was
“more than willing” to do it. Once again, such a discursive strategy ignores the color line,
and it protects white’s invisibility and power relations between whites and non-whites in
society.
In summary, the interpretative repertoire revolving around the American Dream
primarily includes three different mechanisms: erasing race with its focus on the
economy and labor market; positive-self and negative-Other positioning; and blaming
immigrants for their lower economic standing based on individual meritocracy and
references to “exceptional” models. As well as other interpretative repertoires outlined in
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the earlier part of the chapter, this interpretative repertoire provided participants with
various discursive strategies and tools. These discursive strategies and moves are
constrained by and reinforce racist ideologies, and white interactants retained their
superiority in society and articulated what is “normal” in a hegemonic way.
The next interpretative repertoire reproduced and supported the myth of
assimilation. I start the next section with Alice’s statement that came right after the one
cited above, that discusses the necessity for immigrants to learn the English language in
the U.S.
Being American Means Speaking English
After Alice said that more and more immigrants nowadays “are expecting our
country to conform to their needs. And I think it should be vice versa,” she continued:
Alice: It is a privilege and honor to live in this country, and to be able to say you
are a citizen of this country, you should be willing to learn the language, to learn
the customs, and somewhat conform, but not lose your cultural identity at the
same time. But I think you need to, you need to learn those things before you
become a true citizen. I think it’s important.
I started this section of interpretative repertoire with her comments, because they
illustrate how this interpretative repertoire was used as a discursive resource and what
this repertoire achieved. This short statement evidences superior positioning of self and
subjugating Others, and “Americans” are entitled to decide what it takes to become a
citizen and how to deal with “your cultural identity” for “them.” In addition to these
comments, discourse from a lot of participants showed frustration and complaints about
immigrants’ not learning the English language and the necessity of learning the language
to be admitted into or to become a citizen of the United States. Addressing what language
should be spoken in the nation, participants engaged in language negotiation; these
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language negotiations, either at the individual or macro level, are oftentimes controlled
by power-relations in society (Martin & Nakayama, 2008) as can be seen in Alice’s
statement. Therefore, I believe this interpretative repertoire plays a significant role in
reproducing and perpetuating a system of inequality and domination.
The analyses of various discourses within this interpretative repertoire revealed
two primary discursive patterns. The first one was reinforcing assimilation by equalizing
American citizenship or eligibility/criteria for admission into the country with the
acquisition of the English language. The second one was claiming that when “we” U.S.
Americans are the ones who are accommodating or conforming to “them” in terms of
language issues; this is objectionable.
Assimilation means speaking English. At the macro-institutional/ political
level, language policy and assimilation are closely related. Multilingual nations
sometimes establish a language policy that sets one national/official language to promote
people’s assimilation into the “national” culture (Martin & Nakayama, 2008).
Institutional/ political discourse constructs the English language as “the language of the
U.S.” Specifically in immigration contexts, the nation’s motivation to promote
assimilation through language acquisition is evident. For example, President Bush’s
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Plan posted in 2007 on the homepage of the White
House (http://www.whitehouse.gov) explicitly addressed assimilation through English
acquisition as one agenda of immigration reform (Torigoe & Collier, 2008).
We Must Promote Assimilation Into Our Society By Teaching New Immigrants
English and American Values. Every new citizen has an obligation to learn the
English language and the customs and values that define our nation, including
liberty and civic responsibility, and appreciation for our history, tolerance for
others, and equality. When new immigrants assimilate, they advance in our
society, realize their dreams, and add to the unity of America (p.3)
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In this statement, there is a clear distinction between “we” and “new immigrants.” Every
new immigrant “has an obligation to learn the English language” to assimilate into “our
society.” Therefore, “our society” was positioned as the one and only standard, that
values liberty, equality, and tolerance for others. Assimilation was also constructed as
beneficial for both “us” and “new immigrants” here, reflecting the assumption that, by
assimilating into “our society” by learning the language and “our” values, “they advance”
and “realize their dreams” and “we” can maintain “the unity of America.” Such a myth of
assimilation granting equality recreates the false assumption that race has no influence on
immigrants’ social mobility, and it may silence the voices that challenge the racialized
social system that grants different amounts of rewards to white American citizens and
non-white immigrants (Torigoe & Collier, 2008).
Advocating for learning English and assimilating into “our society” as
indispensable conditions to be American, and to “advance” in “our society,” were also
common discursive practices in participants’ interpersonal discourses. The following
excerpts are examples.
Sarah: I also strongly believe that English should be, they should definitely have
to learn English to become a citizen, because it’s a part of America, not to
discount the fact that we should learn other languages, but they should definitely
learn English.
Tom: I think that it would be helpful for immigrants to try to learn, um, learn the
language that’s spoken by most people. Just try to blend in, um, [or] you are not
going to, you are not going to raise yourself above picking fruit or vegetables or
some of the construction around here, roofers …for example.
Julie: I think that it [learning the English language] should be a requirement,
because instead, I mean, that’s great that everybody is diverse. I mean, I have
Latina friends who speak multiple languages. But I think that this country, um, is
America. We speak American. We speak English.
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Cody: If they were to meet the criteria and they haven’t learned the English
language and they haven’t done anything to support the community and
economy within the certain amount of time period that they should get deported.
As can be seen in the examples above, English was constructed as the language “we
speak” and “a part of America” and it is a necessary condition to be a citizen, to “blend in”
to “our” society, to “raise yourself above” low-wage jobs, and to avoid being deported.
Similar to the language policy discourse at the macro-political level in terms of
immigrants’ assimilation, participants’ discourse most frequently positioned Hispanic
immigrants, especially those from Mexico, more negatively compared to other immigrant
groups. Mexican immigrants were most likely to be described as a group that failed to
assimilate into “our” society by adapting “our” language. Hence, these discussions of
assimilation and English created distance between “aliens” and “us,” and contrasted “us”
to “Others” who cannot be part of “us.”
The following conversation was between Jack, a 24 year old Caucasian/White
graduate student, and his best friend Alice. What is notable in Jack’s statement is that
different kinds of arguments were used for different groups of immigrants to justify his
restrictionist/ protectionist view on immigration. The first part of the conversation was on
past immigrants including Irish, German, Italian and Polish, though Alice originally
asked him about Spanish speaking immigrants.
Alice: Well, do you think some of the, our, culture is changing because they, in a
sense, refuse to assimilate into our culture, so they are bringing a lot of their
culture? Like, I know a lot of things are, you have to press one for English, you
know. This is America, and a lot of them speak Spanish and all that. Um, what
do you think of that?
Jack: Well, it’s hard to say they are failing to assimilate because our country was
founded on the principle of immigration and freedom of speech. When the
country was founded, you had different ethnic groups, Irish, um, German,
Alice: Italian
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Jack: Italian. All were speaking in different languages. Polish. And in big cities
like Chicago, New York, still today, there’s separate communities, where all they
do is speak in Polish, all they do is speak in Italian. And I think, I think, in a way,
yes, America as a whole, is English speaking. Um, but, the country itself is still
deeply embedded in the principle of, you know, bring who you are into the
country. It’s a melting pot. I think it is still a melting pot, and we will always be
a melting pot— different cultures and ethnicities—that what makes it great.

Jack’s statement positioned immigrants from Western and Eastern Europe, who are now
considered as members of the white race in the U.S., as a positive addition to the
“melting pot.” They are not “failing to assimilate” even though they speak their own
languages, because “our country was founded on the principle of immigration” which
allows people to “bring who you are into the country.” However, later in the conversation,
Jack articulated a view that contradicted what he had said before.
Jack: The United States is built strongly around English, although I guess we
start to see more of a fifty-fifty split between English and Spanish. Um, but
again, that’s some of the immigration problems, I think. We let too many, too
many, numbers in. I think it needs to be controlled. Um, I think, I guess I agree
with the statement that only the most qualified should get in. I don’t think
immigration should be just um, wait six months and, “here’s your citizenship.” I
think there should be testing, um,
Alice: More testing, you mean.
Jack: More testing. And I do think the language, I think you should have English,
maybe not the primary language, but I think you should know English before
you come to this country…I don’t think it’s right to see our country try to change
its ways for some ethnicity, and pointing one out, um, Spanish speaking. I think
more and more you see, um, Spanish speaking societies expecting our country to
conform to their needs. I don’t think that’s right. I think most importantly, you
have to understand it’s a privilege and honor to live in the country…I’m not
saying, deny these people’s right to be able to live here. I’m just saying these
people need to put more of their effort on their end to conform [to] American
ideals.

According to Jack, though past immigrants were allowed to speak their language and
make their own communities because that conforms to the principle of the country,
Spanish speaking immigrants should not be allowed to do the same. The U.S. is suddenly
143

positioned as a nation “built strongly around English,” and Spanish speaking immigrants
are positioned as a group that do not “understand it’s a privilege and honor to live in the
country,” and who need to “put more of their effort…to conform to American ideals.” In
Jack’s statement, perpetuation of the Spanish language and accommodation toward
Spanish speaking populations were represented as threats or even a linguistic invasion,
and he offered a view of the need for protecting the nation.
As I reviewed in earlier chapters, it is common to position migration of different
racial groups into “our space” as a threat or invasion (Demo, 2005; Dixon et al., 1994;
Flores, 2003; van Dijk, 2000). Along with the construction of immigration as invasion,
Spanish speaking immigrants are positioned as aliens who refuse to assimilate to “our”
society and destroy the unity of “our” country. Such negative positioning of “them”
justified comments such as, “We let too many, too many numbers in. I think it needs to be
controlled.” Also, the myth of equality in the nation legitimated the opposition against
government assistance for Spanish speaking groups, and enabled the claim that special
treatment for one specific ethnic group is against the principle of equality. Bonilla-Silva
(2001, 2006) shows that it is a common strategy to use the argument of equality to openly
express opposition against policies or practices whose aim is fixing inequality embedded
in racial stratification in society (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; 2006).
Another example of contrasting positioning between Spanish speaking
immigrants and other immigrant groups that adopt the English language, was evident in
the conversation between Tricia and Tom, daughter and father.
Tricia: You know, it’s kind of interesting to me that we don’t really run into a lot
of people, well, I’ve never run into anybody from any other country, except for
Mexico, that doesn’t speak English.
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Tom: That’s true. For example, um, people from India…coming to the United
States to go to the medical schools, and um, becoming doctors, obviously. So
that’s a heck of a good job as far as making a lot of money goes. Now, you
couldn’t just, you couldn’t do that in the United States by just speaking Hindu
or,
Tricia: whatever they speak.

In the discourse above, Mexicans, in particular, were positioned as the only cultural group
in the U.S. who do not speak English. Also, in contrast to Indians, who speak English and
are economically successful, the comments implied that Mexican immigrants’ economic
standing can be attributed to their unwillingness to learn the language.
Teresa, a 68 year old Caucasian retired teacher, also specifically referred to
Spanish speaking groups when she expressed her frustration toward them.
Teresa: If you’re gonna come to this country, this is America. Americans speak
English. They can speak other languages but the working language is English.
Mary: Um-hum.
Teresa: And if you’re gonna come here, then you need to learn the language of
the country. And we don’t, we shouldn’t be printing ads in English and Spanish.
We should not be printing menus in English and Spanish.
English again constructed as “the language of the country” and she had a rather assertive
opinion that “we” should not accommodate other languages in the nation.
When Mary, Teresa’s grandson’s girlfriend, suggested that the U.S. could
accommodate two main languages, Teresa employed the argument of equality as Jack did,
by talking about everyone speaking and reading English.
Mary: So, a lot of countries accommodate us, so it seems like we should have,
like, two main languages. One Spanish and one English.
Teresa: Well, what about, you said your teacher is Japanese. What about
Japanese? Should we print in Japanese because we have Japanese people? Or
Vietnamese because we have Vietnamese people? French or German? I mean, if
we start thinking about the melting pot we have, are we gonna print it in all those
languages? And you know, I think, I do, if you are gonna come here, you need to
make an effort. You may not become a lawyer but at least be able to have a
working knowledge of it [English].
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Teresa’s statement demonstrated that the melting pot metaphor is also a discursive
resource within this repertoire. The metaphor was used to reinforce the myth of equality
across different groups in the nation, and it was used to justify and legitimate oppositional
views against the practices that accommodate Spanish speaking immigrants.
While not many participants expressed explicit opposition against bilingualism
or multilingualism in their discourse, some participants argued that “we” were
conforming to “them” in terms of language, where it should be vice versa. This is the
second mechanism of this interpretative repertoire.
“We” Americans should not have to accommodate other languages. In the
previous section, I listed examples of discourse that equalized American-ness with the
English language, constructed assimilation through the acquisition of English as a natural
and beneficial process, and positioned Spanish speaking immigrants negatively in
particular. The following examples show discourse in which participants positively
positioned “us” as frustrated and willing to speak and learn another language if living in
another country, in contrast to “them” as reluctant to assimilate into “our” society and
expecting “us” to accommodate “them.” The first example is the conversation between
Kathy and Brittney.
Kathy: Well, it’s kind of frustrating. People come here and they don’t speak
English.
Brittney: Yeah….If I were to move to Germany or something
Kathy: Yeah, you would have to
Brittney: I probably wanna learn German.
Kathy: I think people who come here, especially people who speak Spanish, just
assume that we need to know Spanish…in order to accommodate them, when it
should be the other way around.
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In the example above, “people who speak Spanish” were accused of imposing their
language on “us” to accommodate “them.” On the other hand, “I” was constructed as the
person who is willing to learn and accommodate to another language when living in a
country outside of the U.S. In a similar vein, Amanda and Rachel also said that “we” are
accommodating, so we expect “them” to do the same.
Rachel: If you go into the government offices, they have the most crazy
languages I have ever seen. They have a big poster on the wall, they’re like, we
have translators. So at least they offer that.
Amanda: Yeah, at least they offer that. So you have to come expecting that
we’re going to expect you to know English. Because as America, we’re a very
egotistical country.
Rachel: We are.
Amanda: And we think that, um, we are, you know, you should conform to our
language more than the other way around.
Rachel: Yeah, like you are coming to America, we are not going to your country
kind of attitude.
Amanda: That’s right.

In the conversation, “America” is phrased as an “egotistical country,” “we” are the ones
who offer translators, “their” languages are “crazy” and “you should conform to our
language.”
The last example of this kind of discursive practice is from Teresa and Mary.
They were talking about the national anthem being translated into Spanish.
Teresa: I heard the other day that they want the national anthem translated in
Spanish.
Mary: Like, what do you mean?
Teresa: For the Spanish speakers…why would it be translated into Spanish? It’s
our national anthem.
Mary: Yeah, that’s too much.
Teresa: So, we are going too far.
Mary: Yeah.
Teresa: We are going too far, and [being] too accommodating, you know.
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In these statements, the positioning of “us” as accommodating and “them” as demanding
is evident. Teresa’s comment, “Why would it be translated into Spanish? It’s our national
anthem” is an example of discursive marginalization of Spanish speaking Americans.
Naturally being able to sing the national anthem in English as “our national anthem”
excludes Spanish speaking Americans from “our” group. Such discursive practice is
embedded in the assumption that the English language is a de facto condition of being
American, and at the same time, this type of discourse reproduces assimilationist
ideology, which places (White) English speaking U.S. Americans and their language on
the top, and (non-white) immigrants and their language on the bottom. Assimilation
through the acquisition of the language was constructed as positive and beneficial to both
immigrants and the nation; the dominant group members can therefore maintain not only
their language, but also their position of being entitled to decide how to be, and thus who
can be, American and what is expected, “normal” and “accommodating.”
Thus far, I have exclusively listed the examples of discourse and positioning that
serve to reproduce and sustain a system of racial inequality and domination. I examined
what kind of discursive resources are available, how the resources were used by
participants in my study, and what they achieved in interpersonal discourse on
immigration issues in the U.S. As Wetherell and Potter (1992) claim, the abstract nature
of interpretative repertoires enables people to use various resources in different ways:
People use multiple and even contradicting resources at the same time which act to
protect dominant members’ privilege, and they can also draw on different repertoires to
challenge as well as reinforce dominant discourse on immigration. Some participants in
this study did employ discourse that challenged the system of inequality by unraveling
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the myth of race-less-ness, mentioned their usually unquestioned levels of privilege, and
problematized their “normal” position in contemporary U.S. society. In the following
section, I list examples of participants’ discourses.
We Should Consider the Context of Racist Policies and Practices and What is
“Normal” and Expected, When Thinking about Immigration
The first two examples below include discourse that acted to challenge
color-blind ideology and a presumption of race-less-ness in contemporary U.S. Along
with the more common discourses in which participants diverted their attention from race
to the economy, or valorized individual responsibility, two examples below are rare cases
in which participants problematized the racialized system of immigration.
Peter, a 53 year old White/Caucasian male, demonstrated his concern that border
security issues might revolve around racist attitudes and racist behaviors.
Peter: I can’t help but feel like the border patrol is more of um, of a racist type of
action.
Illiana: So, border patrol is kind of racist?
Peter: It seems like that…standing at the border, trying to make your point and
the only point they are trying to make is that somebody is different than them.
Um, they are using the excuse of 9/11….they are using that excuse to try to keep
somebody else from coming in for no valid reason other than the fact that they
just cite homeland security or something.
Illiana: That’s nothing [overlapping]
Peter: There’s nothing real about it. That’s what’s troubling about that. That’s
what makes it seem racist cause racist is ignorant.

Later Peter also mentioned that “you can’t eliminate people and hold them for prejudiced
reasons or because you are afraid of something.” Though his earlier comments on the
melting pot imply a color-blind ideology, these statements revealed recognition that some
political actions by border patrol staff are actually race-based. Read together with his
later comment, Peter’s discourse articulated his recognition that the border patrol’s
149

actions are based on national fear and his comments raised questions about these
protectionist views.
Meg, a 29 year old Anglo American student, offered another example of
discourse that challenged the myth of race-less-ness in the U.S. She critiqued racist
immigration policies and practices by citing examples from U.S. histories.
Meg: I can’t remember what year was or what the legislation was, but I know
that there was a time period in the U.S. when there were a lot of immigrants
coming from, um, Eastern Europe and Southern Europe, and oh, they gotta put a
block on that, you know. Clearly, just horrible, because we had a flood of um,
Italian immigrants and, I can’t remember, Polish, etc. And the U.S. put a cap on
immigration at one point, and that was lifted. Back then, you couldn’t just call it
racist or pigheads making those laws, etc. But um, it’s always funny how, when
you look at U.S. history which [is] convenient for the U.S. When um, Chinese
immigration was coming in, and ohhh, we needed, we needed them to, um, lay
down train tracks, help build up to the West, etc. But then, as soon as that was
completed, oh gotta put a cap on Chinese immigration. And it’s like, how
convenient. You like to think nowadays that the United States has changed its
mentality, and I think it has to a point. But you still have people here that are just
so ridiculous.

As I reviewed in chapter two, the Know Nothing movement and Chinese Exclusion Act
that she referred to in her statement, exemplified how immigration policies in the U.S.
have been racialized in a way that is convenient and safe for the dominant white racial
groups. Though this discourse does not use the term “race,” pointing out that those
immigrant policies are always convenient for “us” problematized hegemonic policies and
practices that maintain white privilege.
The next three examples show how dominant discourse was contested. Below,
Allen and Ed discussed what is “normal.”
Allen: Honestly, there’s only one way to learn about the world. That’s interacting
with people who are different. I mean, different is good. When you realize, you
know, there are more people in your life that are different than normal, or like
normal as same as you, I don’t wanna call it normal. It’s such a horrible word.
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Ed: You put normal in quotes.
Throughout this part of the conversation Allen and Ed, 20 year old friends, emphasized
that “normal” means difference. As examples of discourse cited in the previous sections
imply, dominant discourse in the U.S. is more likely to enable White group members to
assume that they are entitled to decide what “normal” is; “normal” often stands for being
White, assimilating to White U.S. culture, working as hard as “us,” and/or speaking “our”
language. In the conversation between Allen and Ed above, however, such an
unquestioned status of “normal” was problematized.
The next example comes from Steve, a 22 year old White/Irish undergraduate
student. In his conversation with his best friend, Betty, he challenged Betty’s position that
immigrants should learn English.
Betty: I agree that they should allow them to be in, but they should learn to
speak English, just to understand
Steve: Why do they have to learn English?
Betty: Because, if there’s only one language. It’s kind of hard to communicate
with them.
Steve: Then why don’t we learn Spanish?
Betty: Because what do we speak in America? We speak English.
Steve: Yeah, but it’s not mandated by the federal government.
Betty: [intelligible]
Steve: What? Just say it.
Betty: Well, I’m just saying that I think English is a positive thing.

In this conversation, Steve employed questions that contested the dominant discourse that
Betty drew on. Her comments implied that assimilation of immigrants through the
acquisition of the English language is natural and positive and an entitlement that the
dominant group has on American-ness. Steve questioned this entitlement.
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In a similar fashion, Cody, a 23 year old White graduate student, questioned his
conversation partner’s privileged assumption that immigrants were less qualified
compared to Americans.
Julie: There would be like, maybe they are offering the job for twelve dollars an
hour and both of you are applying for it. But they are willing to work for seven.
So, who are they gonna give it to? You know what I mean?
Cody: What about it’s more, a talent? They just happen to be more, more
talented in terms of the jobs that they are looking for? Would, would you put that
in any factors? Even if they are from a different country?
Julie: Um, I don’t know. I mean, I kind of have a problem, um, with that whole
situation. Because I think that most of, most of the people that are coming over
are dependent on us for their survival...
Discourse that naturally positions racial Others as less qualified for some jobs is
pervasive in U.S. racial discourse (e.g. Bonilla-Silva, 2001; Moss & Faux, 2006). With
this assumption, dominant racial group members may claim that they could not get a
position because racial Others will work for less money, or there is special treatment for
underrepresented groups, rather than constructing Others as more talented or qualified. In
the example above, Cody employed a challenging discourse that questioned the
assumption that immigrants will work for low wages and are dependent on the U.S. for
survival.
In sum, in this section, I selected examples of discourse that challenged
assumptions of dominant discourse. The aim of this particular section was to demonstrate
what kinds of discursive strategies and resources participants used to challenge or
question dominant racist discourse, which they might also draw on in addition to offering
discourse that reinforced the status quo. As I have shown, individuals’ comments revealed
multiple interpretative repertories and they used available resources in both constrained
and creative manners (Wetherell & Potter, 1992).
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Summary
This chapter described what kinds of interpretative repertoires study participants
employed in their dyadic interpersonal discourse on immigration in the U.S. I examined
how they positioned “us” versus immigrants as “them” within each repertoire, and what
their discursive practices accomplished in terms of the mechanisms of racialized social
systems. Four primary interpretative repertoires emerged: the idea that the U.S. is a
nation of selected immigrants; valorizing of the American Dream and individual
meritocracy; equalizing American-ness and assimilation into the U.S. with speaking the
English language; and questioning the normality of white privilege and racial status quo
in the U.S. Positive self and negative Other positioning was evident in the first three
interpretative repertoires.
Within the first interpretative repertoire, phrases such as “we are a nation of
immigrants,” “we are all immigrants,” and referencing a melting pot metaphor, seemed to
work as discursive buffers that allowed ambivalent statements to remain unquestioned
and to pre-empt ascriptions of being racist. This interpretative repertoire was enabled by
participants following four discursive practices: expressing assimilationist views that
propose immigrants should assimilate into “our” culture as “we” did; describing
appropriation of immigrants’ consumable cultures as acceptable; using criminalization of
immigrants to justify restrictionist views; and supporting a color-blind ideology. In each
practice, a contrast between “us” and “immigrants” was evident. This corresponds with
past research on macro-level immigration discourse (e.g. van Dijk, 1992, 1993, 2000b).
In this study, “us” was positioned positively as groups whose ancestors assimilated and
brought unity to the nation, while recent “immigrants”, most likely immigrants from
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Mexico, were described as groups that refuse to assimilate and cause various social
problems. Additionally, positioning “us” as “culture-less” and “normal” worked to protect
dominant group members’ unquestioned levels of privilege; and assumptions that
individuals’ race or ethnicity does not matter supported a color-blind ideology.
The second repertoire is closely related to individual meritocracy, which is a
significant part of abstract liberalism (Bonilla-Silva, 2001, 2006). With the use of this
interpretative repertoire, the existence of racial difference was erased due to the focus on
economic aspects of immigration. Though the American Dream referred to the
assumption that everybody has the same opportunity for success, this interpretative
repertoire justified blaming immigrants for their own economic standing. Negative
positioning of immigrants, mostly those from Mexico, was also evident in this
interpretative repertoire. Immigrants were likely to be described as non-taxpayers who
take advantage of U.S. systems and therefore do not deserve the American dream;
participants attributed immigrants’ lower social/ economic status to immigrants’ lack of
willingness to work hard; and such views were additionally justified by pointing out
some exceptional cases of immigrants’ success. These discursive practices supported
individual meritocracy and acted to position “us” or “our” ancestors positively as
hardworking taxpayers who deserve their economic standing while positioning “them,”
Others, negatively.
The third interpretative repertoire equalized being American and assimilation
with learning the English language. Participants’ interpersonal discourses within this
framework constructed assimilation into “our” culture through the acquisition of the
English language as natural and beneficial. Within this interpretative repertoire,
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participants were most likely to refer to Spanish speaking immigrants. Spanish speaking
immigrants were positioned negatively as a group that: refuses to assimilate into “our”
society, destroys the unity of “our” nation, and asks “us” to accommodate “their”
language, instead of learning “our” language. Participants’ claims that learning the
English language was beneficial for both “us” and “them” also protected their entitlement
to decide what is necessary to become “U.S. American” and what is “normal.”
Language negotiation in these interpersonal discourses thus reconstructed and reinforced
power relations between “us” and “Others” (Martin & Nakayama, 2008).
Participants’ use of these interpretative repertoires indicated that ideologies
implicated contributed to the mechanism of hegemonic reproduction of racist systems in
society. These interpretative repertoires, discursive resources, and discursive moves
therein were limited and constrained by racist ideologies produced at the macro level; but
at the same time, employing these discourses reproduced these ideologies and maintained
and reinforced systems of inequality.
In addition to these interpretative repertoires that sustained dominant discourse,
there emerged discursive practices that pointed out the role of racial difference in
immigration issues, described racist practices in U.S. immigration histories, and
questioned white privilege and normality. It should be noted that participants who drew
on resources that dominant racist ideologies offer also challenged dominant discourse. As
Wetherell and Potter claim (1992), the abstract nature of an interpretative repertoire
enables contradicting and ambivalent statements; I also believe that the same repertoire
can provide individuals with resources that both conform to and challenge dominant
ideologies.
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Footnotes
1

Anglo is the term frequently used to refer to White Americans in the Southwest.
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Chapter V: Interview Discourse on Foreign Workers in Japan
This chapter discusses what kinds of interpretative repertoires participants
employed and how they positioned themselves and “Others” in their discourse on
immigration/admission of foreign workers in Japan. As I described in chapter two, Japan
and the U.S. have different sociopolitical/historical contexts regarding immigration and
race-relations. One prominent difference between Japanese and U.S. immigration
contexts is the existence of the myth that Japan is a mono-racial/ mono-ethnic nation in
contrast to the concept of the melting pot in the U.S. Another difference is that a smaller
number of foreign residents (approximately 1.57% of the total population) live in Japan
compared to the U.S. Also, an assumption that Japan’s history does not include
immigration is pervasive in Japan, while the U.S. is known as a nation of immigrants.
How these differences in socio-political/historical contexts between Japan and the U.S.
influence people’s discursive practices will be described through the analysis of
interpretative repertoires and positioning that Japanese participants drew on in their
immigration discourses.
In chapter two, I discussed the transitivity of the concept of racialized systems to
Japanese society. I suggested that Japanese racialized social systems consist of a
combination of a global white supremacist system that privileges white races and the
Yamato supremacist social system that privileges the Japanese ethnic group over other
Asians. The global white supremacist system has been perpetuated since the time Japan
opened itself to the West in 1853, and the Yamato supremacist system emerged around the
beginning of the 20th century out of the development of nationalism and imperialism and
the need to justify Japanese colonization of other Asian race groups. Embedded in these
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two racial systems, the Japanese have internalized their racial position as Asians that are
inferior to White racial groups and as a Yamato ethnic group that is superior to other
Asian cultural groups. Even though there has been a widely spread myth of race-less-ness
or Japan as a mono-racial/ethnic nation, the society has been racialized; and the very
absence of the concept of race in society is an evidence of a racial purity ideology and the
existence of nativistic racism in Japan (Douglas & Roberts, 2003, Shipper, 2002).
Past and present immigration policies are examples that clearly demonstrate how
racialized Japanese society actually has been. Various laws and regulations regarding
immigration and admission of foreign workers have justified processes that are based on
Japanese-bloodline or racial proximity, and their criteria of admission have been
constantly re-written to meet the national need for low-wage laborers and maintenance of
racial purity. Scholars in the field of critical cultural studies claim that reluctance of the
Japanese government to admit foreign workers and xenophobic immigration policy are
deeply rooted in a racial purity ideology and nativistic racism (e.g. Bartram, 2004;
Douglas & Roberts, 2003; Jung, 2004; Lie, 2003; Shipper, 2002). Shipper (2002) calls
Japanese immigration processes “state-sponsored racism based on a xenophobic idea of
mono-ethnicism” (p.59). Therefore, Japanese policies of immigration and admission of
foreign workers have contributed to recreate and maintain its racialized social systems,
especially the Yamato supremacist system that values racial purity.
Although the background of immigration/admission of foreign workers widely
differs between Japan and the U.S., mainstream racial discourses at the macro-political/
institutional levels are similar to those in the U.S. As I reviewed in chapter two, public
discourse in Japan also diverts its focus from race to non-race factors, and it constructs
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low-wage laborers as threats to the national economy (Asahishinbun, 2001; Douglas &
Roberts, 2003). White racial groups are positioned positively through media
representations (Darling-Wolf, 2003; Fujimoto, 2002; Hagiwara, 1994, 2004; Hiyoshi,
2001), non-White foreigners are often positioned as negative Others by associating them
with various social problems (Douglas & Roberts, 2003). These discursive practices are
consistent with the findings about racial discourses in the U.S. (e.g. Bonilla-Silva, 2001,
2006; Demo, 2005; Flores, 2003; Santa Ana, 1999), UK (van Dijk, 1992, 1995; 2000),
Australia (Augoustinos & Everm, 2007; Wetherell & Potter, 1992), and South Africa
(Dixon et al, 1994).
Analysis of interpersonal dyadic conversations on immigration/foreign workers
in Japan revealed that Japanese discourse at the interpersonal level has both similarities
with and uniqueness when compared to U.S. discourse. General discursive patterns, such
as focus on non-racial factors and positioning of positive-self/negative others, are similar
to those of the U.S. discourse. However, interpretative repertoires and positioning that
participants employed are different due to Japanese social and historical contexts
regarding immigration/admission of foreign workers. In the following section, I describe
four emergent interpretative repertoires and positioning of self and Others therein. The
four interpretative repertoires that Japanese participants drew on in their conversations
were: 1) Sakoku and Shimaguni: foreign worker issues can be explained by the historical
and geographical insularity of Japan, 2) foreigners are scary, 3) foreign workers are
threatening our national economy and labor market, and 4) Japan is a monolingual nation
and Japanese language therefore is required to live in this country.

159

As I mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, although I compare discursive
patterns in Japanese and U.S. discourse, I do not seek to generalize and essentialize
Japanese and U.S. Americans through their racial discourse. On the contrary, I attempt to
demonstrate what kinds of discursive resources are offered in different sociopolitical and
historical contexts in order for individuals to justify or challenge dominant racial
ideologies. I frequently refer to the discursive themes, strategies, and patterns that
emerged in the U.S. discourse in the analyses of Japanese discourse, but the aim is to
highlight how different macro-contexts enact different or similar discursive resources and
strategies.
Regarding excerpts listed in the following sections, Japanese participants’
discourse was translated into English from Japanese by the author, and another
Japanese-English bilingual student checked the translation to establish translation
equivalence. As well as for U.S. participants, I assigned pseudonyms to Japanese
participants. For those who may not be familiar with Japanese names, I put (F) next to
female participants’ names and (M) for male participants.
Interpretative Repertoires and Positioning in Japanese Interviews
Perhaps due to the prevalence of a racial purity ideology, xenophobic
immigration policies, and a small number of foreign residents in the nation, the topic of
immigration/admission of foreign workers does not seem to be a familiar topic for most
participants in this study.
Rika(F): [The term]“Immigrants” doesn’t come across clearly to me.
Yuko(F): I know.
Rika: The term, I mean.
Yuko: I understand “foreign workers,” but not “immigrants.”
Rika: “Immigrants” sounds like something in the U.S. or in Brazil.
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Yuko: I don’t feel like Japan has any immigrants. But this says 1.57% of the
total population is foreign residents, here.
Rika: Really?
Yuko: That’s a lot. 1.57% means…
Rika: I don’t know.
Yuko: But that’s a lot. I thought it might be much less, like 0.0 something…It’s
not familiar [issue] at all. It sounds like a story of different countries.
Rika: I agree. Maybe because there is no immigrant around us, or we just don’t
care?
Yuko: Yeah, I guess we don’t care. Immigration issues never come up as a topic
in our conversations.

This is an exchange between friends, Rika and Yuko, 18 year old female college students
who both identified their race as Oshokujinshu (yellow race1) and their ethnicity as
Japanese. A lot of Japanese participants in this study expressed their lack of familiarity
with the topic as Rika and Yuko did, and many of them attributed the lack of familiarity
to a small number of foreigners in Japan or a lack of first-hand experience with foreigners.
Japanese people in general are less likely to question why they have such a small number
of foreign residents, and one possible answer to this is Japanese history of Sakoku, which
means national isolation in Japanese. This is the core of the first interpretative repertoire
in Japanese immigration discourse.
“Sakoku” and “Shimaguni”: Foreign Worker Issues can be Explained by Historical
and Geographical Insularity of Japan
As I briefly mentioned in chapter two, Japan closed its borders and banned
exchanges with any foreign countries except China and the Netherlands from the mid 17th
century to the mid 19th century. This historical event of closing off the borders over 200
years served to reinforce a sense of identity and pride that “we could make it just by
ourselves.” Even though the borders were re-opened more than a century ago, the image
of Japan as an insular island nation still lingers in Japanese people’s views. While
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histories of open borders and cultural diversity are symbols of the United States, those of
closed borders and insularity are symbols of Japan. In Japanese discourse on immigration
and admission of foreign workers, in fact, phrases such as “Japan has had Sakoku”
(national isolation) and “Japan is a Shimaguni”(an island nation) frequently appeared.
The analysis of discourses that revolved around these concepts of Sakoku and Shimaguni
revealed that this interpretative repertoire justifies three main practices. The practices are
1) keeping the small number of foreign residents in Japan unquestioned, 2) reluctance to
accept other cultures, and 3) commodifying foreign cultures or foreigners who enact
Japanese traditions. Respective discursive practices are described with examples below.
It is natural to have few foreign residents because Japan has been
historically and geographically isolated. As seen in Rika and Yuko’s conversation, they
are surprised by the fact that 1.57 % of the total population is foreign residents; not
because this number is too small, but because it is more than they thought it would be.
The participants did not describe globalization, increased human exchange among nations,
nor a growing number of foreigners in Japan. Many of the participants did not describe
that 1.57 % is a small percentage compared to other industrialized nations, or did they
question why the number was so low. The interpretative repertoire of Sakoku and
Shimaguni allows people to assume that having such a small number of foreigners is
justified. Having few foreigners is considered historically natural because the country
closed its border for more than 200 years; and it was also described as geographically
natural because the country has been isolated due to the surrounding ocean. Even in this
era of globalization and internationalization, this kind of discourse still works to maintain
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Japanese exclusive immigration policies and leaves foreign worker programs
unproblematized.
The next three excerpts are examples of discourse in which Sakoku/ Shimaguni
interpretative repertoire allows participants to construct Japanese government’s and
society’s reluctance to accept foreigners as natural and normal.
Kenji (M): You know, I think there are not so many foreign workers in Japan.
Fumio(M): Because it is a Shimaguni…I think the biggest factor is the fact that
Japan is a Shimaguni. To me, at least. Countries, like the U.S. have borders with
Mexico and Canada. Not just borders but that’s one continent, so they widely
accept [foreigners]. However, Japan is a totally insular Shimaguni and moreover
regulations are stricter. So, not like Europe, America, China, or any other
countries, people have lived in Shimaguni, so there is a sense of strong
camaraderie. Even more than other countries.
Kenji: We are independent, culturally.
Fumio: Yeah, that’s right. So, like, we’ve been by ourselves. We have 2000
years of history. Right? So, the historical background is a big factor, I guess.

Fumio and Kenji are classmates and both identified their race and ethnicity as Japanese.
Repeating the term Shimaguni and emphasizing its geographical and historical factors,
Fumio’s discourse justified numbers of Japanese condition and practices. Geographical
factors justified statements such as “there are not so many foreign workers in Japan”;
Japan does not accept foreigners as widely as the U.S., European countries, and China
because Japan is not a continental nation like them; and Japanese “regulations are stricter”
because “there is a sense of strong camaraderie” due to the historical background that
“people have lived in Shimaguni.” As can be seen in Fumio’s last statement, “we’ve been
by ourselves. We have 2000 years of history,” the concept of Shimaguni is strongly tied to
Japanese national identity and pride, even though Japan closed its door only for 200 years,
not 2000 years.
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The next example is from Takeru, a 21 year old male student, and his friend,
Megumi, a 23 year old female student. Both of them identified their race and ethnicity as
Japanese.
Takeru (M): But, you know, because it [Japan] is a Shimaguni, I guess people
from overseas feel hesitant to come in. Cultures don’t mix that much, you know,
values don’t mix either.
Megumi (F): It’s totally a Shimaguni, not like continents, like Europe. So, it’s
not so easy for us to go abroad, and on the other hand, it might not be that easy
for foreigners to come to Japan, either, even today.
In Takeru and Megumi’s conversation, geographical boundaries legitimated and
reproduced the myth of a mono-cultural nation. The statement, “cultures don’t mix that
much…values don’t mix either,” generated Japanese culture and values as the one and
only standard. Also, their conversation makes it look like foreigners’ reluctance may be
one reason for the low percentage of foreign residents in Japan, and it is normal given the
geographical location of Japan. The fact is, however, Japanese government deliberately
controls and limits the number of incoming foreign residents through various policies and
regulations as reviewed in chapter two. This interpretative repertoire therefore works to
keep institutional authority and dominant positions of Japanese invisible. The invisibility
and normativity of Japanese-ness created in this discourse is similar to that of whiteness
(McIntosh, 1988) in discourses in the U.S.
Ai and Akiko, female college classmates, who both identified their race as
yellow and ethnicity as Japanese, addressed that it was more of a historical matter than a
geographical one.
Ai (F): You know, given the historical background, like we had a period called
Sakoku, right?
Akiko(F): Yes.
Ai: Well, it’s my personal opinion, but that is a rather big factor, anyhow. You
know, like, I don’t know. It may be a remnant of that, but Japan still has that
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kind of tendency. Compared to the U.S. or European countries, I can’t picture
foreigners coming in and out frequently in Japan.
Akiko: I agree. I don’t know, but that’s true. Well, it says we accept foreign
workers, but do we really accept them? I mean, I’ve never heard of anyone
hiring them.

In addition to justifying Japanese reluctance to accept many foreigners due to the history
of long-term closure, their discourse justified the absence of foreign workers’ existence in
the nation. Failing to recognize the presence of underrepresented groups leads to
silencing their voices in society. In Japanese contexts, this may also contribute to
perpetuating the myth of homogeneity.
Our reluctance to accept foreigners is natural because their cultures and
communication styles are so different from ours. In Takeru’s statement cited above, a
small population of foreigners was attributed to foreigners’ “unwillingness” to come to
Japan. Referring to Japanese histories and geographical location, the absence of
foreigners was created as natural and Japanese immigration policies and regulations were
made invisible. On the other hand, some participants recognized Japanese unwillingness
and yet they justified it drawing on this interpretative repertoire. The following two
excerpts are examples of this kind of discourse. The first one is the conversation between
Yuri, an 18 year old undergraduate student, and her boyfriend Yusuke, who is a 19 year
old college student. Both identified their race as yellow and ethnicity as Japanese.
Yuri (F): I think Japanese are not used to Gaijin2.
Yusuke(M): You know, the U.S. is filled with immigrants, I know there used to
be discrimination against blacks in the past, but they [U.S. Americans] are
accustomed to foreigners. But Japan had Sakoku, and people were startled just
by the appearance of the Black Ship3, well it’s not “just”, but anyway, I don’t
think we are immune to them.
Yuri: Right, I agree. We even get scared of people who speak in a foreign
language, don’t we?
Yusuke: Yeah, we do.
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In their conversation, Japanese unwillingness to interact with foreigners was justified by
the reference to the history of Sakoku and Japanese people’s reaction to the first
encounter with the West. Their discourse implied that after more than 150 years have
passed since the Black Ship came, Japanese still have a right to “be startled” by “Gaijin”
and position them as a threat to the nation. The use of the term “Gaijin” itself positioned
foreigners negatively as outsiders, and they were also described as people to be scared of.
Yusuke mentioned discrimination against blacks in the U.S. when he was comparing
Japan to the U.S. In his statement, black discrimination was constructed as something in
the past. This might imply that racial ideologies generated in a global white supremacist
system are also enacted within this interpretative repertoire.
The next example is offered by Yuko and Rika. They both identified their race as
yellow and ethnicity as Japanese. They were talking about difficulties foreign workers
may face in Japan.
Yuko(F): Many Japanese are reluctant to accept foreigners, don’ you think?
Rika(F): We keep just a little bit distance away from them.
Yuko: I don’t know why. Maybe because we are surrounded by the ocean?
Rika: Because [Japan is] Shimaguni.
Yuko: We are isolated from others.
Rika: You know, personality-wise, Japanese cannot become very close to
someone you meet for the first time. Even among Japanese.
Yuko: Then, we don’t think we should have a policy that increases foreigners in
Japan.
Rika: No, we don’t.
Yuko: We want to keep it at minimum.

As can be seen in their discourse, Japanese participants expressed Japanese
unwillingness to accept foreigners or their own awkward feelings toward them rather
openly within this interpretative repertoire. In this exchange, “we” were positioned as
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restrictionists who are openly against accepting a large number of immigrants. The same
kind of positioning of one’s own group was not common in the U.S. discourse. In the U.S.
discourses, since the myths of multiculturalism, melting pot, and pluralism are pervasive,
dominant group members were likely to position themselves as open toward diversity and
to express their willingness to accept people with different backgrounds. On the contrary,
in Japan, a nation where mono-racial ideologies supported by the historical and
geographical condition are perpetuated, these discursive resources enabled people to
articulate their exclusionary attitudes and practices as natural and normal. Even though
Sakoku was brought to an end many centuries ago and the ocean surrounding the nation is
not really an obstacle against international interactions anymore, the symbolic insularity
of the nation seemed to be maintained and protected through these interpersonal
discourses.
In reproducing the concept of national insularity, Japanese participants’
discourse constructed a clear demarcation between “our culture” and “other cultures” by
positioning self and Others. As well as examples in the U.S. contexts, Japanese
participants also employed positive-self and negative-Other positioning, and most
participants assigned negative cultural differences to Others, and justified Japanese
unwillingness to accept “them.” Thus, this interpretative repertoire enabled interactants to
argue that they are not willing to accept foreigners because of the cultural differences
highlighted by the historical and geographical isolation of Japan, not because of fear of
different racial groups, xenophobia.
Yumiko (F): I think culture, culture is a big factor.
Hiroko (F): You mean, cultural difference?
Yumiko: It may be a typically Japanese way of thinking, like “when in Rome do
as Romans do,” but you know, something like high-context communication
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Hiroko: Oh, you used what we just learned.
Yumiko: Because I really think so.
Hiroko: It’s maybe difficult for those who are not familiar with it [Japanese
communication styles].
Yumiko: Yeah
Hiroko: I mean, there are differences even among Japanese. If they ask us to
understand them, well, it’s difficult.
Yumiko: Because our culture and values are different.

Yumiko and Hiroko are junior level students who identified their racial and ethnic
identities as Japanese. Cultural differences and differences in communication style
between “us” and “them” were emphasized in their discourse. Unwillingness or
difficulties in understanding “them” is justified or normalized by the statement “because
our culture and values are different.” Citing “when in Rome, do as Romans do” implied
that Japanese culture and communication styles are the standard and accommodating to
them is inherently required in Japan.
Although “they” in Hiroko and Yumiko’s discourse seemed to refer to people
from different cultures in general, quite a few participants in this study specifically
mentioned Chinese as a group with a “different culture” that “we” often have problems
with.
Miho (F): Japanese are extremely scared of foreigners or immigrants because
[Japanese] cannot understand why they do certain things, and when, in what
timing, they act in a certain way. You know, they are people from different
cultures. So, in the end, because of cultural differences, we don’t know what
makes them upset or what hurts them. The reason why I know that we don’t
know about these things is that I’ve gone through a culture shock, so to speak.
People from different countries, different cultures hurt me in a weird way and
startled me. For example, if a Japanese person is suddenly yelled at by a Chinese,
the Japanese will be perplexed. So, unconsciously we all know that. So, we have
some sort of a negative image toward immigrants, and try to protect ourselves.
That’s maybe why some people treat them badly, but they do it unconsciously.
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Miho is a 20 year old undergraduate student, who identified her race as Asian and
ethnicity as Japanese. Her discourse attributed Japanese people’s awkward feelings and
maltreatment of foreigners to their unconscious fear and self-defense mechanisms
triggered by cultural differences. Basically, this statement constructed Japanese
xenophobic practices as a natural matter because “they do it unconsciously.” Though she
started with a general statement about foreigners in Japan, toward the end, she singled out
Chinese culture as an example of different cultures. Chinese people were positioned as
those who might “suddenly yell at Japanese” and startle Japanese. Her statement implied
that it is natural for Japanese to have negative views against Chinese and treat them badly
in order to protect themselves. Thus, Chinese people were positioned as threats, while
Japanese were positioned as their victims. This subjugating of immigrants or Others can
also be seen in political debates on immigration in UK (van Dijk, 1992; 1995), and
emerged in the conversations of participants in the U.S.
In a similar manner, Chinese people were positioned negatively as an example of
different cultures in Kenji’s statement, below. Kenji is a college student who identified
his race and ethnicity as Japanese.
Kenji (M): For example, Chinese people come to Japan. Chinese are culturally,
they have a culture of not apologizing so much. But Japanese apologize a lot. So,
that kind of difference may cause problems when Chinese come to Japan. If a
Japanese person thinks a Chinese person is wrong, but if the Chinese person
doesn’t apologize, then there’s cultural difference, you know. Cultural difference
emerges and [the Japanese person] thinks, “What’s wrong with this guy?” I
guess.
In this discourse Chinese were described as a group of people who would not apologize
when they are in the wrong, and this is a cause of problems “they” bring to Japan. This
description of cultural difference positioned Chinese as “wrong” and Japanese as setting
the standards of what should be expected.
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Chinese have been the racial Others for Japanese throughout recent history, and
this relationship is deeply rooted in the development of the Yamato supremacist racialized
social system. As I briefly summarized in chapter two, construction of Yamato race was
derived from the global white supremacist system. As a member of “inferior” yellow race
groups, Japan has tried to differentiate its people from other Yellow race groups to be
recognized as a civilized country by the West (Sato, 1997). When the Chinese Exclusion
Act was implemented in the U.S. during the late 19th century, Japanese public discourse
mirrored and recreated a similar racial ideology (Sato, 1997). Then, the perpetuation of
nationalism and imperialism in the early 20th century required identifying inferior racial
groups to bolster Japanese superiority. Japan claimed the physical and intellectual
superiority of Yamato race (Dikotter, 1997; Weiner, 1997) which justified colonizing the
surrounding Asian countries. Though not many Japanese are willing to employ this social
Darwinist type of discourse anymore, the racial hierarchy constructed back then still
maintains itself through negative media representations and interpersonal discourse such
as those examples cited above.
The next example demonstrates how the Yamato supremacist system and the
global white supremacist system interact and position Japanese and foreigners.
Kyoko (F): You know, Fukuoka4 city is called “the gate of Asia,” so there were a
lot of foreigners, and many of them worked at or owned a restaurant in the town
that I used to live in. They used to come back late at night and talk really loud.
Sora (F): They don’t seem to have a common sense.
Kyoko: Well, they don’t follow “when in Rome do as Romans do.” If they come
into a different culture, I expect them to know about the culture. It would be
better if they know about good manners.
Sora: I agree. I don’t like Chinese because they are rude. Well, I shouldn’t say
like that but I feel they are a little bit rude.
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Kyoko is a 39 year old employee. She and her daughter Sora, an 18 year old
undergraduate student, both identified their race as yellow and ethnicity as Japanese.
Since working at a restaurant or owning a restaurant is a stereotypical profession of
Chinese workers in Japan, it is fair to assume that “they don’t seem to have a common
sense” refers to Chinese, and it is Chinese who are not willing to assimilate into Japanese
culture or who do not have good manners. Sora later openly expressed her dislike of
Chinese by describing them as rude. Also, the statement, “I expect them to know about
the culture,” and linking that to good manners rather than rudeness, set up a clear
hierarchy.
Later, Kyoko and Sora continued their conversations on the difference between
Asians and Whites:
Sora: Maybe I shouldn’t say this, but I feel Whites, and Koreans or Chinese,
Kyoko: Asians, you mean.
Sora: Asian immigrants or workers seem to be different to us, even they are all
foreigners.
Kyoko: You know, in Europe, men have an aesthetic sense and gentlemanship,
and that makes their culture. Western cultures are like that, right? But Asians
don’t have, I don’t know, gentlemanship. It seems like that.
Sora: I don’t know, maybe. Women are kind of oppressed in Asia.
As can be seen in their conversation, Japanese did not seem to be included in the category
of Asians. Lie (2003) argues that most Japanese do not consider Japan as a part of Asia
even today. This tendency has lingered since the colonial era. Chinese people are
positioned as Asians who are rude and treat women badly, but Japanese are different;
European culture is glorified with a stereotypical representation of Whites, which is also
different from Japan but in a positive way. Such a contrasting positioning of Japanese,
“Asians,” and Whites, is constrained by intertwined Yamato and White racialized social
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systems. At the same time, this kind of discursive positioning supports the existence of
these systems. A similar type of discursive positioning was also apparent in the third
group of practices described below.
Foreign workers are acceptable as long as they have something we can learn
from them or they carry on our traditions. This discursive pattern is similar to
commodifying and exoticzing racial Others’ cultures, which also emerged in U.S. context.
The symbolic boundary around the nation in participants’ discourse justified Japanese
unwillingness to accept foreign “others,” and it maintained non-Japanese cultures as
forever-foreign. Without mixing with these cultures, however, Japanese people seem to
be entitled to “consume” or to enjoy these foreign cultures, or to assign foreigners
cultural missions or roles in Japan. In U.S. interpersonal discourse on immigration,
immigrants’ food was sometimes constructed as material culture that Whites can consume
and enjoy, and immigrants were positioned as agents who bring cultures to the
“culture-less” nation. Japanese participants’ interpersonal discourse also commodified
and exoticized other cultures in similar ways. A unique positioning of foreigners emerged
in Japanese discourse, however, participants also positioned foreigners as agents to carry
on Japanese traditions. The following excerpts below are examples of commodification
and positioning of racial “Others” in Japan. Haruka and Shiho are juniors in college, and
both of them left the race column blank, though Shiho identified her ethnicity as Japanese.
Mana is also a junior in college and she identified her race as yellow and ethnicity as
Japanese.
Haruka (F): We had some foreign teachers at schools. What do we call those
who teach once in a while?
Shiho(F): Um, “A”something [She might refer to ALT: Assistant Language
Teacher].
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Haruka: Anyway, I met people like that, and they are the most familiar ones.
They are close to us, and they are harmless, and it’s rather fun to have them, and
we’re interested in them. So, I think we should allow qualified people to come
in.

Mana (F): People from foreign countries have something we don’t have in
Japan and something we can learn from. Like, English teachers can definitely
teach something Japanese cannot. In terms of language, foreigners have better
skills, so it’s important to admit foreigners who have those kinds of knowledge
or skills.

The two excerpts above show that participants constructed foreign English teachers in
Japan in a positive way. They were positioned as “familiar,” “harmless,” “fun,”
“interesting,” “qualified” “skilled,” and “desirable.” This kind of positive positioning,
however, did not apply to all racial groups. Of importance here was the color of those
who teach the English language and those who speak it in Japan. Due to
overrepresentations of Whites as attractive and desirable in Japanese media
(Darling-Wolf, 2003; FCT, 1999; Fujimoto, 2002; Hagiwara, 1994; 2004; Hiyoshi, 2001),
English is considered as Whites’ language and thus Japanese are willing to accept English
speakers who are White, as Haruka, Shiho, and Mana said above. This can be considered
as a reproduction of whiteness at the interpersonal level. At the same time, however,
Whites were exoticized in this kind of discourse, because construction of English as the
White’s language commodifies and freezes Whites’ culture in Japan. In fact, it is often
said that English language schools are likely to hire more White English speakers as their
instructors than non-White English speakers. This means that White English speakers
have higher marketability or commodity value. Therefore, as well as Whites’ bodies, their
language is also racialized in Japan.
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In addition to assigning the cultural role of English teachers to Whites in Japan,
Japanese discourse positioned foreigners residing in Japan as successors to Japanese
culture. This is an interesting contrast with the positioning of immigrants as deliverers of
cultures to the culture-less U.S. Another interesting aspect of this positioning is that
culture and labor/work were closely linked, if not equalized, in this particular discursive
practice. For example, Haruka referred to an U.S. American Enka singer, Jero, who
became popular in Japan during the past few years.
Haruka (F): What about Jero. Well, it’s not labor, but the popularity of Enka
was going down and then Jero revived it. Well, it’s kind of weird that was
[achieved by]a foreigner, but anyway that pleased Japanese, and they got excited.
In that aspect, I think it’s good, if it is in the fields that do not have sufficient
workforce.
Enka is a genre of Japanese traditional music, which is often associated with blues in the
U.S. Its major target audiences are elderly Japanese; young Japanese rarely listen to Enka.
However, Jero attracted an audience beyond the elder generation. Jero is one-quarter
Japanese American who has a black-rapper-like appearance, and he sings Enka without
any accent. In Haruka’s discourse, Jero was constructed as a successor or even a savior of
Japanese traditional music. Thus Jero was positioned as a foreigner who fulfills the needs
of Japan. Also Haruka’s short statement leaked ambivalent feelings toward foreigners –
as Haruka said, if this fulfills the needs of Japan it is fine, but still, “it’s kind of weird” to
have foreigners to do “our” jobs. These kinds of ambivalent feelings are actually intrinsic
to the dialectic tension between Japanese needs for a labor force and its desire to keep
racial purity (Douglas & Roberts, 2003). For example, Hiroko and Yumiko’s discourse
demonstrates such ambivalent feelings toward the balance between labor force and racial
purity. They are 21 year old classmates and they both identified their race and ethnicity as
Japanese.
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Yumiko(F): I never thought that foreigners come, support Japanese economy,
and foster internationalization.
Hiroko (F): Well, it’s happening, I guess. Because of a low birth rate or
something like that. When there is no one who provides care for the elderly,
maybe foreigners will become our caregivers. It’s scary, though.
Recognizing the needs of labor force from overseas, having foreign care-givers is
something “scary” for the “mono-racial” nation.
Another similar example is the conversation between Erika and Reiko, 20 year
old best friends who identified their race as yellow/Mongoloid and ethnicity as Japanese.
Reiko(F): It’s not really about foreign workers, but I feel that Japanese
traditional culture is being carried on by foreigners, not Japanese, in a lot of
cases. Like, Sumo, for example.
Erika (F): I see.
Reiko: and Kimono.
Erika: Kimono?
Reiko: Well, just a little bit, though.
Erika: I agree that foreigners cherish our culture more than we do, or we are
kind of driving them to cherish it, in a way.
Reiko: You know, younger generations are not really interested in Japanese
traditional cultures, unless they are from foreign country.
Erika: Yeah.
Reiko: Like, carrying on our traditional culture, or engaging in the fishing
industry as foreign workers, or there are many foreigners who do pottery, like
professional potters.
Erika: Yeah, well, it is because foreigners are interested in those, Japanese can
make business out of it, and that maintains the tradition or something like that.
Like, maintaining Japanese tradition for foreign audiences.
Reiko: Even if they do that for money or jobs, we need someone who carries on
our culture. Otherwise traditions will end, and also there are professions that
need people from foreign countries to maintain them.
Erika: I see. I agree with that.

In Erika and Reiko’s discourse, foreigners were assigned their role to cherish and
maintain Japanese traditional culture. Imposing cultural roles may constrain foreigners’
agency and freeze their cultural identity avowal. By positioning foreigners as those that
keep traditions alive, this discourse also positioned “our” culture as more “cherishable”
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or “valuable” than foreigners’ cultures, while providing Japanese the rights to decide
what foreigners should do in Japan. Though the race of the musicians, potters or those
who fish was not as clear as that of English teachers, those who are “engaging in the
fishing industry” are usually trainees from Southeast Asian countries. In addition to these
discourses, other interactants also mentioned foreign workers in fishing and agriculture,
and their discourse constructed these as low-wage jobs that Japanese from young
generations rarely want to engage in. This discursive pattern, therefore, positioned
foreign laborers as low wage, low status workers, as well as artists who may earn higher
wages and hold higher status, while both are employed in service to Japanese cultural
traditions. Disguising labor as a cultural activity, which is “our” culture but not
“theirs,”may soften the damage to the myth of Shimaguni, the national pride based on the
false assumption that Japanese have made it by themselves without foreigners’ help until
today.
Thus far, I have described how Japanese participants used discursive resources
provided by interpretative repertoires that revolve around Sakoku [national isolation/
closing borders] and Shimaguni [an island nation]. The analyses of Japanese participants’
discourse revealed that this interpretative repertoire allowed them to construct the
proportion of foreigners to Japanese and Japanese unwillingness to accept foreigners and
foreign cultures as natural and normal, to divert its attention from race to cultural
differences, to commodify foreigners’ cultures, and assigning particular roles, such as
keepers of selected traditions, to them. Just as there was some negative positioning of
foreigners in Japan (e.g. positioning of Chinese people) within this interpretative
repertoire, negative positioning of foreign workers also emerged within the next
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interpretative repertoire. Within the next interpretative repertoire, immigrants/ foreign
workers, especially those who are not White, were constructed as threats to the nation.
Foreigners are Scary
In racist discourse, it is a common discursive strategy to position racial Others as
threats to the nation and its people. For example, van Dijk’s studies (1992, 1995, 2000a)
demonstrate that political debates on immigration position immigrants or asylum seekers
as illegal, criminals, and economic burdens. In a similar vein, U.S. public discourse on
immigration constructs immigrants negatively by emphasizing illegality and criminality.
In this study, U.S. participants’ interpersonal discourse negatively positioned immigrants
from Mexico in particular. Sometimes immigrants were constructed explicitly as
economic threats/ burdens (i.e. exploiting the system without contributing or stealing jobs
from American citizens), and sometimes participants’ discourse disguised negative
positioning of “criminal Others” with compassionate and empathetic statements for the
poverty and challenges in Mexico. Additionally, in most cases in U.S. discourses,
negative positioning of “Others” eluded appearing racist by focusing on non-racial
factors, such as economy and class.
As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, Japanese participants also
engaged in negative positioning of foreigners as “Others.” However, their construction of
foreigners, especially those who are non-Whites, was less covert and more explicit
compared to those in U.S. discourse. In general, foreign residents in Japan were likely to
be described as a source of fear in participants’ interpersonal discourse. As illustrated
below, “they” were regarded as “scary” for participants. This tendency was more evident
in positioning of non-White foreigners than Whites. Also, when foreigners’ criminality
177

and illegality were described, compassionate statements were frequently employed as
they were in U.S. interpersonal discourse in this study. In this section, I list examples of
discourse in which foreigners were positioned negatively in an explicit manner.
I know I’m biased, but I’m scared of foreigners. In the next couple of
examples, Japanese participants expressed the vague sense of fear for foreigners in Japan.
Ai (F): You know, they tend to commit crime, so if they ask us to be friends with
them, I don’t know. At my workplace, I have some male foreign customers who
often come and ask me out for a drink. Those men who come to the restaurant
alone are really friendly, and they casually ask me out for a drink. But honestly,
it’s scary. I don’t think I would ever hang out with them. They are friendly and
nice when they come to the restaurant, but it’s just scary. If I tell my parents that
I go out with that kind of people, they will frown on that. You know, I wanna
keep some distance from them just because they are foreigners. I think I have a
bias.

Ai is 21 year old undergraduate student who identified her race as yellow and ethnicity as
Japanese. She was working at a restaurant in a big shopping mall at the time of this study,
and she said many foreigners dined at her restaurant. Though she said those male
customers were “friendly and nice,” she was scared of them “just because they are
foreigners” and she stated that “they tend to commit crime.” Her discourse demonstrates
that the overemphasis on criminal cases committed by male foreign residents by media is
recreated, and her statement also constructed foreigners as “that kind of people” “we”
should stay away from. At the end, she admitted that she has a prejudicial attitude against
foreigners. Admitting one’s prejudice was not a common discursive practice in U.S.
discourse in this study. On the contrary, declaring one’s bias or prejudice, and/or
admitting to being discriminatory were actually common discursive strategies in Japanese
participants’ discourse. When people talked about negative aspects of
immigration/admission of foreign workers, they often used phrases such as, “I may be
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prejudiced, but…,” “I know I am biased, but…” or “I may be discriminating, but…” This
strategy is similar to the discursive pattern that White U.S. Americans are reported to
employ to deny their prejudicial attitudes, saying, “I am not racist, but…” or “I am not
prejudiced, but…” (Bonilla-Silva, 2001). Culturally speaking, Japanese people are likely
to make themselves look worse than they think they are, because it is considered as
modesty or humility. Therefore, addressing their being biased or prejudiced does not
necessarily mean they actually think they are biased or prejudiced; rather it can be also a
kind of discursive buffering. For example, another college student, Yuri, who identified
her race as yellow and ethnicity as Japanese, used this strategy as following:
Yuri (F): I must admit that when it comes to foreign workers, I don’t have a
good impression or feeling. I guess I’m prejudiced. I know this is prejudice, so I
try not to think that way, though. Well, my foreign friends are all good people.

As the use of phrases such as “I have a black (or any other non-White racial groups)
friend” can be a discursive strategy to protect one’s own image in U.S. discourse
(Bonilla-Silva, 2001; 2006), both “I have foreign friends” and “I’m prejudiced” also work
to save one’s positive image in Japanese discourse.
Keiko and Saki, 20 year old best friends, who both identified their race as
Japanese but put “I don’t know” under their ethnic label, also positioned foreigners as a
cause of fear and trouble.
Keiko (F):To tell you the truth, I would feel safe if my co-workers were all
Japanese.
Saki (F): Right. But I don’t think I care that much, though.
Keiko: Well, some people definitely mind that. People may be afraid that they
[foreigners] will do something bad, or something like that.
Saki: I see. I guess my grandmother might be like that. I guess the elderly tend
to, [overlapping]
Keiko: Yeah, old people may [overlapping]
Saki: mind that.
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Keiko: Concerning that they might do something wrong or cause some troubles,
people decided not to hire them, I guess.
Saki: Yeah.

Keiko’s first statement that she would feel safe in an all-Japanese working environment
implied that the existence of foreign workers ruins the workplace safety. Such an anxiety
geared toward foreign workers in this discourse, positioned foreigners in Japan as
“harmful” and “dangerous,” while positioning Japanese as “safe.”
As well as Keiko and Saki’s discourse, Keisuke and Kengo’s discourse
constructed foreigners, in general, as inherently dangerous. They are 20 year old college
classmates, and they were talking about their selection of the three discussion statements
with which they most agreed.
Keisuke (M): I didn’t know that there are so many [foreign residents]. If there
are that many, I kind of agree that admission should be controlled sooner or later.
Kengo (M): I mean, If I listen to the voice of my reason and think with my head,
the third statement [the most qualified should be allowed] is right, or I want it to
be right, ideally. But honestly, foreign worker issues in Shizuoka prefecture, you
know, like [there is] Toyota. There are many Brazilians in Shizuoka. Even
though they commit various crimes, once they go back to Brazil, Japanese police
cannot do anything about it. So that kind of thing happens. Also, we hear bad
news about American military base in Okinawa. I mean, as Japanese, I agree
with the first statement [immigration should be controlled].
Keisuke: Right. I mean, foreigners are scary. We don’t know what they are
capable of doing.
Kengo: Um, I don’t think I can deny that.

I believe their discourse represents Japanese dominant discourse on immigration/
admission of foreign workers and the need for a foreign labor force in their heads but fear
and concern in their hearts. Both Keisuke and Kengo agreed with exclusive policies and
practices against foreign workers in Japan, and this argument was justified by positioning
foreigners in general as naturally dangerous by saying “we don’t know what they are
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capable of doing,” and by focusing on criminal cases highly showcased in Japanese
media. Thus, xenophobic immigration policies and a racial purity ideology were
reproduced and perpetuated in these interpersonal discourses on foreigners, the source of
fear and troubles. In a lot of cases, participants’ vague fear and anxieties were reified and
solidified in discourse that positioned foreign workers as not just being inherently
dangerous, but as criminals.
I understand they are under stress, but illegal and criminal foreigners are
unacceptable. The analysis of interpersonal discourse on immigration in the U.S.
illustrated that compassionate phrases often accompanied negative positioning of
Mexican immigrants. Some U.S. participants expressed their sympathy toward Mexican
immigrants’ economic status or their living environment in Mexico, while addressing that
it is thus natural that they commit crimes. A similar discursive practice was also
employed by Japanese participants, and quite a few of them referred to the stress foreign
workers might undergo in living in Japan. The following excerpts are from conversations
in which participants positioned immigrants/ foreign workers as criminals while
expressing compassion for them.
Chika (F): You know, there are criminal cases where foreign workers became
burglars or murderers lately.
Yukie (F): That’s right.
Chika: I think it may be because they are under a lot of stress, working in Japan.
You know, there is an image that Japanese are rich. So, for the burglars, they
may think “Why we are the only poor ones when Japanese are rich?”
Yukie: I see, you’re right.
Chika: So, I believe Japanese government should limit the admission of foreign
workers to protect Japanese nation and its safety.
Yukie: Right. Otherwise, the crime rate will go up.
Chika: I mean, admitting good ones sounds really nice, but if you do that, you
know, what should we do if we end up having more murder cases?
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Chika and Yukie are both 18 year old friends, who both identified their race as yellow and
ethnicity as Japanese. Their discourse legitimated Japanese xenophobic policy. Though
they show their sympathy for “poor” foreign workers who are “under a lot of stress
working in Japan,” these foreign workers were constructed as potential burglars and
murderers that destroy the safety of Japan. Therefore, “Japanese government should limit
the admission of foreign workers.” In this argument, foreign workers were used as a
scapegoat for violent criminal cases that spoil domestic security, as if there was no crime
in Japan before admitting foreign workers. This discursive pattern is consistent with
public discourse that claims foreigners are likely to engage in more violent crimes than
Japanese, though the reverse is actually the case (Douglass & Roberts, 2003).
In a similar fashion, other participants also expressed their sympathy for foreign
workers’ stress and lower economic status. Some other examples are below:
Megumi (F): Well, because they are foreigners, so there are many cases [of
crimes], but Japanese also steal, so that’s not limited to foreigners. If we have
proper laws and regulations, that kinds of things will decrease. I mean, they are
under stress, stress of living in Japan, so there are more and more criminal cases,
I think.
Kenji (M): There is an increasing number of foreign workers in Japan from
various different countries, but foreign workers are, well, their salaries are low,
and their living costs are limited. I guess their crimes and illegal activities are
triggered by their dissatisfaction or stress.
Miho (F): I think the reason why foreign workers commit crimes is, honestly,
they are not admitted legally. Because of their illegal residency, and they are
suffering from harsh living condition because of that, right? So, they try to
search for the means to get some money and step into the dark side.
These statements positioned foreign workers as illegal or criminals, but showing
sympathy toward their living and working condition buffered the negative positioning
while maintaining Japanese participants’ positive self image.
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Thus far, I have listed examples of Japanese interpersonal dyadic discourse in
which foreigners or foreign workers in general, were positioned as a source of fear or
criminals that ruin “our” safety. These interpersonal discourses reflected and reproduced
those at the macro-institutional levels in Japan. For example, the public statement made
in 2006 by the Japanese Ministry of Justice (Ministry of Justice, 2006) constructed
foreigners as potential criminals and Japan as a safe nation if “we” do not admit “them.”
We should not accelerate the admission of foreigners without controlling crimes
committed by foreigners or illegal foreign residents. It is essential to grossly
reduce the number of these illegal foreign residents in order to dispel Japanese
citizens’ anxiety regarding safety and to bring back “the world’s safest nation,
Japan.”
Such a discursive positioning of self and Others justified Japanese exclusive and
xenophobic policies and regulations regarding admission of foreigners. As well it
reproducesd the Yamato supremacist racialized social system that generates a racial purity
ideology, which places Japanese on the top of the racial hierarchy. Additionally the
following examples demonstrate the discursive process of racial stratification not only
between Japanese and non-Japanese, but among different racial groups.
I am not scared of White people, but I am scared of Asians and Blacks
because they are criminals. As I have argued, Japanese society is organized by two
racialized social systems, i.e. global white supremacist racialized social system and
Yamato supremacist one, and these two systems affect race relations in Japanese society.
If there is only Yamato supremacist system, Japanese would be placed above collective
non-Japanese. However, due to the mechanism of the global white supremacist system,
racial stratification in white-centered society is also recreated and perpetuated in Japan,
even though Whites are not “elites” in terms of political status or institutional access
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within Japan. These intertwined racialized social systems were reproduced and reinforced
by Japanese interpersonal discourse as seen in the following conversation between Shiho
and Haruna, two best friends.
Shiho (F): If I’m talked to by someone who speaks Japanese with an accent, like
Chinese, I would feel scared.
Haruna (F): Scary. I would feel scared, too.
Shiho: I don’t know why but [it is] scary.
Haruna: You can tell [Chinese]by their appearance. They are also yellow race
and we look alike, but we can tell they are, you know, by how they dress and
stuff. If they come to me, I feel scared.
Shiho: I would be panicking
Haruna: If the person is American, White, you know? If it is a Black person, I
would feel a little scared, though. But if I’m talked to by a white person, I would
be like “what should I do?” but not being scared.
Shiho: I would try to think about how to interact with them.
Haruna: But if a Chinese or Asian person comes to me, I would go like “help
me! Somebody!”
Shiho: wondering “what they are gonna do to me.”
Haruna: Right. We have that kind of image. Well, I guess I would feel the same
for Blacks.
Shiho: Yeah, me, too.

Discursive positioning in Shiho and Haruna’s discourse blatantly drew a color-line
between foreigners in Japan. Whites were positioned as a group that Japanese are willing
to interact with, while Asians (not including Japanese) and Blacks were positioned as
“scary” foreigners that “we” do not feel safe with. Such a positive positioning of White
people as attractive and desirable showed reproduction of whiteness perpetuated by
Japanese media (e.g. Fujimoto, 2002; Hagiwara, 1994; 2004), and contrasting positioning
of Whites and non-Whites evidenced that white supremacist racialized social systems
were at work in Japanese interpersonal discourses. In addition to that, singling out
Chinese as an example of “scary” ones also demonstrated how the Yamato supremacist
racialized social system is entangled with the white supremacist one.
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The following two excerpts are other examples of discourse that contributed to
reconstruction and perpetuation of these two racialized social system in Japan. The first
statement is from Ai, a 21 year old college student who identified her race as yellow and
ethnicity as Japanese.
Ai (F): Again, this may be a prejudicial attitude, but if I become an employer
and need to hire foreign workers, you know, I may be willing to hire
Anglo-Saxon Whites, because you know, they seem to behave and have good
manners, and they can speak English. But I would feel scared of blacks, and I
would doubt educational levels of Arabs or Asians, you know. I think that is why
there are more White teachers at English language schools compared to black
teachers.
Ai’s statement positioned Anglo-Saxon Whites as a group of people who “have good
manners,” Blacks as scary, and Arabs and Asians as groups with lower educational levels.
Such explicit racist positioning was more likely to be avoided in the U.S, because the
color-blind era discourages people to make blatant racist remarks (Bonilla-Silva, 1996,
2001, 2006; Omi & Winant, 1994). However, discursive resources of racial ideologies
enabled such an obvious positioning of racial Others. Positioning of Whites as “honored
guests” (Lie, 2001, p.172) was enabled by a whiteness ideology, and negative positioning
of non-White Others was endorsed by a xenophobic racial purity ideology, which
reproduced the myth of a mono-ethnic nation. Another example of explicit positioning of
non-White foreigners in Japan was offered by Yusaku, a 22 year old senior college
student who identified his race as Japanese.
Yusaku (M): Speaking of crimes, well, I guess I am prejudiced, but when I hear
the news that a foreigner commits a crime, I would automatically think maybe a
black person did it. Maybe it is true that more crimes are committed by blacks.
Well, they have a job and earn their living, right? So, maltreatment toward them
or their dissatisfaction forces them to commit crimes or do something that does
not conform to Japan, and I guess that’s why they [foreign workers] are
considered problematic.
185

As I mentioned in chapter two, racial positioning of blacks as lower in the status
hierarchy was introduced when Japan was exposed to the Jim-Crow type of racism in
white-centered racialized systems. Black Americans have been and still are differentiated
from the category of “Americans” in Japan, because “Americans” connotes White
Americans, while Blacks historically have been positioned as a physically and
intellectually inferior racial group (Lie, 2001). In recent years, due to global media, not
only positive images of Whites but also negative images of Blacks, are reconstructed in
Japanese society. For example, Blacks are more likely to appear in the news as
perpetrators than as reporters or anchors (e.g. Dixon et al., 2004), and images of Blacks
as criminals are reinforced in U.S. media. Such media representations of Blacks also
provide certain discursive tools and resources for Japanese people to recreate the same
images. Construction of Blacks as scary in Haruka, Shiho, Ai, and Yusaku’s discourse
was a reproduction of similar discourses in global media.
Thus as illustrated by participants’ interpersonal discourse, this interpretative
repertoire worked in three different ways. First, the repertoire enabled Japanese people to
discursively construct foreigners in general as a source of fear. As collective racial Others,
foreigners in Japan were dehumanized as if they are threatening creatures in this way.
Second, a vague sense of fear that Japanese hold for foreigners became concrete in
positioning of foreign workers as criminals. Combined with sympathetic statements,
foreign workers were blatantly positioned as potential criminals as they are in a
macro-institutional discourse. Lastly, this interpretative repertoire provided Japanese with
a color-line that categorized acceptable and unacceptable foreigners. Constrained by both
a White supremacist racialized social system and the Yamato supremacist racialized
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social system, Japanese participants positioned non-White foreign workers negatively
compared to White ones in an explicit way. The discursive resources and tools this
interpretative repertoire offered to Japanese people evidenced the very existence of “race”
and racial stratifications in Japan where the myth of race-less-ness is pervasive.
Race-relations among Japanese, Whites, and non-Japanese Asians were also reproduced
within the next interpretative repertoire that averts individuals’ focus from race to the
economy.
Foreign Workers are Threatening Our National Economy and Labor Market
In immigration discourse, it is common that racist discourse disguises itself as
economy/ class discourse: immigrants are frequently described as threats to the national
economy or an economic burden (Cornelius, 2005; Flores, 2003; Marin, 2003; Pantoja,
2006). In this study U.S. participants also positioned recent immigrants, most often those
from Mexico, as economic threats and burdens that took away jobs, lowered wages, and
exploited the welfare system without paying taxes. Japanese public discourse on
immigration also considers foreign workers, especially unskilled laborers, as economic
threats who lower wages and increase unemployment rates in Japan (Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare, 2009). This is one reason why the Japanese government policy
explicitly stated that unskilled low-wage laborers are not allowed into the country and
only highly skilled and educated workers in professional and technical fields should be
admitted (Ministry of Justice, 2006). However, as I argued in chapter two, the
categorization of immigrants/foreign workers in Japan and government policies regarding
admission of foreigners, stratify racial groups in Japanese society and allocate different
rewards according to a racial hierarchy.
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Restrained by and reproducing public discourse on immigration/admission of
foreign workers, quite a few Japanese participants expressed their opinions against
accelerating the admission of foreign workers into the country. In order to justify
advocating for exclusive admission policies and to maintain race-less-ness in society, this
interpretative repertoire provided three primary story lines that Japanese people can
employ: 1) Foreign workers take our jobs away, 2) foreigners from advanced countries
are acceptable, but those from developing countries are not, and, 3) foreign workers
should not be allowed to stay in Japan for a long period of time; this would prevent them
developing their own countries.
We should not accept many foreign workers because they take our jobs
away. As well as Japanese governmental discourses, Japanese participants’ discourses
demonstrated concern for the influence that foreign workers may have on the Japanese
economy, including lowering wages and eventually leading into lower employment rates
among Japanese workers. The following excerpts are from a conversation between Shogo
and Yuta, who identified their race and ethnicity as Japanese; and a statement by Yusaku,
a 22 year old undergraduate student who identified his race as Japanese.
Shogo (M): If we take employers’ perspectives, being able to get the labor force
for low wages must be positive, from their standpoint. But for us, people looking
for a job, to find a job maybe, jobs will be-Yuta(M): gone?
Shogo: difficult to find, I guess. I’m afraid that could happen.

Yusaku (M): I agree with the opinion, or I think it’s a proper argument that
Japan should limit foreign workers because admitting workers who would work
for lower-wages may increase Japanese unemployment.
Given that these three participants are juniors in college, when most Japanese students
start job hunting, their concerns are understandable. In these discourses, however, foreign
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workers were positioned as threats and at the same time as less qualified than Japanese
job applicants; this discourse implied that Japanese companies are willing to hire foreign
workers because it is cheaper, not because they are more qualified. This positioning is
consistent with Japanese public discourse that equalizes foreign workers with unskilled
low-wage workers. Such a positioning of foreign workers employed in interpersonal
discourses used this resource to justify Japanese exclusive admission policies that attempt
to keep unskilled laborers, especially those from Asian countries, outside of the nation.
Discursive practices of constructing Asian workers as unskilled laborers who
lower the employment rate in Japan were evident in the following conversation between
romantic partners, Yuri and Yusuke.
Yuri (F): I don’t know. I think we should not stop admitting [foreign workers]
completely, but if we accelerate the admission, if we do it suddenly, it may
damage Japan. Well, it may not damage, but more people might lose their jobs.
After all, foreign workers can be employed for cheaper wages.
Yusuke (M): I think Chinese and Indians work for so little money lately.
Yuri: Yeah, I think their wages are really low. Because they work for really
cheap wages, Freeters cannot find a job, or it may create a situation where
Freeters have difficulties in finding jobs. I think that’s not good for Japan.

“Freeter” is a recently fabricated term that refers to part-time job-hoppers in Japan. An
increasing number of “Freeters” has become a social issue along with the economic
downturn. Many Japanese young people who gave up their hope for regular employment
need to make their living by having multiple part-time jobs or temporary jobs. In the
conversation between Yuri and Yusuke above, foreign workers, specifically Chinese and
Indians, were blamed for causing the problem affecting opportunities for Freeters and an
increasing number of unemployed Japanese. This discursive pattern of scapegoating that
attributed social problems to immigrants, also emerged in U.S. discourse in this study.
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Another pair of participants also scapegoated Asian workers as the cause of
economic/ labor market issues.
Erika (F): Do you think we should admit more [foreign workers]?
Reiko (F): Well, if we admit too many, Japanese, you know, Japanese would be
considered as people who would work only for higher wages, and Japanese
wouldn’t get hired anymore.
Erika : There will be no jobs for Japanese, then. Because in the field of fishing
or nursing-care, foreign workers work for low wages, and you know, maybe
foreigners are really earnest.
Reiko: I think so, too.
Erika: I saw on the news that at some workplaces, like factories, Japanese
young people are not willing to work there anymore lately, but [foreign workers]
work really earnestly. But I don’t know, if that’s good or not.
Reiko: Um, yeah.
Erika: I wonder.
Reiko: If we hire a lot of foreigners, because of low salaries, if we hire too many
of them, Japanese employment rate would go down, you know.

Reiko and Erika are 20 year old best friends and they both identified their race as yellow/
Mongoloid and ethnicity as Japanese. Although they did not specify racial groups or
nationalities of foreign workers in their conversation, it is apparent that they were
referring to Asian laborers. Foreign workers working in the field of fishing are mostly
Southeast Asians, who come to Japan for training programs. After their training, only
those who pass the exams can officially work for the Japanese fishing industry (Japanese
Fisheries Association, 2006). Also, foreign workers in the field of nursing-care are mostly
Indonesians and Filipinos, because Japan made an official arrangement with these two
countries in 2008 to admit nurses/ care-taker candidates up to 500 a year (Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare, 2009). Therefore, the foreign workers in this discourse are
likely to be Asians.
This conversation contained common discursive strategies frequently used in
racist discourse. The first one is extreme case formulation. Erika’s statement, “there will
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be no job for Japanese, then” illustrated this strategy. This trend also emerged in
interpersonal racist discourse in Moss and Faux’s (2006) interview study. The second
strategy is ambivalent positioning of Others (Billig et al, 1998). Even though both Reiko
and Erika explicitly advocated for stricter admission policies, their discourse positioned
foreign workers as both good and bad— they are earnest workers, but if there are too
many, Japanese workers cannot get jobs. As van Dijk (1997b) posits, racist discourse is
often accompanied by such ambivalence and buffer statements.
The two examples cited above thus negatively positioned Asian low-wage
laborers as the cause of Japanese unemployment, and Japanese as the victims of “them.”
These discourses, therefore, reproduced a Yamato racialized social system that
demarcates Japanese and non-Japanese. However, there are some additional examples of
discourse that stratified racial groups into more than two groups of Japanese and
non-Japanese.
Foreigners from advanced countries are acceptable, but those from
developing countries are not. This storyline allowed people to locate foreigners into a
racial hierarchy as if the categorization is based on the economic status of each country,
instead of race. I argue that when participants employed a Yamato supremacist racialized
social system, the categorization was usually made between Japanese and non-Japanese
Asians; when they employed a global white supremacist racialized social system,
however, the stratification addressed Whites. Within this interpretative repertoire,
however, participants were more likely to stratify foreign workers into two different
groups instead of using racial categories as they did within the previous interpretative
repertoire that mainly positioned all foreigners as “scary.” The two different groups were
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those from “developing countries” (which often refers to Asian countries) and those from
“advanced countries” (which is often equated with the U.S. and European countries).
Categorizing foreign workers into Asian or those from advanced countries deleted the
concept of race from the discourse, and it thus legitimated Japanese xenophobic
admission policies. The conversation between Kengo and Keisuke, 20 year old
classmates who identified their race as Japanese, demonstrated this process.
Kengo(M): Because of economy, because of economic disparity, many people
from Southeast Asia and China come to Japan. On the contrary, I know this is
prejudicial, but I feel American people come here just out of their curiosity or
because of their interests in Japanese culture.
Keisuke (M): I feel the same way, too. But this category, foreign workers who
have skills and knowledge Japan needs, does not apply to those who reluctantly
came to Japan for earning money. It refers to people from Europe or advanced
countries, right?
Kengo: Well, Indians I know are intelligent, though.
Keisuke: India is not an advanced country.

This discourse explicitly distinguished those from advanced countries, including U.S.
Americans and Europeans, and those from Asian countries, including China and India. In
this conversation, “American people,” which in Japan almost automatically refers to
Whites from advanced nations, were described as harmless to Japanese economy or labor
market, because they do not come for getting jobs or earning money; they come to fulfill
their cultural interests. Even if they come to Japan as workers, they fall into the category
of highly-skilled, desired workers. On the contrary, those from Southeast Asia and China
come to Japan due to economic disparity – they can earn more money in Japan than in
their homeland. Thus, foreigners from Asian countries were positioned more negatively
as low-skilled, unqualified workers in contrast to Whites regardless of their immigration
status. The next excerpt offered a similar example.
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Haruka (F): For example, we would respect or have positive feelings toward
Americans or workers from advanced countries, but you know, we tend to feel
that people from developing countries are scary or dangerous. I think that
happens, you know.
Shiho (F): I think so.
Haruka: Because of how they look.
Shiho: I mean, if they come here as elites, then we would think they really tried
hard, but if we see foreign workers doing heavy labor, we would pity them or
have different impressions, right? I know they tried hard to come to Japan,
though.

While this discourse also illustrated the previous interpretative repertoire that positioned
foreigners as “scary,” it also positioned foreign workers based on class level and economy.
Who should be respected and who is scary and dangerous is decided based on the
economic advancement of countries; what kind of impressions “we” have depend on the
foreign workers’ class, whether they are elites or physical laborers. This discourse thus
constructed economic and social class as the central factor of admission of foreigners in
Japan. Nevertheless, “American” almost automatically refer to “white Americans” in
Japan, and those from “developing countries” usually means non-Japanese Asians;
discourse regarding foreign workers is therefore racialized. In addition, Haruka said it
was possible to tell if foreigners were from developing countries by “how they look.”
Therefore, this discourse, without any explicit reference to racial categories, actually
maintained a clear racial hierarchy in Japanese society; White Americans/ Europeans
were given immediate respect and thus were positioned as equal or perhaps higher status
than Asians.
The last example is a conversation between Yuta and Shogo. It is more blatant
than the other two, and it indicates how racist discourse can be disguised as class/
economy discourse.
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Yuta (M): I agree with statement number one [admission should be limited],
because, for example, I would feel awkward if a person from a developing
country became my boss.
Shogo (M): You would?
Yuta: Yes. I know this sounds discriminatory, but I would feel that way. So, if I
think about this, I don’t think I agree with the third statement, which says we
should not treat them just as laborers.
Shogo: So, for you, they are just guest laborers.
Yuta: Something like that. I know I have pride that Japan is an advanced nation.
Shogo: I see.
Yuta: I know this is prejudicial.
Shogo: Have you ever had a boss, who is a foreigner?
Yuta: No, or I avoided that, but no. I can’t even imagine. If they are at the same
level as me, or working at the same level, then that’s ok. I won’t complain. But if
they tell me what to do, then-Shogo: like, “who do you think you are?”
Yuta: I would feel awkward…when I work for a company in the near future, I
don’t want to play up to bosses from outside, honestly. I know this is prejudice,
and discriminatory, but I don’t want to do that. But I’m all for admitting them as
physical laborers.

Repeatedly using discursive buffers, such as “I know this is prejudice,” Yuta’s statement
negatively positioned foreign workers from “developing countries” or “outside” as
unqualified for higher management positions in “an advanced nation.” People from
developing countries can work at the same level as Yuta, if not lower as physical laborers,
but he “can’t even imagine” having a boss from a developing country. His discourse
sounded as if the home country’s economic advancement decides foreign workers’ class
status in Japan. However, this class/ economy discourse was a camouflage for racist
discourse. In a later conversation, in fact, Yuta asked Shogo, “don’t you think it’s
different, say Americans and Filipinos? Don’t you feel that way? Those who are from the
U.S. would look good in a suit.” Descriptions of race or color were implicit in these
particular comments about foreign workers in Japan.
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The excerpts cited above are examples of positioning foreign workers from
developing countries, i.e., Asian countries, negatively as threats to the Japanese economy
and labor market, in contrast to desirable foreigners from “white” advanced countries.
Such a discursive practice acted to justify Japanese xenophobic admission policies. In the
third storyline, participants’ discourse justified the same exclusionary policies with a
humanitarian argument.
Foreign workers should not be allowed to stay in Japan for a long period of
time; this would prevent them developing their own countries. Wetherell and Potter’s
(1992) analysis of public discourse on Maori reveals that humanitarianism plays a
significant role in maintaining racial status quo in society. In colonial contexts, Pakeha
(White New Zealanders) have been positioned as kind and caring individuals whose
interests are protecting and supporting the welfare of Maori people (Wetherell & Potter,
1992). However, this patronizing discourse actually constructed Pakeha as an advanced
race and Maori as inferior who need help from Pakeha, and it thus reproduced colonial
discourse and hierarchy between Pakeha and Maori (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). In
addition, humanitarianism in Pakeha’s public discourse masked their actual interests of
“controlling the political and economic agenda to retain a position of dominance”
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p.25).
Japanese society also has developed similar humanitarian discourses regarding
foreign workers. In chapter two, I briefly mentioned about the technical training program
that Japanese government established in 1981 as a solution for the severe labor shortage
Japan has struggled with since the 1960s (Ishikida, 2005). The basic principle of the
training program is allowing trainees from Asian countries to learn “advanced” skills,
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knowledge, and techniques in Japan for a limited amount of time and to bring the learned
skills back home to contribute to the improvement of their home countries. However, the
embedded intention of this policy was to enable exploitation of cheap labor imported
from Asian countries legally (Ishikida, 2005), without changing the racial composition of
society. The technical trainee program is still considered a humanitarian program in
which Japan, an “advanced” nation, helps “developing” countries. I consider this to be a
remnant of colonial history of Japan in the early 1920th, which is the backbone of Yamato
supremacist racialized social systems.
Such humanitarian and patronizing discourses were reproduced in participants’
comments, and this indicates ways that that public and private discourses are interrelated
(Essed, 1991). The following excerpts exemplify discursive strategies that position “us”
as people who care for the best interest of foreign workers, which creates a subjugated
position for “them” and supports xenophobic admission policies. The first example is
from Erika, a 20 year old student who identified her race as yellow/Mongoloid and
ethnicity as Japanese.
Erika (F): Rather than letting them to work in Japan and earn a lot of money, we
should support them in a way that enables them to make their living in their own
country. You know, there are some cases that, not just sending stuff to
developing countries, but teaching them skills and techniques so that they can
get by there. So we should support the country so that people won’t work
illegally in Japan. You know, it is illegal so they will get caught.
This statement came right after the conversation cited in the previous section, in which
Erika and Reiko were expressing their concern for foreign workers’ taking over Japanese
people’s jobs. Her argument that Japan should support the countries of workers so that
they do not have to work in Japan might sound humanitarian. However, this discourse
implied that Japan should support other countries so that Japan can keep foreign workers
196

from developing countries outside. Also, as Wetherell and Potter (1992) posit, this
discourse can be a reproduction of colonial discourse; the “advanced “Yamato race
educates other “inferior” race groups for “their” own interests. Historical evidence,
economic conditions between Japan and other Asian countries, and the Yamato
supremacist racialized social system offer discursive resources to justify exclusion of
foreign workers, and these kinds of discourse then ensure that the current status
hierarchies can be maintained.
The next two examples are excerpts in which participants supported training
programs for a short period for the sake of foreign workers’ nations. The first one is a
conversation between Saki and Keiko, 20 year old college students who identified their
race as Japanese and said they did not know what their ethnicity was. The second
example is the one between Yuko and Rika, 18 year old college students who both
identified their race as yellow and ethnicity as Japanese.
Saki (F): When we talk about poor countries, you know, we talk only about
assistance. But if we help them too much, these countries will be depending on
us. They should reach the point where they can manage by themselves. They
should work and earn money there.
Keiko (F): Someone said that education is important. The reason why Japan has
developed even though it was damaged badly during the war is that people took
education seriously. We should not just assist them, but we should assist them so
that they can help themselves. So, they can learn skills and techniques [in Japan].
Well, not forever, because this country is not their homeland. So, we can have
some policies to admit them for a limited time period.

Yuko (F): You know, there are some people who come to learn skills and
techniques, to work at factories for one year or so and go home, like
manufacturing techniques.
Rika (F): Skills and techniques are really advanced in Japan.
Yuko: It’s good to use these [skills and techniques] for improving their countries,
but if they stay here too long, they may end up not feeling like going home at all.
So, I’d like them to learn those in a limited amount of time and go home.
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Both pairs’ discourses have a humanitarian façade; their concerns were the development
and improvement of foreign workers’ nations through offering skills and techniques in
Japan. However, their statements also subjugated foreign workers by positioning them as
“the saved” and Japanese as “the savior.” This discourse not only perpetuated particular
power relations with Japanese having higher status than outsiders, but this discourse also
served Japanese, dominant members, enabling them to cushion and cover their interests
of protecting the racial purity in the nation. The limited duration of the training programs
designed for Asian foreign workers is thus convenient for Japanese to obtain a cheap
labor force and to protect its racial insularity myth at the same time. Wrapped in
economic discourse with a hint of humanitarianism, a racial purity ideology and
xenophobic practices were kept unnamed and unquestioned.
As demonstrated in the examples above, this interpretative repertoire put focus
on the economic, educational and technological disparities between Japan and other
Asian countries. Constructing racial factors in immigration/admission of foreign workers
as due to economic or class factors was actually a common strategy both at public and
private discourse in the U.S. In the Japanese context, the Japanese government’s
discourse positioned foreign workers as threats to the national economy and labor market,
and participants in this study reconstructed the discourse in their conversation.
The analyses of their discourse revealed that this interpretative repertoire offered
three storylines. In the first one, non-Japanese Asians were positioned as threats,
unskilled, and unqualified for higher status, while Japanese were described as their
victims. In the second theme, foreign workers were stratified into a racial hierarchy:
Whites from advanced nations are harmless but those from non-white developing
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countries are damaging Japan. In the last storyline, humanitarian discourse was employed
to positively position “us” while reproducing a colonial racial hierarchy in Japanese
society and the myth of a mono-racial nation. The next interpretative repertoire also
sustained and recreated race relations in Japan hierarchically, and supported a widely
accepted assumption of mono-lingual nation which reinforced the mono-racial myth.
Japan is a Monolingual Nation; the Japanese Language therefore is Required to
Live in This Country
As well as U.S. participants, Japanese participants constructed the national
language as a key concept in the context of immigration/admission of foreign workers. In
both cases, the dominant language represents naturally privileged positions of dominant
racial groups in society, while equalizing the language with success and advancement in
society (Torres, 1997). The difference between U.S. and Japanese discourse may lie in
what national language symbolized in each nation; while the English language
symbolized unity of the nation and assimilation among people from different racial and
cultural backgrounds, the Japanese language embodied mono-racial-ness of the nation. It
is widely assumed in Japan that Japan consists of only the Japanese race and people that
only speak the Japanese language. Kawai (2007) contends that Japan has been strongly
influenced by the essentialist view of national language, nation, and race. In the
essentialist view, it is assumed that one nation is comprised of only one racial group and
the nationality therefore is equal to the racial group; hence, national language of the
nation becomes the symbol of the nation and the racial group (Kawai, 2007).
This close connection between the Japanese language and Japanese-ness enables
discourses that construct the status of the Japanese language as natural, neutral, and
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standard and discourses that bar non-Japanese speakers from the society. These
discourses thus allow institutional imposition of the Japanese language on non-Japanese
speaking immigrants/ foreign workers. For example, Japanese government required
Nikkeijin immigrants, descendants of Japanese immigrants from Latin American
countries, to have Japanese language ability in order to stay in the country, stating:
Regarding Nikkeijin who are already residing, financial stability (regular job)
and certain level of Japanese language ability will be set as the conditions of
continuous residing. (Ministry of Justice, 2006, p.3)
Also, the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare required Japanese companies that
employ foreign workers to implement training programs on Japanese language, lifestyle,
culture, and customs (Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, n.d.). These governmental
discourses reinforced the status of the language, which is identical with the status of
Japanese speaking Japanese, as the only standard in society.
Reproducing and being constrained by these discourses at the macro-institutional
levels, Japanese participants constructed race relations between Japanese and
non-Japanese at the dyadic interpersonal levels within an interpretative repertoire
regarding Japanese mono-lingualism. The primary mechanism of this interpretative
repertoire was camouflaging Japanese xenophobic and racist treatment against foreign
workers as a problem of a language barrier. This interpretative repertoire offered two
storylines for Japanese participants: It is the language barrier that bars them, and
non-Japanese speakers are scary.
Japanese are not willing to hire foreigners because they cannot speak
Japanese. This storyline enables Japanese participants to attribute foreign workers’ social
and economic standing to their Japanese language ability and lack thereof. In this
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storyline, Japanese can say that foreigners cannot get a good job or cannot “blend in”
because they do not speak the Japanese language well enough.
In the following two excerpts, participants mentioned that, if they were business
owners, they would consider foreign workers’ language ability as an important criterion
for hiring. The first example is from Yumiko and Hiroko, 21 year old classmates who
both identified their race and ethnicity as Japanese.
Yumiko (F): If I’m asked whether I’m willing to hire them [foreign workers] or
not, then I don’t know. You know, when we were elementary school kids,
weren’t we asked in class which we, as business owners, want to hire, people
with disabilities or without disabilities? It’s the same thing. If I’m asked to
choose between Japanese and foreigners, I mean, people from foreign countries,
I guess I would choose Japanese. I don’t know.
Hiroko (F): I guess it’s easier. I mean, management-wise.
Yumiko: Right. Communication is easier.
Hiroko: Yeah, communication-wise.
In this discourse, Japanese participants justified their potential choice of Japanese
workers over foreign workers not as their racial preference, but based on language ability.
Foreign workers were subjugated as people who cannot speak Japanese and are more
difficult to communicate with. In their statement, lack of fluency in Japanese language
was equalized with disabilities; Yumiko stated that the choice between Japanese workers
and foreign workers was the same as the one between people with and without disabilities.
Given pervasive essentialist views on the Japanese language and race in public discourses
in Japan (Kawai, 2007), Japanese people’s reluctance to hire non-Japanese speakers also
demonstrated xenophobia. However, unnamed positions of the Japanese language, as the
standard, mask racial components with these kinds of discourses. In a similar vein, Keiko
and Saki also talked about a hypothetical situation of hiring foreign workers. Keiko and
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Saki are best friends and they identified their race as Japanese and said they did not know
their ethnicity.
Keiko (F): If we need to work with foreign workers, if you are an employer, and
they come to have an interview. What would you do?
Saki (F): Well, I think they need to have Japanese language ability in order to
work.
Keiko: Right. They will have trouble if they cannot speak the language.
Saki: I would roughly check that to some extent. Other than that, it’s the same as
normal Japanese people. If they are responsible or not, or
Keiko: or their personalities.
Saki: But I don’t know what I would do when that actually happens.
Keiko: I don’t know either. Maybe I would see them with a biased eye.
Saki: If I find some minor things that I don’t like about what they do, I may get
really upset. I might also get irritated that they don’t understand what I’m
saying.
Keiko: I think so, too.

Saki’s statement, “I think they need to have Japanese language ability in order to
work…other than that, it’s the same as normal Japanese people” showed the assumption
that foreign workers usually cannot speak the language, and not speaking the language is
constructed as “abnormal” and “irritating.” In contrast, the Japanese language was
positioned as “standard” and “normal,” as well as people who speak the language.
The previous two conversations were about the hypothetical situations of hiring
foreign workers. A similar example came from describing the actual employment of
foreign workers at a Japanese company. The example was offered by a mother and a
daughter, Kyoko and Sora.
Kyoko (F): By the way, there have been some foreign part-timers in my
company, since last year or two years ago. But they don’t understand the
language.
Sora (F): Really?
Kyoko: The company hired them even though they don’t know the language.
Sora: That’s ridiculous.
Kyoko: It’s also the company’s fault.
Sora: Right.
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Kyoko: I guess there’re some kinds of subsidies, for hiring foreigners, like
subsidies for paying them. Otherwise, they wouldn’t hire foreigners.
Sora: That’s true.

In their conversation, foreign workers who do not understand the Japanese language were
positioned as unqualified to work in Japanese companies; they were hired only because
there were financial rewards for the company, not because they were qualified for their
positions. This discourse implied that language ability is equal to work ability—foreign
workers who are not fluent in Japanese were automatically positioned as “incompetent.”
Chika, an 18 year old freshman who identified her race as yellow and her
ethnicity as Japanese, also offered a similar example that equalizes language ability and
work ability. She described an experience of working with Chinese people, and also
equalized language ability and work ability.
Chika (F): When I was working at the hotel, we had many Chinese employees.
Japanese workers can understand instructions once they were told to do this and
that. But, you know, even though Chinese people could understand some
Japanese, it was not perfect. So they were assigned different jobs.
Yukie (F): I see.
Chika: Japanese were assigned complicated tasks, but for Chinese, “put this
there, one by one” or something like that. They were made to do simple tasks.
There was nothing else to do because they don’t understand the language, but I
guess it’s discrimination.
Yukie: Language is an important issue, in that kind of aspect.

Though Chika seemed to recognize it as discriminatory treatment, she said, “there was
nothing else to do because they don’t understand the language.” This comment
naturalizes the assumption that speaking and understanding the Japanese language
perfectly is required and normal in order to be treated equally as Japanese-speaking
Japanese, whose “normal” position remained unquestioned. Such an assumption was also
used to justify people’s exclusive attitudes toward foreign workers. One example is a
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conversation between Yuko and Rika, freshmen friends who identified their race as
yellow and ethnicity as Japanese.
Yuko (F): When I was a high school student, my teacher said in class that in the
field of nursing care, we import a lot of nurses from Southeast Asia and
Philippines.
Rika (F): I’ve heard of that, too.
Yuko: In fact, I feel bad, because I have this weird feeling, but nurses deal with
sanitation, right? I have a feeling that people over there don’t care that much
about it, so I’m a little worried about it.
Rika: I see. And what about the language?
Yuko: Yeah, exactly. Moreover, it’s not that nurses and care-takers just do their
tasks. They need to communicate with Japanese patients, right?
Rika: What if something urgent happens and they need to handle it in Japanese?
Yuko: I think there are many people who want to be nurses.
Rika: I think so. Many of them.
Yuko: So, I don’t think we need to bring that many [from foreign countries].

In order to justify opinions that Japanese do not have to admit foreign nurses and
care-takers, cultural arguments and language arguments were employed. In Yuko and
Rika’s conversation, people from Southeast Asian countries were negatively positioned in
that their cultures were not as sanitary as Japanese culture, and then they were
constructed as incompetent and unqualified, due to an assumed lack of language fluency.
Racial preferences for Japanese nurses and care-takers over non-Japanese ones evidence
racist practices, but this was obscured by using this interpretative repertoire.
In most cases, this storyline was employed to justify the argument that foreign
workers are less desirable because they cannot speak the language. Moreover, some
participants mentioned that foreigners’ social isolation in Japanese communities is also
due to the lack of their Japanese language ability. For example, Megumi considers
“kotoba no kabe [a language barrier]” is one of the core factors in immigration/foreign
worker issues in Japan.
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Megumi (F): I saw it on the news, but teachers at public schools, they are called
ALT5, right? Some ALTs cannot get along with people in their community
because they cannot speak Japanese. You know, there are some rules in every
community, like how to take out your garbage. But they cannot follow the rules,
well, it’s not that they cannot follow, but they cannot understand, because they
don’t understand the Japanese language. Since you cannot communicate with
them, you know, others would think they don’t observe the rules. Neighbors
would think “what’s with those foreigners” and complain about them. ALTs
belong to the Ministry of Education, so complaints also go to the Ministry of
Education. So, I heard on the news that they deal with this issue by prioritizing
ALTs who can speak Japanese and extending their stay in Japan.
Takeru (M): I think the problem is communication. If we can [communicate],
the laws don’t have to be that strict.
Megumi: I agree. I’d like them to try to conform to us.

Megumi is a 23 year old senior student and Takeru is her friend. They both identified
their race and ethnicity as Japanese. Their conversation constructed the problems some
ALTs may face in Japan as if they would be solved if they could speak Japanese, because
“the problem is communication.” Additionally, in many cases, the language issue is just a
part of bigger challenges foreigners in Japan are likely to face. Personally, I have had
some opportunities to talk with ALTs who came from the U.S., U.K., and Australia, and
what they usually complained about was not the language issue but a sense of otherness
that stalked them whenever they go. Some of the ALTs I know are not very fluent in
Japanese and others are pretty fluent. However, all of them mentioned to me that they
will never be able to become in-group members of Japanese society however long they
stay in Japan. They often get stared at, Japanese people avoid contact with them, they
said that some Japanese even look scared when they approach, or strangers talk to them
just to practice their English. Many foreigners think they cannot be fully accepted in the
Japanese community because they are foreigners and they “look” foreign, not because
they do not speak perfect Japanese.
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Non-white foreigners who do not speak Japanese are scary. The second
storyline that this interpretative repertoire offered to participants is similar to the
interpretative repertoire which revolves around the concept that foreigners are “scary.”
However, this storyline demonstrated the pervasiveness of Japanese essentialist views on
language, nation, and race (Kawai, 2007), and how mono-lingual and mono-racial nation
myths are closely intertwined. Within this repertoire as well, foreigners were positioned
as a source of fear. One difference between this storyline and the other is that
“foreignness” was defined by the language they speak in this framework. The following
excerpt is from a conversation between Yuri and Yusuke.
Yuri(F): You know, there are relatively many foreign workers in the
neighborhood, like in the Chūō Park.
Yusuke (M): Yeah, they are there at night.
Yuri: When many of them get together at night and talk loudly in the language
we don’t know, don’t you feel scared? I feel scared. I do.
Yusuke: Ok, I understand.
Yuri: And they are all men, those people who are talking like that. So, I feel
scared.
Since race and language are closely related, if not identical, in these essentialist views
(Kawai, 2007), people who speak in non-Japanese languages were positioned as racial
Others, a group of people to be scared of. In addition, this example shows how language,
race, and gender intersected in the positioning. In the nation where there is a clear
demarcation between Japanese-speaking and non-Japanese-speaking races, foreign
language speakers were positioned as threats to racial purity in Japan. Therefore, the fear
of foreigners was equalized with the fear of foreign language speakers, especially males.
Another participant also expressed his fear of people who speak
foreign-languages. Keisuke, 20 year old college student who identified his race as
Japanese, was talking with his classmate, Kengo, about his experience when he visited
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the U.S. He was on the bus and he was in between two Middle Eastern men who were
talking in their language. He said, “I was clutching my bag. I know this is prejudice or a
stereotype…I don’t understand their conversation and that made me feel like they are
plotting something bad.”
Keisuke (M): I just feel scared in that kind of situation. If they are Japanese, I
don’t think I would feel scared.
Kengo (M): I kind of understand, if you are in the U.S. or abroad.
Keisuke: Whether it is abroad or in Japan, if I get sandwiched between two
Japanese, it’s not a big deal, but even in Japan, if foreigners stay on both sides of
me and speak in a foreign language, I would feel tense.
Kengo: What if Americans who are fluent in Japanese are at the both sides of
you?
Keisuke: Well, then, I can understand their conversation, you know.
Keisuke said his anxiety came from the language foreigners speak, because he said he
would not feel awkward if two Americans, most likely White Americans, were talking in
Japanese. However, it does not mean that he was scared of the language per se; the source
of fear was people who speak foreign languages. I also believe that Japanese would not
feel tense even if two Japanese are talking in a different language, though it would be a
rare case. Due to the false assumption of a mono-racial nation and monolingualism in
Japan, non-Japanese languages are racialized and so are non-Japanese speakers. More
specifically, comparing Middle Easterners, Japanese, and “Americans who are fluent in
Japanese” in their conversation demonstrated a racial hierarchy in a racialized social
system. Among these racial groups, Japanese-speaking Japanese were positioned on the
top; Japanese-speaking Whites in the middle, and Middle Easterners who do not speak
Japanese or English at the bottom.
As can be seen in the examples in this section, the discursive framework of the
Japanese language and monolingualism played a significant role to reproduce and
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maintain the myth of a mono-racial nation. By standardizing and naturalizing the status of
the Japanese language in society, Japanese people who speak the Japanese language
remained at privileged positions, while foreigners who lack Japanese language ability
were constructed to be harmful outsiders. Japanese language ability was thus a
convenient tool to demarcate Japanese and non-Japanese and to justify racial preferential
practices such as race-based employment.
Thus far, I have listed examples of interpersonal discourses in which Japanese
participants employed interpretative repertoires that reproduced and reinforced dominant
racist ideologies in Japanese society. In these discourses, foreigners were often negatively
positioned as criminals, economic threats or unqualified, diverting the attention from race
to non-racial factors. In so doing, Japanese xenophobic and exclusive practices against
foreign workers were discursively legitimated. Although the number is small, some
participants, in contrast, drew on discourse that challenged these dominant racist
ideologies.
Japanese Media Overemphasize Foreigners’ Criminality
Across Japanese participants’ interpersonal discourse on immigration/foreign
workers, a negative construction of foreigners as criminals was prominent. As can be
seen in the excerpts listed in this chapter, foreign workers were likely to be assumed to be
potential criminals. In some cases, however, participants recognized and questioned this
tendency of negative positioning of foreigners in society, and they attributed a
criminalization of foreign workers to media representations. The following two examples
challenged assumed criminality of foreigners. The first one is a conversation between
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Erika and Reiko, 20 year old best friends who identified their race as yellow/Mongoloid
and ethnicity as Japanese.
Erika (F): Crime cases committed by foreigners are highlighted more than
Japanese cases
Reiko (F): Yeah.
Erika: If one person, for example, if one Chinese commits a crime in Japan,
then the images of entire Chinese people are created. People think that Chinese
people are from the country of criminals, so if Chinese people come for job
interviews after that kinds of incidents, nobody would hire them.
Reiko: I see. That’s gonna be an issue.
Erika: Ethnocentrism.
Reiko: Ah, we just learned that.
Erika: I think this is Ethnocentrism. I guess we become like, we prefer Japanese
people.
As I previously mentioned, Chinese have been the very target of racial Othering in Japan,
and Japanese participants rather explicitly positioned Chinese negatively in their
conversation. Reiko and Erika, however, considered that negative images people have
about Chinese are created in media, and media representations support Japanese
ethnocentric racial preferences. There was actually a highly showcased homicide case
committed by Chinese exchange students in Fukuoka, a few years prior to data being
collected. Because of the hostile media coverage, a number of Chinese workers were laid
off or forced to move out from their apartments without any recourse. Reiko and Erika’s
discourse challenged dominant racist discourse that Chinese people are intrinsically
criminals.
Similarly, Chisato and Kimi, 21 year old classmates who identified their race as
yellow and ethnicity as Japanese, also problematized the role Japanese media play in
constructing the images of foreigners as criminals.
Chisato (F): Well, foreign workers are only 2% or 1.5 % of Japanese population.
I wonder how many of them commit a crime.
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Kimi (F): I read that it’s rather small. It was in the newspaper, and it was much
smaller than I thought.
Chisato: It’s because their cases are emphasized. I think the total number is not
that many.
Kimi: It is how mass media cover their cases.
Chisato: Don’t you think so? So only that part is focused on, or it stands out,
because we only see that part. Of course there are more crimes committed by
Japanese.
Instead of reproducing dominant discourses that position foreigners as criminals, they
questioned why criminal cases committed by foreigners were more featured compared to
Japanese ones.
In addition to questioning negative positioning of foreigners in Japan, a couple
of participants also pointed out that race actually matters in terms of immigration/foreign
worker issues in Japan. The following except is from a conversation between Misato and
Mana, 21 year old college classmates who identified their race as yellow and ethnicity as
Japanese.
Misato (F): You know, because of ethnicity or because of racial difference, we
see them differently, as outsiders and insiders. You know, when a foreigner
commits a crime, it is highly showcased. There are many Japanese cases but
only because it was committed by a foreigner, it is highlighted.
Mana (F): I saw in a documentary that a person from China, working at a
printing company as a foreign worker, was bullied by his boss. When I saw that,
I thought it’s just because his race is different, you know, he speaks a different
language, and when he couldn’t do what he was expected to do, it’s wrong to
attack him, focusing on his race. Since racial differences are, because you
automatically notice the differences, so they can be the core [of immigration
issues].

Though it is widely believed by Japanese people that racism cannot take place in Japan
because it is a mono-racial nation, Misato and Mana seemed to recognize that race
demarcates “outsiders and insiders,” and “it can be the core” of immigration issues. Kenji
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is another one of a few participants who pointed out the existence of race and racism in
Japan. He is a 21 year old student who identified his race and ethnicity as Japanese.
Kenji (M): It’s about my experience I had when I visited the U.S. but, you know,
whites always wear a suit, and blacks and Hispanics, like Mexicans, are always,
for example, working in a kitchen at a restaurant, or you know, they do
background work. Namely, whites are on the top. That kinds of racial issues may
play a role here. Well, in that sense, Japan has few immigrants, but maybe
because there are small numbers, you know, Japanese people may have a sense
of superiority over minority groups, that kind of thing. I think that is also an
issue.
Referring to the racial stratification in the U.S., Kenji stated that a similar system is also
in operation in Japanese society. It was not very common to see such a discourse that
challenged the unnamed privileged position Japanese have in society.
Given the fact that all of these participants listed in this section have taken or
were taking an intercultural communication class, in which they learn about racism, or a
mass media class where they are taught the power of media, I cannot deny the possibility
that they were just paying “lip-service” to these ideas. However, if these participants
received discursive tools and resources that can challenge dominant racist discourses in
their classroom, it can demonstrate that classroom discourses in these classes have a
potential as a discursive space for social change.
Summary
This chapter discussed what kinds of interpretative repertoires emerged in
Japanese interpersonal discourses on immigration/admission of foreign workers, and
what kinds of discursive resources were offered, how participants used them, how they
positioned themselves and “Others,” and what these discursive practices could potentially
achieve in both Yamato supremacist and global white supremacist racialized social
systems. Though the general pattern of negative/positive positioning of Others and self
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and discursive focus on non-racial factors were common both in the U.S. and Japanese
discourses, interpretative repertoires participants drew on varied, due to the differences in
socio-political and historical backgrounds between the two nations.
The most prominent interpretative repertoire in Japanese participants’ discourse
revolved around the concept of “sakoku and shimaguni [national isolation and island
nation].” Referring to the history of closed borders and geographic isolation of the nation,
participants could justify various racist practices, such as the Japanese government’s
reluctance to accept foreigners, people’s unwillingness to interact with foreigners,
rejection of non-Japanese cultures, and commodifying and exoticizing foreigners’
cultures.
Within the second interpretive repertoire, foreigners were negatively positioned
in a more blatant way compared to negative positioning of Others in U.S. contexts. With
blatant descriptions that foreigners are potential criminals, they were positioned as a
source of fear. Positioning of different racial groups within this framework also revealed
racial stratification in Japan: Japanese are on the top, while whites are better than
non-Japanese Asians, and Middle Easterners and blacks are on the bottom.
The third interpretative repertoire which constructed foreign workers as
threatening our national economy and labor market, was similar to the positioning of
immigrants as an economic burden in U.S. contexts. Within this interpretative repertoire,
participants were enabled to express their restrictionist attitudes explicitly by
camouflaging racist discourse due to economic or humanitarian concerns. Racial
stratification was also disguised as class differences in this repertoire so that Japanese
myth of racial purity and racial preference remained unquestioned.
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The last interpretative repertoire offered participants discursive resources to
erase the concept of race from unequal treatment toward foreign workers. Within this
discursive framework, Japanese were enabled to attribute social and economic problems
that foreign workers face in Japanese communities to the (assumed) lack of Japanese
language ability. Discourse in this repertoire also demonstrated that race and language
were closely intertwined in construction of “us” and “them.” Foreign languages were
racialized and othered, and so were foreign language speakers. This repertoire thus
maintained and reproduced Japanese ideologies of Japan as a mono-racial and
monolingual nation.
In general, analysis of Japanese participants’ interpersonal discourses revealed
that they were both restrained by and reconstruct Japanese xenophobic institutional
policies that are embedded in a racial purity ideology. Foreigners were likely to be
positioned negatively in contrast to “normal” and “standard” Japanese, and the systems of
racial inequality in “mono-racial nation” were kept invisible. However, a few participants’
comments showed that they also used some discursive resources that questioned the
Japanese racial status quo, though the number was very small.
Footnotes
1

I use the term “yellow” or “yellow race” here because participants (and

Japanese in general) used the term “yellow race (Oshoku jinshu)” more often
than “Mongoloid.”
2

“Gaijin” is a derogative term that refers to foreigners, literally meaning

“outsiders.”
3

When Commodore Perry came to Japan in 1853 to demand Japan to open its
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borders, he brought four black ships. Japan called the fleet “Kurofune (the Black
Ship).”
4

Fukuoka is the city where this study is conducted. It is located in the

southwestern part of Japan.
5

Assistant Language Teachers are native English speakers primarily hired by the

Ministry of Education.
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Chapter VI: Conclusions and Implications
During the last several years while I have been working on this study,
sociopolitical dynamics in the U.S. and Japan have been changing. The Bush
administration ended and Barack Obama became the president of the United States in
2008. Japan has failed to maintain a long-term and stable administration in the last
several years. The present Kan administration is already the 5th one since 2005. Along
with the shifts of power and the trend of globalization, both countries have proposed
and/or implemented new immigration laws, policies and acts to deal with the dilemmas
between the needs for a labor force and national security. The more immigrants and
foreign workers that flow into the nation, the more exclusive and more restrictive
immigration policies in both countries seem to become.
One of the recent and most heated debates in the U.S. during the time of this
study was the immigration bill signed in Arizona in spring 2010. The bill required all
immigrants to carry their authorization documents all the time (which was already
enforced in current Japanese immigration law), and it allowed police officers to
investigate immigrants’ status whenever they seemed “suspicious.” This bill was blocked
by a federal judge as unconstitutional right before it was enforced, but several states are
still considering constituting similar immigration bills (Immigration and Emigration,
2011, February 11). The Secure Community Act implemented by the Obama
administration as a major means to deal with illegal immigration, is another example of
exclusive immigration policy. It is reported that approximately 58, 300 immigrants were
deported with criminal charges since 2008 (Preston & Semple, 2011).
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Though it did not attract as much attention as these immigration policies in the
U.S., the Japanese government also launched several immigration acts and laws that
restrict non-Japanese workers’ or residents’ access to public benefits or certain
immigration status. One example is a newly introduced immigration policy that
encourages Nikkeijin workers to return to their homelands in exchange for 300,000 yen
(approximately 3,000 dollars). According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Wealth of
Japan (March, 2009), this policy was implemented for the sake of Nikkeijin workers
because they think it is a more realistic option for them to return to their home countries
and find jobs there than seek a position in Japan1. This is explained as being due to their
“lack of Japanese language fluency” and their “unfamiliarity with Japanese employment
practices” under the unstable economic circumstances that Japan is facing (Ministry of
Health, Labour and Wealth, March 2009). By calling this a “supporting project” for
Nikkeijin workers, however, this policy does not allow them to re-enter Japan as Nikkeijin,
which is a less restricted immigration status compared to other ones. This policy,
therefore, is designed to lock out Nikkeijin workers who are not “Japanese-enough.”
These exclusive policies, of course, can be attributed to the severe financial
crisis that both countries have gone through during the recession. However, these latest
immigration movements are also as racialized as any immigration policies and laws have
been throughout each country’s history. Racialization of both societies through
immigration issues has been demonstrated both in institutional discourse on immigration
and interpersonal, everyday discourses. The intersection of these two discourses is a site
where systems of racial dominance sustain themselves in a hegemonic fashion.
In order to synthesize the results of this study, in this chapter I summarize the
216

analysis of participants’ discourses illustrated in chapters four and five, and then elaborate
on my interpretations. I also discuss the limitations and implications for future research.
Summary
The purpose of this study was to investigate discursive processes in which
systems of racial inequality produced at the macro-institutional level discourse are
recreated and/or challenged in interpersonal dyadic discourses regarding immigration and
foreign worker issues in the U.S. and Japan. The link between institutional discourse and
descriptions of lived communicative experiences has been called for in the intercultural
communication field from those advocating for the utility of a paradigmatic trend or turn
toward critical perspectives (Flores, Orbe & Allen, 2008; Halualani et al., 2006; Starosta
& Chen, 2005). In order to establish the link between institutional and interpersonal
discourses, I analyzed how racial ideologies were reproduced and/or challenged through
participants’ use of various interpretative repertoires and positioning of self and “Others”
in their dyadic conversations in their respective countries.
The participants in this study were 14 pairs of self-identified white Americans in
the U.S. and 17 pairs of Japanese residing in Japan. I asked each pair to record their
30-60 minute long private conversations at the site of their choice following the
discussion guide I provided. The discussion guides contained three different points of
view regarding immigration/admission of foreign workers in each country. Roughly these
views were: admitting immigrants/foreign laborers is positive; it has both good and bad
sides; and it should be controlled or restricted (See Appendix A for U.S. American
version and Appendix B for Japanese version that I translated into English).
The set of procedures to solicit dyadic conversations worked well in capturing
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naturally occurring texts that are considered a preferred source of data for discourse
analysis (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). Due to the social constructivist theoretical foundation
in discourse analysis, research interviews are often categorized as “researcher-instigated
discourse” (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p.72). This study demonstrated advantages of asking
participants to have private conversations instead of face to face interviews in order to
investigate their “natural” discursive practices. From the content of the conversations it
was evident that individuals expressed a variety of views, conversed in an informal
manner, and asked questions of one another. Thus the quality of situated, unfolding
conversations, which was desired, was obtained. The frequency of critical comments also
demonstrated the lack of “demand characteristics,” or following norms to perform in
socially appropriate or instructor approved ways. Consequently the utility of using this
kind of course activity for both research and educational purposes was demonstrated as
well.
The analysis and interpretation of participants’ discourses were guided by the
methodology called discursive psychology (Wetherell & Potter 1992). This methodology
is based assumptions that evidence both critical and interpretive paradigms. As I
summarized in chapter three, Wetherell and Potter’s (1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987)
discursive psychology is designed to investigate the way in which individuals use
everyday discourses as resources that are available to them by social/ideological forces to
construct their social realities and identities. This methodology, thus, was well suited to
the aim of this study, which was to interrogate the relationship between institutional
discourses and every day interpersonal discourses.
The two primary analytical frameworks used in this study were interpretative
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repertoires and positioning. An interpretative repertoire consists of images and languages
that are made available by social structures for individuals to use to negotiate their social
realities and identities. Wetherell and Potter (1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) insist that
hegemonic social systems and dominant ideologies are maintained by the use of certain
interpretative repertoires. Therefore, investigating what kinds of interpretative repertoires
are employed and how individuals position themselves and “Others” enabled me to
uncover what kinds of ideologies are prominent and what kinds of roles their discursive
practices play in sustaining systems of racial inequality and dominance in society.
Summary of U.S. Discourses
In chapter four, I delineated my analysis of U.S. participants’ discourses on
immigration. In their discourses, four major interpretative repertoires emerged. The major
themes in these four repertoires were: 1) the U.S. as a nation of immigrants, 2) the
American dream, 3) being American means speaking English, and 4) the context of racial
policies. The repertoire that was most frequently referred to by U.S. participants revolved
around the notion that the U.S. is a country built upon immigration and immigrants. As
multiple excerpts in chapter four demonstrated, many participants showed their pride in
the long histories of immigration and diversity in the nation, and expressed benefits of
being a big “melting pot.” However, such celebratory discourse enabled participants to
demarcate “our” type of preferred immigrants and “Others” who were dis-preferred. In
this repertoire, “we” were constructed as a unified group of immigrants (or descendants)
who assimilated into “the American culture” and lost “our past cultures” to contribute to
the unity of the nation. On the other hand, recent immigrants, i.e. “Other” immigrants,
were negatively positioned as outsiders who resist assimilation, break the unity of the
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melting pot, who are illegal, criminals, non-taxpayers, and non-contributors. Only in
aspects of their consumable cultural products, such as their food and languages, were
recent immigrants positioned positively.
The second most frequent interpretative repertoire that emerged in U.S.
participants’ discourses was based on the idea of “American Dream.” Strongly embedded
in meritocracy ideology, this repertoire allowed participants to justify their criticism
against immigrants’ economic standing and social status in the U.S. The core concept of
American Dream is equal opportunities for economic success. Drawing on this repertoire,
participants positioned immigrants, especially those from Mexico, as groups of people
who do not deserve the American Dream because “they were not working hard enough.”
This repertoire allowed participants to express that immigrants’ economic standing is
caused by the lack of their effort. Participants also referred to exceptional immigrants
who succeeded financially, and immigrants in the past, to make their point, “they
achieved their American Dream; why can’t you?” Such a “blaming the victims” move
became justified in this repertoire.
The third interpretative repertoire that U.S. participants employed frequently
equalized being “Americans” and speaking English. This repertoire is strongly related to
assimilation ideology. As can be seen under other interpretative repertoires employed by
U.S. participants, recent immigrants, especially those from Mexico and Latin American
countries, were categorized as groups who refused to assimilate into “our” cultures.
Immigrants’ native language, i.e. Spanish, was also constructed as a symbol of diversion
from the “unity” of the nation. Participants frequently argued that immigrants should
learn to speak the English language if they want to stay in the U.S. and expressed their
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frustration toward Spanish speaking groups specifically. In this interpretative repertoire,
Spanish speaking immigrants were negatively positioned as non-accommodators who
refuse to speak “our” language, and “we” are the ones who accommodate to “their”
language.
This repertoire, thus, allowed participants to decide who can be or cannot be
“real Americans.” This feeling of entitlement and construction of “our” language as the
standard in participants’ discourses demonstrated and reconstructed white U.S. Americans’
racial standing as “normal” and “desirable.” The language negotiation issue in these
participants’ interview discourse seemed to reinforce power relations and established a
status hierarchy between English speaking-white U.S. Americans and Spanish speaking
Mexican immigrants in the U.S.
The previous three interpretative repertoires acted to sustain and recreate
dominant racial ideologies such as color-blind ideology, meritocracy, and assimilation
ideology. The fourth interpretative repertoire, on the other hand, allowed participants to
challenge these dominant discourses. Instead of erasing the concept of race from their
discourse on immigration, some participants focused on the contexts of racist policies and
practices. Some also confronted the normativity of “whites” in the U.S. and a widespread
tendency of negative positioning of immigrants by referring to racist practices in U.S.
immigration histories and practices. These discourses sometimes were included in a
combination of ambivalent views, however, illustrating the value of uncovering the
complexities of discursive repertoires in interpretations.
Summary of Japanese Discourses
Regarding Japanese participants’ discourses on immigration/foreign workers,
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five interpretative repertoires emerged. The key concepts in each repertoire were: 1)
historical and geographical insularity of the nation, 2) scary foreigners, 3) foreigners as
economic threats, 4) Japan as a monolingual nation, and 5) Japanese media’s
overemphasis on foreigners’ criminality.
The one that participants most frequently drew on revolved around the concept
of Japanese historical insularity, “Sakoku,” and geographical insularity, “Shimaguni.”
Under this interpretative repertoire, there emerged mainly three storylines. The first
storyline allowed Japanese participants to leave small numbers of foreign residents in the
country unquestioned. By referring to the histories of “Sakoku” and geographical
isolation from neighboring countries, participants could express that it is natural that
there are not many foreigners residing in the nation. The second storyline allowed
participants to express their reluctance to accept foreigners as normal. “We” were
positioned as restrictionists and yet justified as “normal,” while “they” were positioned as
“different” and “unacceptable.” A clear demarcation between “our culture” and “their
culture,” showing that the cultures are not commensurate, was created, and this
demarcation legitimated Japanese people’s unwillingness to accept large numbers of
foreigners. As well as in the case of U.S. participants’ discourses, foreign workers were
positioned as acceptable only when they could offer something “we” could learn or if
they acted as purveyors of Japanese traditional cultures. This is the fourth story line.
Overall, the interpretative repertoire about “Sakoku” and “Shimaguni” allowed
participants to justify their ignorance toward foreigners in the nation and legitimate
generally restrictive attitudes and practices toward immigrants and foreign workers.
I named the second interpretative repertoire “Foreigners are Scary” based on
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what participants frequently stated in their actual conversations. In this repertoire,
foreigners in general, but especially those of color, were the target of more blatant
negative positioning. Illegality and criminality were focused upon and foreigners were
often described as a source of fear. Racial stratification in negative positioning of
foreigners was also observed: some participants mentioned that they were not afraid of
white people but Asians and blacks were “scary” for them because “they are criminals.”
Among these rather crude racial remarks made by Japanese participants, what caught my
attention were phrases such as “I know I’m prejudiced but…” and “I know I’m biased
but….” This discursive strategy of admitting one’s prejudicial and biased attitude toward
different racial/ethnic groups presented a striking contrast to the one often pointed out in
U.S. racial discourses, which includes the use of qualifiers that showcase individual
openness and lack of prejudice such as “I’m not prejudiced, but…” and “I’m not racist,
but….” These qualifiers are often followed by racist statements (Bonilla-Silva, 2006). My
analysis, however, demonstrated that preceding explicitly negative views with
descriptions acknowledging personal bias or prejudice employed by Japanese participants
also served as a discursive buffer in similar ways as did the opposite kind of comment, a
denial of bias, in the U.S.
While foreign workers’ criminality and illegality were focused upon in the
previous repertoire, they were also positioned as threats to the national economy and
labor market. Foreigners, most likely people of color, were described as fearful because
they might take “our” jobs away; foreigners from advanced countries could be acceptable
but not those from developing countries; and speakers said that foreignersshould not stay
in Japan too long because they need to develop their own countries. By relying on these
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storylines, racial aspects of immigration/ foreign worker issues were erased and
colonial/patronizing discourses were naturalized.
The fourth interpretative repertoire was based on the pervasive notion that Japan
is a monoethnic/monolingual nation. While English was constructed as a symbol of unity
in U.S. discourses, the Japanese language was created as a symbol of “homogeneity.”
Non-Japanese speakers were, therefore, considered as threats to Japanese ethnic/linguistic
homogeneity. By expressing that foreigners should be required to speak the Japanese
language to stay in Japan, Japanese xenophobic practices, both institutional and personal,
toward foreigners could be camouflaged as a problem of a language barrier.
Though the number was small, some participants made some references to
Japanese media that overemphasized criminal cases committed by foreigners. As
previous interpretative repertoires showed, interpersonal discourses of Japanese
participants were likely to position foreign workers, especially non-white ones, as
potential criminals.

Though most of them drew on dominant Japanese discourses in

other aspects, some participants of this study pointed out how mass media perpetuates the
image of criminal foreigners. A couple of participants also recognized the role race plays
in a supposedly “race-less” nation.
Thus far, I summarized what kinds of interpretative repertoires both U.S. and
Japanese participants of this study drew on and how they positioned themselves and
immigrants/ foreign workers therein. In the next section, I discuss my interpretations of
these findings to answer what and how these discourses achieve, for whose interests, in
systems of inequality and dominance, in each respective country. In addition, I present
scholarly contributions of this particular study regarding critical analysis of interpersonal
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dyadic discourses and intercultural communication.
Interpretations of the Findings
As described in earlier chapters, there is a plethora of studies on race relations
and immigration in the U.S. which have been conducted from various perspectives in
different fields of study. In terms of racial discourses, scholars within a critical paradigm
have mainly focused on discourses related to macro structures, such as government,
politics, media, and educational institutions. With increasing attention to critical
perspectives in the study of culture and communication, scholars in intercultural
communication could contribute to the interdisciplinary discourse by building links
between macro-institutional discourses on race and discourses from everyday interactions
at interpersonal levels (Halualani, Fassett, Morrison & Dodge, 2006). The interface of
these two levels is the very space where power relations become evident in positioning of
self and other, and hegemony and dominance are produced, reproduced and/or challenged.
Interrogating practices in the discursive space of two nations with different historical and
sociopolitical backgrounds, nations which act to limit the numbers and rights of
immigrants and foreign workers, contributes to the scholarly investigation of the
importance of the linkage.
Hegemonic Ideologies and Dialectical Relationships
Exploring the interplay between interpersonal discourses and macro-institutional
discourses on immigration/foreign workers in the U.S. and Japan, this study demonstrated
the value of approaching hegemonic ideologies and systems of inequality as products of
dialectical tensions in what discourse analysts call the, “dialectical relationship” of
discourses (Fairclough, 2003, Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). As past research on
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immigration histories, policies, media coverage, and race relations has been showcasing,
as described in previous chapters, hegemonic ideologies that fit specific political/
economic/ social conditions and dominant group members’ interests often have been born
out of dialectical tensions. For example, policies, acts, operations, programs of
immigration and foreign workers in the U.S. embody dialectical tensions between the
desire to maintain the face of an “open and welcoming nation” and the need for a labor
force on the one hand, and restrictionist and nativistic concerns on the other. To maintain
racially dominant group members’ levels of privilege and status positioning, ideologies
such as color-blind ideology and meritocracy have been deployed (Bonilla-Silva, 2001,
2006).
One of the major findings of this study is that the analyses of participants’
discourses on immigration/ foreign workers demonstrated the existence and significance
of the dialectical relationship (Fairclough, 2003, Fairclough & Wodak, 1997) between
these ideologies and everyday interpersonal discourses. Namely, these ideologies at the
macro-institutional level constrain individuals’ everyday discourses by making certain
discursive resources available to use, while everyday interpersonal discourses reproduce
or challenge these ideologies. Therefore, sustaining racialized social systems of
inequality and domination relies partly on this interrelated nature of macro and micro
discourses.
Also, by juxtaposing discourses of similar themes in two nations with differing
historical and sociopolitical backgrounds, this study indicates the importance of taking
these contexts into account when studying immigration discourses that are racialized. The
dialectical relationship between structural and interpersonal discourses emerged both in
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U.S. and Japanese participants’ discourses. Though general patterns of ideological
reproduction were similar between the two nations acting to reinforce the status quo and
restrictionist policies in each country, available discursive resources and characteristics of
positioning were unique to each society.
Reproduction of the U.S. Racialized Social System
Analyses of U.S. participants’ discourses on immigration reified the dialectical
relationship between dominant racial ideologies, and interpretative repertoires and
positioning therein. Though they were not mutually exclusive, there emerged three major
ideologies that maintain racial status quo that privileges the white racial group over
others. These ideologies are color-blind ideology, meritocracy, and assimilation ideology.
Color-blind ideology was implicated in the first interpretative repertoire
including such phrases as, “we are all immigrants, “we are a nation of immigrants,” “the
U.S. is a melting pot.” Color-blind ideology is then maintained by individuals’ use of this
repertoire, because the repertoire confirms a false notion of equality in society and erases
racial aspects in the issue of immigration. As various researchers insist, discursive erasure
of race achieves to protect whites’ normativity which leads to their dominance in society
(e.g. Dixon et al, 1994; Durreheim & Wilbraham, 1994; Every & Augoustinos, 2007).
Whites’ dominance can remain unquestioned in this repertoire because this repertoire
endorses hegemonic nature of racialized social systems. It is hegemonic because
color-blind ideology enables whites to remain on the top of the racial ladder in the U.S.
through consent, not coercion (Gramsci, 1971). In other words, since color-blind ideology
is so pervasive through multiculturalist and pluralist discourse praised at the institutional
level, non-white group members also buy into the logic. They are convinced to agree on
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erasing race from their discourses (Bonilla-Siva, 2006) and erase their racial positioning.
Although immigrants were positioned as racialized Others who jeopardize the unity of
the nation, as harmful, or were commodified through their food and languages, discursive
resources made available for dominant members to use worked as discursive buffers to
both cover up discrimination (the U.S. is an immigrant nation and therefore color-blind)
as well as excuse discrimination (the U.S. must not tolerate those who enter illegally and
do not contribute to the nation). These discursive resources thereby enable maintenance
of the racial status quo in the U.S.
In a similar vein, individual meritocracy works to protect the white group’s
racial standing and privilege in the U.S. One of prominent discursive resources made
available by this ideology was the concept of American Dream. First of all, storylines of
American Dream lead participants to focus almost solely on economic aspects of
immigration. The focus on economic aspects then erased the concept of race in
immigration; and erasure of race and the false assumption of equal power relations and
agency across different racial groups automatically make white U.S. Americans invisible
and normal. This repertoire also ideologically demarcated “us” and “them” in terms of
economic standing and economic success, and there exists a clear color-line in this
practice. The American Dream story constructs good immigrants as those who deserve
American Dream and bad immigrants as those who do not. Those who are qualified for
the American Dream, according to the participants, were mostly white immigrants, such
as ancestors or past immigrants from Europe. On the other hand, those who were not
qualified are mostly those from Mexico. As such,an ideology of individual meritocracy
maintains the color-line in economic standings in the U.S. by allowing individuals to
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“blame the victims” with the concept of race erased. That leads to sustaining whites’
privileged position and leaving the position unquestioned and unchallenged. As well as
the previous interpretative repertoire, the American Dream repertoire also reveals
hegemonic mechanisms of racialized social systems. Since the American Dream is
believed to be available and possible for every individual regardless of race or class, it
can be a very useful and powerful discursive resource to erase race from immigration
discourses. Even though a clear color line emerged in participants’ positioning of
immigrants who are deserving and those who are not, this division was justified and
legitimated by the assumption of the American Dream as open to all.
The third ideology, assimilation ideology, is another wheel of white supremacist
systems in the U.S. As I reviewed in the first chapter, assimilation ideology was
implicated in the comprehensive immigration reform plan from the Bush administration.
That particular institutional discourse constructed “America” as a highly desired place
and learning “American culture” and English as necessary to be accepted in society.
Similar discourse was observed among U.S. participants of this study. “We” were
positioned as “immigrants who assimilated into American culture and lost our original
cultures and languages,” and “they,” mostly immigrants from Mexico, were positioned as
“those who refused to do the same.” As described in participants’ discourses, “our”
American culture was talked about as if there was only one, it was the highest standard,
and it was also constructed as a “better” culture as compared with all others. In such a
discursive process, whites’ normativity and invisibility in the U.S. remained
unchallenged: “American culture” was white culture, and it was constructed as the norm
in the U.S. Combined with color-blind ideology and meritocracy, assimilation ideology
229

provided individuals with discursive tools that allowed them to racially divide superior
“us” from inferior “them” without appearing to be racist.
Such discursive relationships between positive/superior “us” and
negative/inferior “them” in U.S. participants’ discourses not only reify aforementioned
racial ideologies, but they also reproduce and solidify the dominant status of whites in the
U.S. and maintain the racial status quo. U.S. participants’ discourses demonstrated that
their discursive positioning of immigrant Others simultaneously constructed white U.S.
Americans (both European American ancestors and current citizens). The reproduction
and maintenance of white supremacist social systems in the U.S. was mainly achieved
through constructing whites as invisible, standard, and entitled to the dominant voice that
decided who can be “Americans,” who are “good” immigrants, what immigrants should
do, and what language they should speak.
Invisibility of whites and their privileged positions also emerged in U.S.
participants’ racial/ethnic identifications. Although most participants identified their race
as White or Caucasian and some of them listed multiple ethnic identities on the
demographic survey (see Table 1.), they rarely claimed their racial/ethnic identities in
their conversations. They usually referred themselves as “we,” “us,” “our country/nation,”
and/or “American” when discussing immigration issues. This demonstrates that they are
in relatively privileged positions where they do not have to claim their identities. In other
words, “Americans” were equalized with being white, and they were constructed as
“normal” and “standard.” Such a discursive construction of whites in U.S. participants’
discourses was enabled by and reproduced color-blind ideology.
The white supremacist systems in the U.S. thus were maintained though the
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dialectical relationship between institutional discourses and everyday interpersonal
discourses. Racial ideologies emerged in macro-institutional discourses and these
constrained social actors’ discourses on immigration by providing particular discursive
resources. The resources included concepts and phrases that facilitated fixation of the
false assumptions of equality and color-blindness. They also offered a foundation and
justification for a general tendency of positive self positioning and negative Other
positioning. With these discursive tools, dominant racial group members’ dyadic
discourses recreated dominant racial ideologies. Reconstruction of dominant racial
ideologies, then, acts to sustain invisible privilege that is intrinsic to whites’ standing in
society, and that leads white oriented systems of inequality to be reified. Similar
discursive mechanisms of a racialized social system also were observed in the interplay
of Japanese institutional and interpersonal discourses.
Reproduction of the Japanese Racialized Social System
In chapter two, I posited the transitivity of white supremacist racialized social
systems in Japanese society, and I named the system Yamato supremacist racialized social
system. I also proposed that both global white supremacist systems and Yamato
supremacist racialized social systems operate together in Japanese society. I believe the
results of this study support my arguments. In this section, first I discuss the relationship
between primordial construction of “Japanese-ness” and racial stratification of different
racial groups in Japanese discourse on immigration/foreign workers. Then I talk about
what kind of role the racial stratification plays as a part of mechanisms of Yamato and
white supremacist racialized social systems that permeate Japanese privilege and
dominance in Japan.
231

In exploring how a Yamato supremacist system is reproduced in Japanese
participants’ discourses, I noticed that a primordial definition and construction of
“Japaneseness” plays a key role in maintaining the racial status quo in Japanese society.
Primordialism is a paradigm to define ethnicity. According to Geertz (1963),
primordialism holds the notion that an ethnic group in the present era can be defined with
a shared historic lineage to the past, and their collective belonging is based on “naturally”
given factors, including blood, race, language, and region. Such a construction of
“Japanese-ness” was apparent in Japanese participants’ self positioning in their discourses
on immigration/ foreign worker issues in Japan.
As various scholars contend, national, ethnic, and racial identities are conflated
in Japanese identity (e.g. Dikotter, 1997; Kinefuchi, 2009; Lie, 2003; Weiner, 1997). The
demographic data of this study illustrated the conflation. Out of 34 participants, 15 of
them answered their race is Yellow (or Mongoloid), while another 15 participants
answered that their race is Japanese. Only two of them identified their race as Asian.
Those who identified their race as Japanese, on the other hand, either identified their
ethnicity as Japanese also or answered “I don’t know.” Therefore, Japanese participants
of this study identified themselves racially through a mixture of nationality, ethnicity and
race. Among these three categories, I found Japanese as an ethnic identity, through
references to genetic ancestry, was significant in participants’ discourse, as other scholars
of Japanese identity argue (Kinefuchi, 2009; Weiner, 1997). I believe the emphasis on
ethnicity is a means of racialization of supposedly “race-less” Japan.
In chapter two, I delineated how the purposeful use of “minzoku (ethnicity)”
instead of “jinshu (race)” when defining Japanese as “Yamato minzoku” actually
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racialized Japanese nation and people in the era of imperialism. By employing an “ethnic”
label, Japanese constructed themselves as a different and genetically/physically superior
group compared to those in other Asian nations (Dikotter, 1997; Sato, 1997; Weiner,
1997; Young, 1997). Excluding themselves from membership as an Asian racial group
was useful to justify and rationalize Japanese colonization of East Asia in the early 20th
century. Although more than a century has passed since then, this study demonstrated that
participants’ discursive construction of “Japanese” still relied heavily on an ethnic
boundary. As can be seen in participants’ discourses, shared histories of insularity,
national borders, and language were prominent markers for their Japanese ethnic identity.
This way of identification achieved racial stratification endorsed by Yamato supremacist
social system and a white supremacist social system.
Compared to U.S. participants’ discourses, rather blatant discursive demarcation
of positive “us” and negative “Others” was observed in Japanese interpersonal discourses.
While Japanese people were constructed as “normal,” “standard” or a “more preferable
choice for employment,” foreigners in Japan were likely to be positioned as scary,
dangerous criminals or economic threats to the nation. Strikingly, participants of this
study admitted their biased attitudes toward foreigners, stating, “I know I’m prejudiced,
but….” I believe it is primordialism of “Japaneseness” that enabled dominant Japanese
members to openly position “Others” negatively while admitting their exclusive attitudes.
The primordial notion of Japanese-ness plays its ideological role and provides Japanese
people with historical storylines of the image of the Japanese nation as insular and a set
of secluded islands. As a result, Japanese were likely to admit their own exclusive
attitudes and agreed with institutional practices that bar non-Japanese, as if there was no
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choice or as if it was the way things are/the way things have always been. Since it is
created as “natural” for Japanese to be different from “Others,” social, political, economic,
and demographic disparities between Japanese and non-Japanese remain unquestioned
and Japanese people’s privileged positions are kept secure. In this way, the Yamato
supremacist social system can maintain itself.
This is how Japanese were put on the top of the racial hierarchy in Japanese
society through the structure of Yamato supremacist systems, but as demonstrated in
participants’ discourses, non-Japanese “Others” were also racially stratified in Japan. I
argue that the racial stratification of non-Japanese “Others” is influenced by global white
supremacist systems – whites were at the top of the status hierarchy over non-Japanese
groups, “Asians” except Japanese were next, and Middle Easterners and blacks were
positioned with lowest status.
The major purpose of Yamato supremacist system is to maintain Japanese
unearned privileged status in society. As long as there are racial “Others” in society,
Japanese-ness can be defined and secured. However, Japanese-ness is not limited to the
dichotomy of Japanese and non-Japanese. Construction of “Japanese” or “Japanese-ness”
also constructs “American-ness,” which is equalized to “whiteness” in Japanese society
(Kinefuchi, 2009).
Whites are generally positioned and perceived positively in Japanese society.
They are considered aesthetically and physically superior to Japanese (Darling-Wolf,
2003), and white people are often represented positively in Japanese media as desirable
and attractive (Fujimoto, 2002; Hagiwara, 2004; Lie, 2003). As this study demonstrated,
Whites and Americans were oftentimes equalized, and this is a common tendency among
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Japanese. Therefore, Japanese participants’ frequent references, mostly positive ones, to
Americans or the U.S., positioned “whites” positively as good “Others” or honored
guests in Japan. Such a construction of whiteness was then related to discursive
positioning of “Asians” and “blacks.”
Discursive construction of “Asians” seemed to be a platform where Yamato and
White supremacist systems were intertwined, in which speakers negotiated positioning
and hierarchy of different racial groups. The Yamato supremacist system allows Japanese
to separate themselves from “Asians,” who are both racial and economic others in a
race-less, class-less image of Japan (Fujimoto, 2002; Kinefuchi, 2009). In the current
study whites were constructed as Others, but superior to Asians. Also, blacks and Middle
Easterners, in this study, were discursively constructed as scary Others who were
positioned at the bottom of a racial hierarchy.
Such a racial ladder remains invisible and unchallenged in Japanese society, in
similar ways to exclusive and xenophobic immigration policies and laws related to
admission of foreign workers in Japan. As reviewed in chapter two, Japanese
governmental discourse and its highly exclusive practices, implicate the desire to
maintain racial purity in society in order for Japanese to maintain their privilege and
normativity. Xenophobic institutional discourses on immigration/foreign workers in
Japan were reproduced in Japanese everyday discourses and they were justified and
legitimated as “normal” practices in an insular nation.
Reproduction of Japanese institutional discourses in everyday discourses enabled
the maintenance of the Japanese racial status quo in a hegemonic way. The primordial
notion of “Japanese” erased race from society, and turned xenophobic immigration
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policies and practices into “natural” products in Japan. This was achieved by providing
discursive resources that emphasize shared histories of insularity, closed borders, and one
standard language, all of which constituted “Japanese-ness.” Thus, the primordial
construction of “Japanese” legitimated institutional practices that were reinforced by
racial purity and xenophobia. It also provided dominant members in Japan with
discursive resources that made possible for them to seclude themselves from other races,
as well as racially stratifying other racial groups with the concept of race kept invisible.
This is how the Japanese racialized social system sustains itself in a hegemonic way
through the dialectical relationship between Japanese institutional discourses and
everyday discourses. Pervasive construction of primordial Japanese ethnicity can be
considered as a type of racism in Japan, which serves the interests of racially dominant
Japanese in Japan (For a similar argument about South Africa, see Blommaert &
Verscheueren, 1996). Positioning of dominant members’ identity, therefore, is a
hegemonic process that sustains systemic racism, even in a nation defined as race-less
(Kinefuchi, 2009), and it is the interplay between institutional and interpersonal
discourses where ideologies, hegemony, and power relations are constructed (Halualani et
al. 2006).
Limitations
There are several limitations of this study. The first limitation is a lack of some
categories of cultural diversity among participants. Because I recruited participants of this
study in college classrooms in the U.S. and in Japan, most participants were university
students. Though some of them chose partners who were not college students,
participants were not diverse in terms of age, class, and profession. However, since my
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goal was to build critical understanding of dyadic discourses rather than generalizing to
wider populations, analyzing the comments from 62 respondents in 31 conversations is
certainly sufficient data for the critical discourse analysis.
The second limitation was the location of the study. In terms of the U.S. data,
location of the study and racial diversity therein might have influenced participants’
discourses. The area where I conducted this research is one of the states that has a
relatively high percentage of Latino residents and there is attention to immigration issues
given proximity to the U.S. –Mexico border. It is important to acknowledge that the U.S.
dyadic conversations occurred in this social and political context. Berg’s study (2009) on
White opinions toward unauthorized immigrants demonstrates that Whites who live in
areas with a higher percentage of Latinos tend to favor stricter restrictions against “illegal”
immigrants. Most participants of the U.S. portion of the study lived in a city where more
than half of population is Latino. Some participants mentioned in their conversations that
they knew immigrants who were working in the U.S. illegally. Such proximity and
familiarity that participants have with immigrants and immigration issues might have
affected how they perceived and constructed immigration in the U.S.
As well as the U.S. data, the selected location might also have had some effect
on Japanese discourses. The city in which this study was conducted is one of several big
metropolitan areas in Japan. However, compared to other cities, such as Tokyo or
Yokohama, the number of foreign residents is much smaller. Therefore, participants in
this study may have had less first-hand experiences of interaction with foreigners. In this
study, many Japanese participants constructed immigration/foreign worker issues as
something unfamiliar and distant; however, that might have been different if I had
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collected data in another city where people have more interactions with foreigners.
The third limitation is insufficient examples that showed intersecting aspects of
identities other than race, nationality, and socioeconomic class. I consider discursive
positioning as involving multiple cultural identity categories, including nationality, race,
ethnicity, socioeconomic class, religion, gender and others. The dyadic discourse revealed
positioning of self and others related to intersecting national identity and
immigrant/foreign worker status, and explicit as well as implicit references to race.
Additionally, socioeconomic class positioning was implicated generally through
discussions of types of jobs and status hierarchies based on income from the jobs.
However, there were few references that pointed to additional categories of age and
generation, and to sex. While the speaker’s sex was noted to see if males and females
views and repertoires differed; there was no evident difference between the responses of
male and female interactants. Since most of the participants identified cultural groups
positioned by each society with dominant status, I was not able to examine hybridity of
participants’ positioning, or contradictions that might have emerged across those
positioned as different based on ethnicity or generation.
Implications and Directions for Future Research
Including these limitations, the results of this study suggest several directions for
future research. First, more diversity among participants in each country is necessary to
further explore if and how different demographic factors including age, socioeconomic
class, and education level influence their discourse. It would be preferable to recruit
larger number of participants, especially those who are not college students. It may be
possible to add additional topics and views as well as add additional probes about
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demographic categories such as gender to the three positions on immigration/admission
of foreign workers. For example, in the U.S., adding information on the topics of “anchor
babies” to spark conversation on gender, or the topic of the Dream Act to spark
conversation on age and student status, might prove useful.
Secondly, it would be helpful to collect discourses in different states and regions.
In Japan, for instance, individuals who have more chance of interacting with members of
different racial groups on a daily basis may participate in discursive reproduction of
racialized social systems in different ways from those who are not living in diverse
communities. Frequency of contact with different racial groups could be added to a list of
demographic questions or as one of the discussion questions.
The result of this study also made me curious about the role played by
subordinate racial groups in each country in terms of discursive reproduction of and
resistance to racialized social systems. Consider the Japanese “support project” that
deports Nikkeijin workers; hegemony is maintained because hegemonic discourses sound
like serving racially subordinate groups’ interests; while they actually serve dominant
members’ interests. To maintain hegemony, consent from subordinates is necessary
(Gramsci, 1971). In order to prove scholars’ arguments that racially subjugated group
members reproduce discourses of white domination (e.g. Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Woodson,
1990), it is necessary to obtain non-dominant group members’ discourse on the same
issue, i.e. immigration/foreign workers. I did not include non-dominant members’ dyadic
discourses in this particular study, because it was out of the scope of the study. To extend
and make more profound arguments on the hegemonic nature of discursive reproduction
of systemic racism through interpretative repertoires and positioning of “self” and
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“Others,” I could analyze non-dominant members’ discourses on immigration/ foreign
workers in a future study.
Another implication of the current study is the need for successive studies on
racialized discourses on immigration/ foreign workers in each respective country.
Juxtaposing analyses of U.S. and Japanese immigration discourses revealed that different
historical and sociopolitical contexts set a stage for different discursive practices to
maintain racialized social systems of domination. Histories of race-relations in the U.S.
also illustrate that when racial dynamics change, different racial ideologies are created to
provide particular discursive resources to maintain white dominance and privilege (Flores,
2003). Therefore, given the rapidly changing immigration politics and racial dynamics in
both nations due to globalization, it is important to track construction and reproduction of
systemic racism and changes over time.
With regard to theoretical and methodological implications of the study, the use
of discursive psychology in general, and the focus on interpretative repertoires and
relative positioning of self and other in particular, offer promise for scholars committed to
integrating interpretive and critical approaches to intercultural communication research.
The emergence of critical intercultural communication (Halualani et al., 2006) as an area
of research of culture and communication also could benefit from more attention to
everyday discourses through which group positioning and hierarchies, along with
ideologies, are constructed. Finally, the results of the current study demonstrated the
value of approaching discourses on immigration as a site through which salient
national/racial/ethnic cultural identities are negotiated (Collier, 1998; 2005) in the context
of broader discourses of privileged citizen and immigrant (Other) relationships.
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The final implication of this study is an educational one. I believe this study can
make a contribution to academic discourse in the field of intercultural communication by
demonstrating the significance of examining the interplay between institutional
discourses and interpersonal everyday discourses as a site of challenging and
reconstructing dominant ideologies and racial status quo in the U.S. and in Japan.
However, it does not fully achieve what the critical paradigm is aiming for, which is
social change. Analyzing people’s discourse on immigration per se does not increase
awareness of the realities of race-relations in the U.S. and Japan, nor lead to
race-conscious practices. What is necessary to contribute to social change is to provide
alternative discursive resources that challenge and resist the racial status quo, and I
believe intercultural communication education and research can be the means to fulfill
this task.
This idea came to my mind when I reviewed Japanese participants’ comments.
One person referred to the term “ethnocentrism,” which is barely known to most Japanese
people, and her discussion partner said that they just learned the concept in their
intercultural communication class. Various institutions, including educational ones, have
constructed dominant racial ideologies and that facilitate the maintenance of racial status
quo, which means Japanese invisibility and privilege in Japan. However, I believe
educational institutions can be the sites where students are taught to recognize their
multiple positions and levels of privilege and marginalization, are taught to recognize the
work of various “isms” and storylines, and are provided with or share discursive
resources that challenge inequality and domination. Advancing alternative and
transformative interpretative repertoires will require that those positioned into positions
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of dominance and privilege engage in self-reflexivity about their positioning. This is the
first step of what instructors and trainers utilizing critical pedagogy call, “praxis” – the
dialogic process in which social agents de/reconstruct invisible social systems of
oppression with critical reflection about self-positioning (Freire, 1973, Giroux, 1983).
Though critical pedagogy was originally designed to enable subordinate social group
members to enact social change (Freire, 1973), I believe it could be expanded to include
those positioned into both dominant and subordinate locations as some scholars argue
(e.g. Allen, 2004; Allen & Rossatto, 2009). In so doing, dominant members become
aware of their positions and unearned privilege, and they can gain a “language of
criticism” which is necessary to critically restructure oppressive society and create a
“language of possibility” which allows dominant members to participate in social change
(Giroux, 1983).
Although the number was small, some participants’ comments exemplified the
power of the “language of criticism” (Giroux, 1983). As this study demonstrated, dyadic
discourses are as powerful as institutional discourses in maintaining the systems.
Everyday interpersonal discourses equipped with transformative interpretative repertoires,
then, can be a strong means for social change. This study reminds me that researchers and
educators in intercultural communication have opportunities to make their research and
classroom into sites to invite and share alternative, resisting discursive repertoires.

Footnotes
1

MHLW(2009, March) states that “under the current social and economic

circumstance, it is quite difficult for Nikkeijin workers with unstable
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employment status, such as those on temporary status, to find another job once
they are unemployed because of their lack of Japanese language fluency and
their unfamiliarity with Japanese employment practices, as well as their
insufficient working experiences in our country” (Translated by the author).
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Appendix A
Instructions for Discussion
Steps to Follow:
1. Please select a friend/ classmate/ family member/ partner, who is older than 18 years
old and identifies herself/himself with the same racial group or category that you
identify yourself with. She or he needs to be someone with whom you feel
comfortable talking about the issue of immigration/foreign workers in the U.S.
2. Meet with your conversation partner in a quiet location where you can audiotape your
conversation. The conversation will take approximately 30-60 minutes.
3. Each of you please read and sign the consent form provided.
4. Make sure there is an audiotape inside the tape recorder, you are at the beginning of
the blank audiotape, and test the volume and recording performance.
5. Turn on the tape recorder and first say your name so that I can distinguish your voice.
6. Follow the instructions for your conversation provided below.
7. When you finish your conversation, stop recording and fill out the demographic
survey.
8. Bring the signed consent form, demographic survey, tape-recorder, and audio tape to
your instructor by the assigned date. Remember you will receive credit for this
assignment ONLY when you turn in the signed consent forms, completed
demographic surveys, tape recorder, and audio tape with a completed conversation.
Instructions for Discussion of Topics:
* First, please record your name so that I can distinguish your voice.
Please read the following statements and then discuss the issue of immigration/foreign
workers with your partner. Suggested questions to answer during your conversation are
listed below, but you are welcome to add your own questions and comments and talk
about whatever you wish.
Please remember that you are not expected to reach agreement or consensus. The idea is
for both of you to talk about your views. You may have similar or different opinions
about immigration/foreign worker issues.
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Appendix A, continued
U.S. Discussion Questions
Currently, the U.S. is facing one of the biggest waves of immigration since records of
immigration were kept in 1820. Currently, the population of foreign-born residents in the
U.S. corresponds with 12% of the entire population of the U.S.
I.

Immigrants are harmful to the U.S. They take jobs away from U.S. citizens,
and illegal immigrants exploit our welfare, healthcare, and educational
systems without paying taxes. Also, when there are high numbers of
immigrants, the crime rate often goes up and cities become overpopulated.
High numbers of immigrants may threaten our traditional American values
because most do not learn to speak English and they do not want to assimilate
to the U.S. culture or lifestyle.

II.

Immigrants contribute in many positive ways. The U.S. has a long history of
opening its doors to immigrants. They help our economy by taking jobs that
many U.S. citizens are unwilling to do, and they provide a much needed labor
force in U.S. companies and in the field of agriculture. Many immigrants have
knowledge and specialized training that is needed in fields like higher
education. Immigrants also help the U.S. participate more effectively in a
global economy and add to valued diversity in our country.

III.

Immigrants are both good and bad; it depends on what they contribute to the
country. Legal immigrants who learn English and make efforts to adjust to
U.S. culture and lifestyle might be able to contribute in a positive way. Our
economy can’t support too many immigrants though, so it would be best for
the country if only the most qualified, in small numbers, were allowed into the
country.

Discussion Questions
1. Which statement, if any, do you identify more with? Why?
2. What values, beliefs, or past experiences influence your position on this issue?
3. What are the most important factors to consider when discussing immigration in the
U.S.? These might include: financial needs, economic issues, political factors, labor
market, environment, race, ethnicity, culture, life style, illegality, crime, personal
safety, border security, etc.
4. When you look at the other statements and views that you didn’t select, are there
any aspects of the other views that you might see as valid? Please explain.
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Appendix B
Japanese Discussion Questions [Translated in English by the author]
Instructions for Discussion
Steps to Follow:
1. Please select a friend/ classmate/ family member/ partner, who is older than 18 years
old and identifies herself/himself as Japanese. She or he needs to be someone with
whom you feel comfortable talking about the issue of immigration/foreign workers in
Japan.
2. Meet with your conversation partner in a quiet location where you can audiotape your
conversation. The conversation will take approximately 30-60 minutes.
3. Each of you please read and sign the consent form provided.
4. Make sure there is an audiotape inside the tape recorder, you are at the beginning of
the blank audiotape, and test the volume and recording performance.
5. Turn on the tape recorder and first say your name so that I can distinguish your voice.
6. Follow the instructions for your conversation provided below.
7. When you finish your conversation, stop recording and fill out the demographic
survey.
8. Bring the signed consent form, demographic survey, tape-recorder, and audio tape to
your instructor by the assigned date. Remember you will receive credit for this
assignment ONLY when you turn in the signed consent forms, completed
demographic surveys, tape recorder, and audio tape with a completed conversation.
Instructions for Discussion of Topics:
* First, please record your name so that I can distinguish your voice.
Please read the following statements and then discuss the issue of immigration/foreign
workers with your partner. Suggested questions to answer during your conversation are
listed below, but you are welcome to add your own questions and comments and talk
about whatever you wish.
Please remember that you are not expected to reach agreement or consensus. The idea is
for both of you to talk about your views. You may have similar or different opinions
about immigration/foreign worker issues.
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Appendix B continued
Immigration Bureau of Japan reported in 2006 that 2,011,555 foreign residents are currently
registered. It corresponds with 1.57% of the entire population of Japan. Most foreign workers
residing in Japan can be categorized into one of the following categories: Zainich foreigners,
Nikkeijin, trainees, entertainers, professional/technical laborers, or illegal workers.

I.

We have been facing various issues due to the recent increase of foreign
workers in Japan. For example, the increasing cases of theft, robbery, assaults,
homicide, over-staying, illegal labor, and false marriage are noticeable. Also,
employing low-skill cheap labor force from foreign countries may lead an
increasing number of unemployed in Japan. Given these issues, Japanese
government should set a limit on the number of foreign workers to protect the
Japanese nation and its citizens.

II.

Due to the low birth rate and aging population in Japan, the demand for young
labor force has been rising. Immigrants and foreign workers play an important
role to support Japanese economy by filling the void and they also accelerate
internationalization of the country. For example, foreign workers are
absolutely necessary in areas lacking in the labor force such as nursing care.
Also in academic or technical fields, fruitful and successful international
exchange can be achieved by inviting skilled people including engineers,
instructors, or foreign students to work together. In order to achieve national
advancement and internationalization, Japanese government should
implement policies that facilitate the admission process of foreign workers.

III.

Though Japan should not accept an unlimited number of immigrants and
foreign workers, we should actively accept foreign workers with knowledge,
talent and skills that our nation needs. In order to achieve that, Japan should
reconsider the treatment of foreign workers: They should not be regarded as
merely unskilled labor force but should be eligible for some protection, such
as Minimum Wage Act, Labor Standard Act, and labor insurance. In addition,
Japanese government should implement stricter policies to punish Japanese
companies that hire illegal immigrants, in order to reduce the number of
illegal workers and illegal residents.

Discussion Questions
1. Which statement, if any, do you identify more with? Why?
2. What values, beliefs, or past experiences influence your position on this issue?
3. What are the most important factors to consider when discussing immigration in
the U.S.? These might include: financial needs, economic issues, political factors,
labor market, environment, race, ethnicity, culture, life style, illegality, crime,
personal safety, border security, etc.
4. When you look at the other statements and views that you didn’t select, are there
any aspects of the other views that you might see as valid? Please explain.
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Appendix C
Demographic Survey
1.

Your age:

2.

Your Gender (Please check)
Female ______
Male _______

3.

Your conversation partner is your: (Please circle)
Best friend
Friend
Classmate
Romantic partner (boyfriend/girlfriend)
Spouse
Sibling (brother/ sister)
Parent
Child
Other family members
Co-worker
Other (please indicate)

years old

4. If your conversation partner is NOT your family member, how long have you known
her/him?
year(s)
month(s)
5.

Your background information: (Please describe.)
a. Labels you prefer for your race(s)

b. Labels you prefer for your ethnic background(s)

c. Labels you prefer for your religious belief(s)

d. Your householder’s occupation

e. To which annual income bracket does your family belong: (Please circle)
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Less than $30,000
$ 30,001- 40,000
$ 40,001- 50,000
$ 50,001- 60,000
$ 60,001- 70,000
More than $70,000
f. Educational level: (Please circle)
High school student
Undergraduate student
Graduate student (Master/ Doctorate)
Other (please indicate)

Please leave your email or contact information below if you would like to receive a copy
of the transcription. Thank you for your input and cooperation.
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Appendix D
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Chie Torigoe, from the
Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of New Mexico. The
results of this study will contribute to her dissertation project, titled “Immigration
discourses in the U.S. and in Japan.” You were identified as a possible volunteer in
the study because you identify yourself as a white U.S. American citizen, who is older
than 18 years old.

•

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY: This study investigates how people talk about
immigration/foreign worker issues in the U.S. and in Japan by analyzing interpersonal
dyadic conversations about the issues. More specifically, this study attempts 1) to
establish the connection between political/institutional/public discourses and
interpersonal everyday discourses about immigration; 2) to investigate what kinds of
themes and factors commonly emerge in interpersonal dyadic conversations about
immigration; and 3) to examine how people position themselves and immigrants in
their dyadic conversation about immigration.

•

PROCEDURES AND ACTIVITIES
If you choose to participate in this study, first, you will be asked to select a
conversation partner who also identifies herself/himself as a white U.S. American.
She or he needs to be someone with whom you feel comfortable talking about the
issue of immigration in the U.S.
You and your partner will choose a quiet location where you can talk and audiotape
your conversation. Noisy places such as a crowded cafeteria or a café that plays
music loud should be avoided. You will be asked to discuss the issue of immigration
in the U.S. with your partner based on the three brief statements and suggested
discussion questions on the sheet provided in class with this consent form. The
conversation will take approximately 30-60 minutes. When you finish your
conversation, each of you will be asked to complete a demographic survey.
If you choose to participate in this study, you will receive extra-credit as outlined by
your instructor. You may choose not to participate without any penalty whatsoever;
your instructor will provide alternative options for extra credit.

•

POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
The risks to participants in this study are minimal. You may feel some degree of
discomfort in sharing your views and opinions about immigration issues due to the
political and social aspects of this issue. However, you can skip any questions
provided when you feel uncomfortable, or withdraw from the study at any time
without any penalty. Your responses will only be used for academic purposes, and
your responses will be kept strictly confidential.

•

POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
250

There are at least two benefits of this study. You will have the opportunity to reflect
on the world-wide issue of immigration/foreign workers through your participation in
this study. By sharing your views regarding immigration/foreign workers with your
conversation partner, you may be able to learn more about the issues of immigration.
Additionally, discussion and sharing your opinions may enhance your understanding
of your conversation partner’s views.
•

CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified
with you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or
as required by law. All your responses will be confidential. To secure your privacy, I
will be the only one who is allowed access to the tape-recordings and interview
transcripts. The data will be kept in a locked cabinet in my locked office. In writing
up the findings, pseudonyms will be used and all identifying information will be
deleted. Once the transcriptions are completed, the audio tapes of your conversation
will be destroyed by cutting the magnetic ribbons of the tape.

•

PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You can choose whether to participate in this study or not. If you volunteer to
participate, you may withdraw at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to
which you might otherwise be entitled. When you begin your discussion, you may
also refuse to answer any questions you do not want to answer and still remain in the
study.

•

IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATORS AND REVIEW BOARD
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact:
Chie Torigoe, Ph.D.student
University of New Mexico
Department of Communication and
Journalism
MSC03 2240
Albuquerque, NM 87131
ctorigoe@unm.edu
Office: 505-277-2106

Dr. Mary Jane Collier, Faculty
University of New Mexico
Department of Communication and
Journalism
MSC03 2240
Albuquerque, NM 87131
mjc@unm.edu
Office: 505-277-5305

If you have other concerns or complaints, contact the Institutional Review Board at
the University of New Mexico, 1717 Roma NE, Room 205, Albuquerque, NM 87131,
(505) 277-2257, or toll free at 1-866-844-9018.
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SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT
I understand the procedures described above. My questions have been answered to
my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. I understand that the
discussion with my conversation partner will be tape-recorded. I have been
provided a copy of this form.

Name of Participant

(please print)

Signature of Participant

Date

SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR
In my judgment the participant is voluntarily and knowingly providing informed
consent and possesses the legal capacity to give informed consent to participate in
this research study

Name of Investigator or Designee

Signature of Investigator or Designee

Date
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Table 1.
Demographic Information of U.S. Participants
Name
Sex Age Rel. Type Race

Ethnicity

Religion

Income*

Agnostic

6

-

-

Roman
Catholic
Roman
Catholic
Spiritual/
Christian
Episcopal
ian/
Christian
Jewish

6

Tricia

F

23

Parent

White

Tom

M

-

Child

White

American/
German
German

Illiana

F

19

Parent

White

White/Hispanic

Peter

M

53

Child

White

White/Hispanic

Alice

F

22

Best friend

Caucasian

Caucasian

Jack

M

24

Friend

Caucasian/
White

Caucasian

Amanda

F

20

F

22

Caucasian/
White
Caucasian/
White

Russian/British

Rachel

Romantic
partner
Romantic
Partner

Allen

M

20

Friend

Ed

M

20

Friend

German
Italian
Caucasian
White

Kathy

F

18

Classmate

Brittney

F

18

Classmate

Teresa

F

68

Mary

F

18

Brandon

M

42

Grand
daughter to
be
Boyfriend’ White
s
grandmoth
er
Friend
Caucasian

Jake

M

23

Friend

Caucasian/
White
White/
Caucasian
Caucasian

Caucasian
253

German/ Italian

American,
German
American

Non
denomina
tional
Independ
ently
spiritual
-

6
3
5

1
1

6

-

French/ Russian

Not
affiliated
Non-affili
ated
Jewish

-

Polish/ Russian

Agnostic

1

-

Atheist

6

-

Agnostic

-

American

2

Betty

F

18

Best friend

White/
Spanish
White

Czech/ Spanish

Catholic

-

Steve

M

22

Best friend

Irish

Catholic

-

Meg

F

29

Anglo

American

Agnostic

3

Caucasian

American

Agnostic

-

24

Romantic
partner
Romantic
partner
Best friend

Cecilia

F

27

Judy

F

Caucasian

No preference

Atheist

1

Damon

M

25

Best friend

Anglo

American

1

Victor

M

21

Best friend

White

Italian

Non-relig
ious
Catholic

6

Sarah

F

21

Best friend

Caucasian

Irish/ Scottish

Christian

6

Cody

M

23

White

White

Christian

2

Julie

F

23

White

Caucasian

Christian

6

Nancy

F

19

Family
member
Family
member
Parent

White

Irish, Dutch,
Christian 3
Indian
Sonia
F
55
Child
White
Irish, Dutch,
Christian 3
Indian, German
* Less than $30,000=1, $30, 001-40,000=2, $40,001-50,000=3, $50,001-60,000=4,
$60,001-70,000=5, More than $70,001=6
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Table 2.
Demographic Information of Japanese Participants
Name
Sex Age Rel. Type
Race

Ethnicity

Religion

Income*

Akiko

F

20

Classmate

Yellow

Japanese

Buddhist

2

Ai

F

21

Classmate

Yellow

Japanese

Shintoist

2

Keiko

F

20

Best friend

Japanese

Don’t know

3

Saki

F

20

Best friend

Japanese

Don’t know

Reiko

F

20

Best friend

Japanese

4

Erika

F

20

Best friend

Japanese

Atheist

3

Yuko

F

18

Friend

Yellow/
Mongoloid
Yellow/
Mongoloid
Yellow

Nothing
special
Nothing
special
none

Japanese

Buddhist

-

Rika

F

18

Friend

Yellow

Japanese

Buddhist

-

Yukie

F

18

Friend

Yellow

Japanese

None

3

Chika

F

18

Friend

Yellow

Japanese

Yuri

F

18

Yellow

Japanese

Yusuke

M

19

Yellow

Japanese

-

-

Keisuke

M

20

Romantic
partner
Romantic
partner
Classmate

Jyodo-Sh 2
inshu
-

Japanese

-

Buddhist

2-3

Kengo

M

20

Classmate

Japanese

-

Buddhist

4

Yuta

M

20

Acquainta
nce

Japanese

Japanese

Shogo

M

21

Japanese

Japanese

Shiho

F

21

Acquainta
nce
Best friend

Family is 4
Jyodo-Sh
inshu,
but I’m
not
religious
None
4

-

Japanese

Buddhist
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3

6

Haruka

F

20

Best friend

-

-

-

6

Miho

F

20

Asian

Japanese

Atheist

-

Mariko

F

20

Asian

Japanese

Atheist

2

Yumiko

F

21

Friend/
classmate
Friend/
classmate
Classmate

Japanese

Japanese

-

-

Hiroko

F

21

Classmate

Japanese

Japanese

-

-

Sora

F

19

Parent

Yellow

Japanese

Atheist

-

Kyoko

F

39

Child

Japanese

-

Buddhist

-

Yusaku

M

22

Friend

Japanese

-

Buddhist

-

Kenta

M

23

Classmate

Japanese

-

Mana

F

21

Classmate

Yellow

Japanese

Nothing special,
but my
family is
Buddhist
Buddhist -

Misato

F

21

Classmate

Yellow

Japanese

Buddhist

-

Kimi

F

21

Classmate

Yellow

Japanese

None

6

Chisato

F

21

Classmate

Yellow

Japanese

-

6

Takeru

M

21

Friend

Japanese

Japanese

Shintoist

5

Megumi

F

23

Friend

Japanese

Japanese

Buddhist

5

Fumio

M

21

Classmate

Japanese

Japanese

-

-

Kenji

M

21

Classmate

Japanese

Japanese

-

-

* Less than ¥3,000,000=1, ¥3,000,001-4,000,000=2, ¥4,000,001-5,000,000=3,
¥5,000,001-6,000,000=4, ¥6,000,001-7,000,000=5, More than ¥7,000,001=6
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